[inchaaruutaa]

(Continued)

This particular definition of the three types of sa"nkhaaraa -- kaayasa"nkhaara, vaciisa"nkhaara, cittasa"nkhaara -- always occurs in the course of a discussion on the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling (sa~n~naavedayita-nirodha). It is intended to prepare the way for an explanation of the order in which the three types of sa"nkhaaraa cease when a monk enters the attainment of cessation.
But that is not all. Not only are the three sa"nkhaaraa of the Cuu.lavedalla Sutta always rigorously excluded from discussions of pa.ticca-samuppaada, but among all the suttas in which the Buddha exemplifies the expressions 'avijjaapaccayaa sa"nkhaaraa' ("with ignorance as condition, formations") and 'sa"nkhaarapaccayaa vi~n~naa.na.m' ("with formations as condition, consciousness"), there is not a single text in which he explains sa"nkhaaraa in a way that has any relevance to the three kinds of sa"nkhaaraa of the Cuu.lavedalla Sutta. The two types of discussions of sa"nkhaaraa -- the threefold enumeration of the Cuu.lavedalla Sutta and the threefold enumeration in the PS context -- though employing the same terms, are assigned to completely separate compartments. Nowhere in the Sutta Pi.taka does the one triad extend beyond its own context and bear any explicit relationship to the other context. If the Buddha had intended the sa"nkhaaraa that are conditioned by ignorance and that condition consciousness to signify the in-&-out breaths, thinking-&-pondering, and perception and feeling, then one could reasonably expect to find at least one sutta on pa.ticca-samuppaada where he exemplifies sa"nkhaaraa by way of the Cuu.lavedalla triad. But not a single sutta of such a nature can be found anywhere in the entire Pali Canon.
Lack of textual corroboration is only one problem with Ven. ~Naa.naviira's proposal to read the Cuu.lavedalla triad of sa"nkhaaraa into the interpretation of the PS formula. Another objection, even more formidable, can be brought against this suggestion, namely, that it leads to incoherence. For the sa"nkhaaraa of the PS formula must be dependent upon ignorance as their necessary condition and must cease with the cessation of ignorance, but the three sa"nkhaaraa of the Cuu.lavedalla Sutta do not meet this requirement. These sa"nkhaaraa are not necessarily dependent upon ignorance and do not cease with the ceasing of ignorance. Though the arahant has completely eradicated ignorance, he continues to breathe in and out (except when in the fourth jhaana and higher attainments), to think and ponder (except when in the second and higher jhaanas), and to perceive and feel (except when in the cessation of perception and feeling). But what does cease for the arahant with the cessation of ignorance are volitional formations -- sa"nkhaaraa understood as sa~ncetanaa. Whereas the non-arahant's bodily, verbal, and mental activities are constructive forces conditioned by ignorance that sustain the round of rebirths, the arahant's activities are kammically extinct. They no longer sustain the continuation of the round, no longer project consciousness into any new mode of becoming.
12. In analyzing the teaching of pa.ticca-samuppaada, the texts use the two terms cittasa"nkhaaraa and manosa"nkhaaraa as though they were interchangeable. This is not typical of the Suttas, which usually reserve citta and mano for separate contexts. When the texts define sa"nkhaaraa in the PS formula, they do so by enumerating the three types of sa"nkhaaraa: kaayasa"nkhaara, vaciisa"nkhaara, cittasa"nkhaara; yet they do not take the further step of defining these terms as such. Then, when they exemplify the function of sa"nkhaaraa in PS, they employ the triad of kaayasa"nkhaara, vaciisa"nkhaara, manosa"nkhaara. The Pali Commentaries identify the two triads, taking them as alternative expressions for the same thing; both are understood to refer to bodily volition, verbal volition, and mental volition (kaayasa~ncetanaa, vaciisa~ncetanaa, manosa~ncetanaa). Ven. ~Naa.naviira takes issue with this identification, holding that the two triads must be distinguished. He admits that the second triad is to be identified with cetanaa, but he insists that the terms used in the first triad have to be understood by way of the explanation given in the Cuu.lavedalla Sutta.
