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Originally posted by chegitz guevara
What PoMos argue is that you can know nothing of the objective. I smell empiricist BS.

PoMo stands in opposition to modernist metanarrative.
So, yes, they would mostly observe that the 'objective' is 'unknown' except within the terms of a given n"ar"r`at'i"ve.
I happen to think that's a perfectly reasonable observation.

Now Quine is certainly no PoMo. But he makes much the same observation.
The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all. My countersuggestion, issuing essentially from Carnap's doctrine of the physical world in the Aufbau, is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body

And PoMo is less fatalistic than you make it out to be. It poses the question "How can we speak meaningfully about xyz if there is no final appeal to an absolute code of knowledge?"
So knowledge of the objective is a matter for inquiry. Not some discarded impossibility.