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A dead giveaway is when one group in Bishop’s research will start talking about another as ‘those people’, as if they were from another planet: ‘Pockets of like-minded citizens that have become so ideologically inbred that we don’t know, can’t understand, and can barely conceive of ‘those people’ who live just a few miles away.’ However, Bishop does not elaborate upon how nasty these conversations (or actions) can become, precisely because they are so personal. In particular, he does not address the discussion of how blue liberal elites look down on red conservative workers as inferiors, which has been a debating point in recent elections, including the current one (1).

Bishop also writes about ways, other than residential segregation, in which people are self-selecting to limit their exposure to diverse views. Following territory well-ploughed by other writers before him, he cites the explosion of media outlets, such as hundreds of cable TV channels and the internet, and how people choose the news that fit their existing outlook. ‘We now live in a giant feedback loop’, he says.

Bishop is particularly concerned about the consequences of community clustering for politics. Here he is a less steady guide than when discussing the basic trends. Bishop cites such problems as a ‘growing intolerance for political differences that has made national consensus impossible’, and ‘politics so polarised that Congress is stymied’. He ties these political developments to his main thesis, the clustering of the like-minded. In particular, he notes that, without any counter-balance, people within ideologically homogeneous communities tend to develop more extreme views and, in turn, elect politicians who share those zealous outlooks. This leads, Bishop says, to bitter partisanship in Congress and an inability to solve pressing national problems.

In this regard, Bishop criticises those who, like the academic Morris Fiorina, stress that political leaders are to blame for partisanship. Fiorina is the much-cited author of The Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, and his main thesis is that most Americans hold moderate views on most policy issues, and that it is elected officials and their parties who push extreme divisions (2). Bishop believes that the process is both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’, and he essentially thinks that voters get the officials they deserve: ‘They represent us, and they represent a people who don’t know and don’t understand those who live just a couple of miles away.’ (3)
But in his discussion of politics, Bishop confuses policies with lifestyles - or, to put it another way, issues discussed in political terms versus issues discussed from the perspective of lifestyle. This is disappointing, because elsewhere in the book Bishop seems to appreciate the distinction, such as when he writes ‘elections are no longer just contests over policies, but bitter choices between ways of life’. In this respect, what Bishop and Fiorina are arguing is not mutually exclusive: Fiorina says that most Americans have middle-of-the-road views on policy issues, but we also know that elections and politics generally today are not contested on the basis of policies, but instead they are arenas for the expression of lifestyle choices. I can agree with Bishop that we shouldn’t one-sidedly focus on a ‘top down’ process, and that the interactions between elected officials and the electorate work in both directions in a complex manner. But the important point is that this interaction is now more likely to be mediated by means of lifestyle connections than shared views on policies.

Furthermore, when bemoaning extreme views and partisanship, Bishop slips into a well-worn discussion today on so-called ‘hyper-partisanship’ (4). At worst, the participants seem to throw their hands up and say ‘oh why can’t we all get along?’. In fact, there is nothing wrong with extreme ideas or with partisanship – so long as we are debating real political and economic ideas. The problem with the extremism and partisanship of recent years is that it has to do with lifestyle, not policies – which accounts for the petty nature of many of the squabbles in Washington.

Bishop is also less sure-footed when he ventures to explain why Americans are seeking refuge in like-minded enclaves. The primary rationale he puts forward is economic. He postulates that postwar prosperity meant that Americans had the freedom to decide on careers and where to live: ‘Freed from want and worry, people were reordering their lives around their values, their tastes, and their beliefs.’ But he also presents a socio-cultural argument: that in the 1960s, trust in institutions fell dramatically and traditional ways of life were called into question. People found the process of change disorienting and a cause of anxiety. In a ‘post-material world’, they had the freedom to move to try to find security.

All of these are reasonable factors to consider, but they fall short of a full explanation. In particular, Bishop’s account downplays developments in politics – most notably, the demise of the contestation of ideas following the end of the Cold War. Politics appears exhausted, devoid of big ideas, and in such an environment it is not entirely surprising that individuals would turn inward, focus on lifestyle, and hunker down in their neighbourhoods.

Bishop’s explanation, focused on the 1960s, also does not account for the noticeable hardening of lifestyle politics in recent years. This form of ‘politics’ became most prominent during the 2000 and 2004 elections, when parties no longer believed it was possible to win over others and focused on invigorating their bases. For example, President George W Bush’s adviser Karl Rove pursued a ‘51 per cent’ strategy – rather than appeal across the board, the Republicans were content in securing their base as long as they won, no matter how slim the margin. In 2004, battlelines were drawn over lifestyle issues – abortion, guns, gays, and so on. Voters said that a major factor in determining which president they selected was on the basis of who they could identify with on a personal level. Many liberals criticised Bush in cultural terms (dumb Texan) rather than on the grounds of policy disagreements.

What’s confusing is that the greater attention paid to elections more recently gives the appearance of a reinvigoration of politics, when in fact it is the opposite. People have turned away from what is traditional politics – engaging in debate, seeking to win others to your reasoning – and towards the pursuit of lifestyle. Many have become totally disengaged from the political process (or only tune in when election time rolls around), but those who do enter the arena today are more likely than not to do so from the perspective of lifestyle. In particular, many use party political affiliations, or support for particular candidates, as a key component of their personal identity, of defining who they are. Those who have the most t-shirts and bumper stickers might seem like the most ‘political’, but they are not expressing a desire to engage in politics, they are flashing their badges of identity to the world. These types are in fact the least political – they prefer not to talk to others with different views, or if they do, they simply shout at them.

An interesting question is whether this year’s election contest between Barack Obama and John McCain will overcome the divide in politics Bishop discusses, and render his book effectively past its sell-by date. Both candidates preach against ‘hyper-partisanship’ and polarisation, and both present themselves as centrists willing to buck their parties’ hardcore constituents. Moreover, a greater number of people say they are exasperated with the knock-down, drag-out culture wars.

But, if you look more closely, you can see politics is, if anything, becoming more, not less, viewed through the prism of lifestyle. Consider the Democratic Party primary: Obama gained the support of certain cultural types, and Hillary won the support of other cultural types. In fact, it was remarkable how the red-blue divide, which was originally a divide between parties, had now become so ingrained that it had infiltrated the Democratic Party itself. The controversy around Obama’s ‘Bittergate’ comments (that white workers ‘cling to guns or religion’) showed that this issue still touches a nerve in society. Finally, the basis of Obama’s support seems to be more on the grounds of ‘he’s like me’, rather than ‘I agree with his ideas’. Notice how many liberals expressed shock at Obama’s apparent ‘flip-flops’ on issues recently, even though it is clear from Obama’s political history and writings that he has always been an opportunist (5).

Like other popular sociology works in recent years – such as Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone, Richard Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class, and David Brooks’ Bobos in Paradise – Bishop’s book is likely to become an important reference point. For this reason, and because there is much of value in it, I recommend reading and debating The Big Sort – preferably with someone who doesn’t share your lifestyle.

Sean Collins is a writer based in New York.