This assertion, as we have seen, does not receive confirmation from the Suttas. The original source on which the Pali Commentaries base their identification of the two triads is the Vibha"nga of the Abhidhamma Pi.taka. In that work, in the Suttanta Bhaajaniiya (Sutta Analysis) section of its Pa.ticca-samuppaada Vibha"nga, we read:
What are the sa"nkhaaraa that are conditioned by ignorance? Meritorious sa"nkhaara, demeritorious sa"nkhaara, imperturbable sa"nkhaara; body-sa"nkhaara, speech-sa"nkhaara, mind-sa"nkhaara....
Therein, bodily volition is body-sa"nkhaara; verbal volition is speech-sa"nkhaara, mental volition is mind-sa"nkhaara (cittasa"nkhaara). These are called the sa"nkhaaraa conditioned by ignorance.
Ven. ~Naa.naviira may refuse to acknowledge the authority of the Vibha"nga and insist that he will not relinquish his view unless a sutta can be brought forward confirming this definition. This attitude, however, would appear to be an unreasonable one. Even though the more elaborate conceptions of Abhidhamma thought may be products of a later age than the Suttas, the Suttanta Bhaajaniiya sections of the Vibha"nga can make a cogent claim to antiquity. Evidence suggests that this portion of the Vibha"nga is extremely old, dating from perhaps the third century BC, and thus represents the understanding of the Buddhist community from a period not long after the Buddha's Parinibbaana. It would even be plausible to maintain that this body of material was originally an old commentary on basic Suttanta terminology going back to the very first generation of the Buddha's disciples; it is not specifically Abhidhammic in character and may have been absorbed into the Abhidhamma Pi.taka owing to the lack of any other suitable repository for it.
In any case, in the absence of direct clarification of the issue in the Suttas themselves, the Vibha"nga becomes the most ancient source to which we can turn for help in clarifying PS terminology. There we find the triad of kaayasa"nkhaara, vaciisa"nkhaara, and cittasa"nkhaara explained in a way that confirms the exclusive identification of the sa"nkhaaraa factor in the PS formula with cetanaa. This lends weight to the view that this second link should be taken as kamma and its relation to vi~n~naa.na as that of the kammic cause from the preceding existence.

The Meaning of 'Sa"nkhaaraa'
13. I intend to examine very briefly all the suttas that help shed light on the sa"nkhaaraa factor in PS formulation, as found in the Nidaana Sa.myutta, the Buddha's collected short discourses on dependent arising. But first a few words should be said about Ven. ~Naa.naviira's general understanding of the word 'sa"nkhaaraa'. Ven. ~Naa.naviira maintains that this word has a univocal meaning relevant to all the contexts in which it occurs. The meaning he assigns to it is that of "something upon which something else depends" (#11); hence his rendering 'determinations'. The Suttas themselves do not offer a single etymological derivation of the word with unrestricted application. The well-known derivation -- sa"nkhata.m abhisa"nkharontii ti tasmaa sa"nkhaaraa ti vuccanti (in Ven. ~Naa.naviira's terminology, "They determine the determined, therefore they are called determinations") -- applies specifically to sa"nkhaaraa as the fourth of the five aggregates, not to sa"nkhaaraa in all usages. In this context they obviously signify cetanaa, volition, understood as a constructive force, and thus an active derivation is appropriate.
The Pali Commentaries offer two derivations of the word 'sa"nkhaaraa'. One is active (as given above), the other passive (sa"nkhariiyantii ti sa"nkhaaraa). Thus the Commentaries hold that the word can signify either things that actively produce other things, or things that are produced by other things. Which meaning is relevant depends on the context. In the two contexts of pa.ticca-samuppaada and the fourth aggregate, the active sense is relevant, as in both cases the sa"nkhaaraa are volitions. But in such statements as 'sabbe sa"nkhaaraa aniccaa', etc., the Commentaries explain that sa"nkhaaraa should be understood as sa"nkhata-sa"nkhaaraa, that is, as conditioned things.
According to the Majjhima Nikaaya Commentary, the passive sense also pertains to two of the three sa"nkhaaraa of the Cuu.lavedalla Sutta: (i) the in-&-out breaths are body-sa"nkhaara because they are determined by the body, made by the body, produced by the body; (iii) perception and feeling are mind-sa"nkhaara because they are determined by the mind, made by the mind, produced by the mind. In contrast, (ii) thinking-&-pondering, as speech-sa"nkhaara, play an active role: they are determinants of speech.
