General Discussion Undecided where to post - do it here. |
Reply to Thread New Thread |
![]() |
#21 |
|
Hopkins is a developing country?
It's in Baltimore, isn't it? You should expect a free download if you are a subscriber, a corporate associate of the NBER, a journalist,a site with your domain name in ".GOV" , or a resident of nearly any developing country or transition economy. http://www.nber.org/papers/expecting/w6304 |
![]() |
![]() |
#22 |
|
|
![]() |
![]() |
#24 |
|
One point with the patent buyout option. It would reward big corporations more than small ones, as the big ones could hold out more while the small ones not sure of success would be more likely to sell the patent.
Errr...yes, for a fixed dollar amount smaller competitors have to be more risk averse. But that's always true for everything. |
![]() |
![]() |
#25 |
|
One point with the patent buyout option. It would reward big corporations more than small ones, as the big ones could hold out more while the small ones not sure of success would be more likely to sell the patent. |
![]() |
![]() |
#26 |
|
Good! There is less of a loss from a big corporation holding a patent to itself than a small one, because the big corporation likely has a much larger pool of other patents to draw on, with which it can combine the new one to create a new product. It also probably has more resources to market and sell the new product. b) I don't see that it's obvious from an overall efficiency point of view that we want a large company holding a patent rather than a small company, ceteris parebus. The small company might be more inclined to widely license its patent, for example c) Most of the time we DON'T WANT people holding patents. Patents suck. That's the whole idea.... |
![]() |
![]() |
#27 |
|
a) This isn't what Jon was talking about Yes, but my point was that they also have different risk-neutral valuations. b) I don't see that it's obvious from an overall efficiency point of view that we want a large company holding a patent rather than a small company, ceteris parebus. The small company might be more inclined to widely license its patent, for example If the smaller company were inclined to license its patent then it would be perfectly happy to sell to the government, because its expected license revenues would be a floor on whatever bids it got for the patent. c) Most of the time we DON'T WANT people holding patents. Patents suck. That's the whole idea.... Yes, but IF someone is going to hold a patent, we want them to be as large as possible so their patent is combinable with as many other patents as possible. |
![]() |
![]() |
#28 |
|
If the smaller company were inclined to license its patent then it would be perfectly happy to sell to the government, because its expected license revenues would be a floor on whatever bids it got for the patent.
Not necessarily. Not all producers are equal, Kuci. Some might know the potential market better than others. By the way, I'd assume that most of the time the patent holder would be willing to sell, given the size of the multiplier being proposed (say, 2), so this is a moot point... |
![]() |
![]() |
#29 |
|
Yes, but IF someone is going to hold a patent, we want them to be as large as possible so their patent is combinable with as many other patents as possible.
If somebody's going to hold a patent we want it to go to the person who will produce the highest social benefit with it. This may or may not be related to the privately-appropriable benefit they can derive from it and even more speculatively may or may not have anything to do with their risk-aversion... |
![]() |
![]() |
#31 |
|
The competition comment is based on the idea that there is a market for patents. Some decide to sit on them, some decide to license them, some decide to use them themselves.
If we want to create a government program that is buying up a significant portion of the 'worthwhile' patents, then this will obviously include a major new competitor in the market for patents. A big benefit of the government versus corporations is that the corporations are trying to maximize profit, while the government's goal would be to maximize national growth (which relates to national income). I was thinking a fee for use for corporations which do less than a certain amount of business within the country or some other such metric or a licensing fee for the property outside of the counrty or something. Otherwise other countries wouldn't have a large insentive to start buying patents themselves, rather they will just let the richest government (ours) do it. JM |
![]() |
![]() |
#32 |
|
My statement was that the patents of large companies would cost more, which would mean that the government would be less likely to buy one (if both patents provided the same benifit to society).
Due to the research that takes place in large companies, this is a negative of the system (it would work better if most research companies were small companies). I didn't care whether it was 'mean' to the small corporations or not. JM |
![]() |
![]() |
#33 |
|
I was thinking a fee for use for corporations which do less than a certain amount of business within the country or some other such metric or a licensing fee for the property outside of the counrty or something. Otherwise other countries wouldn't have a large insentive to start buying patents themselves, rather they will just let the richest government (ours) do it.
Jon, there's no reason to believe that countries couldn't collaborate on this. The US gov't would be the patent holder (on the international stage) of any patents it bought. If other countries didn't want to buy into the auction system they would still be bound by respect for the ownership of the patent (assuming they are bound by int'l patents today and aren't simply pirating everything) and, users of the patent in these countries would have to pay for licensing fees. |
![]() |
![]() |
#34 |
|
which would mean that the government would be less likely to buy one (if both patents provided the same benifit to society)
Errr...did you even read what I wrote, Jon? The government buys ALL PATENTS WITH THE SAME FREQUENCY (it pulls random numbers out of a hat to decide which patents to buy). EDIT: all patents for which the owner accepts the sum (M * highest bid), that is |
![]() |
![]() |
#35 |
|
which would mean that the government would be less likely to buy one (if both patents provided the same benifit to society) The government buys ALL PATENTS WITH THE SAME FREQUENCY (it pulls random numbers out of a hat to decide which patents to buy) I was talking about my solution which is a bit different than your solution. I didn't actually read your solution. JM |
![]() |
![]() |
#36 |
|
|
![]() |
![]() |
#37 |
|
Due to the research that takes place in large companies, this is a negative of the system (it would work better if most research companies were small companies). Based on your response to me, I thought we were talking about the same system but I see that I should have read your earlier posts first. My bad on that. JM |
![]() |
Reply to Thread New Thread |
Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 2 (0 members and 2 guests) | |
|