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I take it Sam's post was conveniently ignored?

From the Washington Post reference in Sam’s post, dated January 10, 2007:
Pentagon insiders say members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have long opposed the increase in troops and are only grudgingly going along with the plan because they have been promised that the military escalation will be matched by renewed political and economic efforts in Iraq. Gen. John P. Abizaid, the outgoing head of Central Command, said less than two months ago that adding U.S. troops was not the answer for Iraq. From General J.P.Abizaid’s Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony (under oath), November 15, 2006: http://armed-services.senate.gov/sta...2010-15-06.pdf :
In discussions with our commanders and Iraqi leaders it is clear that they believe Iraqi
forces can take more control faster, provided we invest more manpower and resources into the coalition military transition teams, speed the delivery of logistics and mobility enablers, and embrace an aggressive Iraqi-led effort to disarm illegal militias. This is particularly important with regard to the Jaysh al Mahdi elements operating as armed death squads in Baghdad and elsewhere. As we increase our efforts to build Iraqi capacity, we envision coalition forces providing needed military support and combat power to Iraqi units in the lead. Precisely how we do this continues to be worked out with the Iraqis as ultimately capable independent Iraqi forces, loyal to an equally capable independent Iraqi government, will set the conditions for the withdrawal of our major combat forces. From the NPR reference in Sam’s post, dated December 6, 2006:
The Iraq Study Group's other major recommendation is a change in the focus of U.S. military operations in Iraq. The reports says U.S. troops should transition to a support role, with the Iraqi army taking "over primary responsibility for combat operations." Indeed, that is one of the recommendations. However they recommend that multiple non-exclusive approaches are required for success. These approaches include diplomatic, Iraqi international support, intelligence, internationl, and military. From the Iraq Study Group report: http://www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/i...p_findings.pdf
II. The Way Forward – A New Approach
B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves
3. Security and Military Forces
A Military Strategy for Iraq
There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can bring about success in Iraq….
While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units….
One of the most important elements of our support would be the imbedding of substantially more U.S. military personnel in all Iraqi Army battalions and brigades, as well as within Iraqi companies….
Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and to our ongoing fight against Al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence is intended to be a long-term “occupation.” We could, however, support a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be effective. We also reject the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we believe that so much is at stake.