The commentarial recognition of a twofold derivation of the term 'sa"nkhaaraa' seems to be confirmed by the texts. For instance, the Cuu.lavedalla Sutta explains:
"In-&-out breaths, friend Visaakha, are bodily, these things are dependent upon the body; that is why the in-&-out breaths are the body-sa"nkhaara.... Perception and feeling are mental, these things are dependent upon the mind; that is why perception and feeling are mind-sa"nkhaara."

In contrast, Ven. ~Naa.naviira's insistence on assigning an exclusively active sense to sa"nkhaaraa compels him to apply the old Procrustean bed of exegesis to several passages that do not easily submit to his interpretation. For example, in his separate note on Sa"nkhaara, he attempts to explain how the reference to sa"nkhaaraa in the Mahaasudassana Suttanta (DN 17/ii,169ff.) can be interpreted in line with his view of sa"nkhaaraa as active determinations. In this sutta the Buddha, after describing all the rich endowments and possessions of King Mahaasudassana, a king of the distant past, concludes with a homily on impermanence: "See, Aananda, how all those sa"nkhaaraa have passed, ceased, altered. So impermanent, Aananda, are sa"nkhaaraa ... this is enough for weariness with all sa"nkhaaraa, enough for dispassion, enough for release." Ven. ~Naa.naviira discerns a cryptic message concealed in this passage thus: "Those things [the possessions, etc.] were sa"nkhaaraa; they were things on which King Mahaasudassana depended for his very identity; they determined his person as 'King Mahaasudassana', and with their cessation the thought 'I am King Mahaasudassana' came to an end." There is nothing in the sutta itself to support this interpretation, and the text (as well as others of a similar character) reads so much more naturally if we take sa"nkhaaraa simply to mean the conditioned things of the world. Moreover, other suttas can be found which include the same final exhortation on dispassion, yet which provide absolutely no ground for seeing the term sa"nkhaaraa there as determinants of anyone's personal identity (see e.g. the Anamatagga Sa.myutta, SN 15/ii,178ff.).

Sa"nkhaaraa in the PS Formula
14. Let us now turn directly to the Nidaana Sa.myutta to see how the suttas on pa.ticca-samuppaada treat the term 'sa"nkhaaraa' in relation to avijjaa and vi~n~naa.na. As the suttas in this collection that expand upon the stock formula are conveniently few in number, we can take a brief look at each in turn. Of these texts, two establish the two major paradigms for the interpretation of sa"nkhaaraa, namely, that formulated in terms of the three doors of volitional action and that formulated in terms of three kammically graded types of volition. Besides these, three additional texts can be found that shed light on the problem. I should stress at once that the Nidaana Sa.myutta incorporates virtually all the shorter discourses of the Buddha dealing with pa.ticca-samuppaada, and hence should be taken as definitive in its presentation of the meaning and function of the constituent items in the formula.
We will begin with the Bhuumija Sutta, the paradigmatic text for distinguishing sa"nkhaaraa by way of the doors of action:
"When there is the body, Aananda, because of bodily volition there arises internally pleasure and pain. When there is speech, because of verbal volition there arises internally pleasure and pain. When there is the mind, because of mental volition there arises internally pleasure and pain.
"With ignorance as condition, either by oneself, Aananda, one forms that body-sa"nkhaara (speech-sa"nkhaara, mind-sa"nkhaara) on account of which that pleasure and pain arises internally; or because of others one forms that body-sa"nkhaara (speech-sa"nkhaara, mind-sa"nkhaara) on account of which that pleasure and pain arises internally...
"Ignorance is included among these things. But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance that body does not exist (that speech does not exist, that mind does not exist) on account of which that pleasure and pain arises internally."
Here the three sa"nkhaaraa that are said to be conditioned by ignorance are explicitly identified with the three types of volition. The sutta employs the term 'manosa"nkhaara' rather than 'cittasa"nkhaara', but in the absence of any other exemplification of cittasa"nkhaara in the PS context, we can take the terms as interchangeable; though such usage is not common, it is not totally foreign to the Nikaayas and other instances can be cited of the synonymous use of citta and mano.
