[Peptobismol]

STRATFOR INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Intelligence Points to Militant Action in Saudi Arabia

Summary

A number of Stratfor sources have indicated that militants are in
the final stages of planning attacks on Middle Eastern targets.
Based on the identity of -- and intelligence from -- these
sources, Stratfor expects any attack to occur in Saudi Arabia,
and we doubt it will be an isolated incident.

Analysis

Beginning May 4 and rolling over into May 5, Stratfor received a
number of tips from sources in, or knowledgeable about, the
Middle East indicating there is an imminent attack planned. As we
triangulated that information with intelligence from additional
sources, Stratfor has deduced that an attack is most likely to
occur within Saudi Arabia, and that it will target Westerners as
opposed to Saudis.

The security situation in the kingdom continues to degrade for a
variety of reasons.

The mix of source information on the threat crosses business and
government intelligence lines in both the United States and the
Middle East. All sources have repeatedly proven their value to
Stratfor, and that they are all -- independently -- warning of a
possible attack makes this a threat that we take very seriously.

To put the gravity of the threat in context, militants shot and
killed five Western expatriates May 1 in Yanbu, a petrochemical
town on the Red Sea coast. Two days later, U.S. Ambassador to
Saudi Arabia James Oberwetter advised all Americans living in the
kingdom to leave.

The problem Westerners face in Saudi Arabia is three-fold.

First, U.S. policy indirectly stoked the current militant
activity in Saudi Arabia.

After the Sept. 11 attacks, Washington deemed Saudi efforts
against al Qaeda insufficient. The reasoning for the Saudi
tentativeness up to that point was obvious: Al Qaeda's
ideological home is rooted in the Wahhabi Islam that dominates
the kingdom. For al Qaeda, the royal family's affiliation with
Western interests is a betrayal of Islam and the Sauds are guilty
of apostasy. Historically, the royals have dealt with this by
providing the country's militants with an out: Go fight infidels
elsewhere. This strategy worked well, and Saudi Arabia exported
its militants to places such as Afghanistan and Chechnya.

After Sept. 11 -- when several of these "exports" attacked New
York City and Washington -- the United States confronted Riyadh
over the practice. Stripped of the ability to simply send the
militants elsewhere, Riyadh was forced -- by U.S. design -- to
deal with the militants within the kingdom. More militants at
home mean more militant activity at home -- which means more
problems for Western guests.

The second problem Westerners in Saudi Arabia face is that the
militants have adjusted their operational methods. The Yanbu
attacks were not only the first attacks in that city, or even in
the Hijaz region; they were also the first attacks in which the
militants infiltrated the company employing the victims, even
obtaining valid company identification cards. Such sophistication
is not only frightening, considering the local nature of the
militants, but nearly impossible to defend against.

Third, the Saudis are still on the learning curve.

The intricacies of tribal loyalties -- and the unique role of
religious go-betweens with a leg on each side of the fence --
always have complicated the process of gathering actionable
intelligence. But in the aftermath of the November bombings of
housing compounds in Riyadh, local Muslims were so outraged that
the militants would attack other Muslims that many -- even in the
Najd region, from which many militants hail -- were willing to
cooperate with Saudi authorities to root out militant cells. That
resulted in a quantum leap in Saudi intelligence capabilities.
But the effort remains in its infancy; Saudi domestic
intelligence efforts were never robust -- and they still are not.
After all, the emphasis before Sept. 11 was on getting the
militants out of country, not into Saudi prisons.

Taken together, these factors all indicate that the Saudi
security situation is tangibly decaying, and local authorities
are increasingly unable to adequately protect foreigners. Expect
more Yanbus.


(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.

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[NeroASERCH]

Personally I think the security and political situation in the KSA is so bad that these attacks are supported by the government itself in order to deflect attacks on themselves.