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Link Operation Parakram Revisited The author Major General (Retd) PJS Sandhu was the Chief of Staff of a Strike Corps during Operation Parakram

Yet, there were indicators below the surface which were pointing otherwise. These can be listed as (a) The BSF units deployed along the international border and those earmarked for operational duty had not been placed under the operational control of the Army immediately on mobilisation, as the Union War Book requires. This measure was taken at a belated stage. (b) The mobilisation of ad hoc units was half-hearted and slow which indicated that we were not preparing for war. (c) The railways did not accord the requisite priority to the movement of military special trains. As a result, our strategic reserves took much longer to reach their destinations than planned. (d) There was no re-orientation of the industry or boosting up of production by the Ordnance factories to make up our inventories of war materials. The Army continued to function with shortages. (e) The civil transport required by the Army to move and to make up the deficiencies of the integral military transport was hired and not impressed (requisitioned for service with the Army) into service. Hiring of transport is a tardy and time-consuming process at the best of times. (f) The railways acted with great sense of urgency. However, since no civilian trains were cancelled the military special trains took longer to be marshalled to reach their destinations. This explains the criticism that the mobilisation took inordinately longer than planned. (g) Above all, neither was a â??state of emergencyâ?? declared, nor were the provisions of the Union War Book invoked. As a result, various ministries did not orient their functioning towards the war effort.

We not only allowed the Gujarat riots to occur during 2002 and continue for a number of days but diverted our army formations from the trenches to deal with them. The troops were up-stuck from their deployment areas and flown to quell the riots. Naturally, the adversary would know that we were not serious (about waging war), even if the rest of the Army remained deployed on the border. No sooner was the sordid affair over, there was a fresh crisis in Ayodhya with the government acting as the silent spectator. Again there were demands to send in troops, albeit even from scanty and adhoc rear parties to assist in controlling the situation. Mercifully, this time the Army resisted any such move and no formations from the border were diverted, nor were the rear parties deployed to control the situation. Pakistan would have watched these developments from across the border with relief.

No wonder, from March 2002 onwards, there was a noticeable change in Pakistanâ??s responses to our continued mobilisation. Its strategic reserves moved out of their deployment areas to the cantonments or to training areas and never returned. Even the manning levels at the border were reduced, especially theatre reserves. Obviously, Pakistan had concluded that we posed no threat; yet we were to remain deployed for another six months. Our Prime Minister while addressing troops in a forward area in J&K exhorted them by calling the forthcoming battle â??Aar Par Ki Ladhaiâ??. The same evening while talking to the media in Srinagar, he said that when he looked up he did not see any war clouds - or words to that effect. This left those of us deployed for war wondering as to what was the real intention. Such talk was demoralising, to say the least.

We had played out our last card and were left with no further option. This became amply clear, after the Kaluchak massacre in which the terrorists from across the border struck at the families of the defence personnel. Our deployment could neither deter such an outrage, nor could we respond in a punitive manner. By June 2002 we were quite sure that there was no possibility of war and that our continued stay at the border and in our deployment areas was futile. Perhaps, we had no exit route to save face. This was the most trying period for the commanders and the troops. Depending upon the circumstances, the formations started organising rest and recreation as best as they could but the weather continued to take a toll of the equipment which was subjected to the elements.



It was finally in October that the National Security Advisory Board came to the rescue of the Government by recommending â??strategic relocationâ?? of formations with a view to be able to respond to any threat. In fact, it was a move back to the permanent locations but for some obscure reason, we were averse to calling it that. There was an interesting side to it. Soon after â??strategic relocationâ??, (move back to permanent locations), we referred our claims to the Controllers of Defence Accounts. They turned these claims down saying that the government orders to move back to our permanent location had not been issued; as such the claims could not be processed. On taking up the matter through staff channels, such orders were later issued. I do not know about Pakistan, but at least our financial wizards were not fooled by this â??strategic relocationâ?? plan.

What was the Grand Strategy?

It seems that from the very beginning the mobilisation was ordered to support coercive diplomacy. Initially, it carried credibility and Pakistan was badly shaken. They imagined that the â??pot was about to boil overâ??. President Musharrafâ??s speech on TV around January 8, 2002 bears testimony to that. India had the initiative. However, by the end of February 2002, we were no longer in control of the situation and the credibility of our intent had started slipping. The HQ 2 Corps episode resulting in the removal of the Corps Commander further eroded the credibility of our intent. To this day, it is widely believed that this was done under American pressure. Their satellite surveillance had picked up move of 2 Corps elements dangerously close to the border and that Pakistan had raised the alarm. In retrospect, it seems that the difference between coercive diplomacy and full scale mobilisation of the military was not appreciated by the political leadership.

The Army maintains that the mobilisation gave ample opportunity to the formations to train for war. To some extent, it is correct. However, at the same time our moves and dispositions did to a great extent compromise the security of our operational plans. The effect on morale and credibility of commanders (in the eyes of the troops) was considerably impacted. After some time, it became difficult to explain to the troops as to why we were still there. We had laid extensive minefields in consonance with our operational plans. These mines caused many casualties to the civilian population as also to the troops involved in laying and lifting of these mines. The mines once laid had to be replaced from Ordnance factories and this meant time and money. The Army Engineers and even Infantry personnel suffered many casualties during demining, a process which continued for many more months. The civilian population too suffered losses as mined areas could not be sown or harvested for at least 2-3 seasons. The overall financial impact on the defence budget and to the nation was considerable but the returns were not commensurate with the effort. Did we manage to coerce Pakistan to end its support to militancy and waging of proxy war? The answer to this vital question, I am afraid, is in the negative. It was business as usual. The terrorist strike at Mumbai on 26 November 2008 is a stark example of that.