According to the commentary, this volition is to be understood as kamma, and the pleasure and pain that arise internally as vipaakavedanaa, as feelings resulting from that kamma. A temporal separation between the volition and the resulting pleasure and pain may not be explicitly mentioned in the text, but if we read the above passage against the broader background of the Suttas, we can readily infer that an implicit temporal gap is intended. One sutta in the Anguttara Nikaaya, on the correlations between kamma and its fruit, helps us to understand the process by which sa"nkhaaraa function as conditions for the arising of pleasant and painful feeling:
Here, monks, someone forms an afflictive body-sa"nkhaara, speech-sa"nkhaara, mind-sa"nkhaara. Having done so, he is reborn into an afflictive world. When he is reborn there afflictive contacts contact him, and he experiences feelings that are extremely painful.... Someone forms a non-afflictive body-sa"nkhaara, (etc.) ... he is reborn into a non-afflictive world.... Non-afflictive contacts contact him, and he experiences feelings that are extremely pleasant.... Someone forms both an afflictive and a non-afflictive body-sa"nkhaara, (etc.) ... he is reborn into a world that is both afflictive and non-afflictive. Afflictive and non-afflictive contacts contact him, and he experiences feelings that are both painful and pleasant."
Here the term used is again 'manosa"nkhaara', and it is clear that the three sa"nkhaaraa are primarily of interest because they determine a person's plane of rebirth and the quality of affective experience prevailing in his life. The sutta is not manifestly concerned with PS, but if we examine the sequence of events being described we would find, embedded in it, a segment of the standard PS formula. These events can be represented thus: sa"nkhaaraa --> rebirth into a world --> contact --> feeling. From the Mahaanidaana Sutta (DN 15/ii,63) we know that rebirth into any world involves the co-arising of consciousness and name-and-form, and from the latter we can elicit the six sense bases as the condition for contact. This suffices to establish that the above text and the PS formula are defining the same situation, and here it is evident that the sa"nkhaaraa serve as condition for the arising of pleasure and pain across the gap of lifetimes.
The last paragraph of the above quotation from the Bhuumija Sutta expresses obliquely the converse side of the relationship. Here, when the Buddha states that with the cessation of ignorance, body, speech, and mind no longer serve as conditions for pleasure and pain to arise internally, what is meant is that these doors of action cease to be instruments for generating sa"nkhaaraa, actions with the power to produce re-becoming. When ignorance is eliminated, volition no longer functions as sa"nkhaaraa, as a constructive power that builds up new edifices of personal existence in future lives. The actions of the arahant, whether performed by body, speech, or mind, are khii.nabiija, "with seed destroyed" (Ratana Sutta, Snp. 235); they are incapable of ripening in the future, and hence no longer serve as conditions for pleasure and pain to arise.
15. The second major paradigm for understanding the sa"nkhaaraa factor in PS, and its relations to avijjaa and vi~n~naa.na, grades the sa"nkhaaraa according to their ethical quality, which in turn indicates the type of rebirth they produce. This paradigm is delineated in the following passage:
"Bhikkhus, if a person immersed in ignorance forms a meritorious sa"nkhaara, consciousness goes on towards merit. If he forms a demeritorious sa"nkhaara, consciousness goes on towards demerit. If he forms an imperturbable sa"nkhaara, consciousness goes on towards the imperturbable."
Once again it is obvious that we must understand sa"nkhaaraa as volition (cetanaa). And once again it is not so obvious that the relationship between sa"nkhaaraa and consciousness may be a causal one operating across different lives. The commentary to the sutta explains that the phrase "consciousness goes on towards merit" can be understood in two complementary ways: (i) the kammically active consciousness associated with the volition "goes on towards" meritorious kamma, i.e. it accumulates merit; and (ii) the consciousness resulting from the merit "goes on towards" the result of merit, i.e. it reaps the fruits of that merit. The same principle of interpretation applies to the other two cases -- the demeritorious and the imperturbable. Thus the point of the passage, as understood from the traditional perspective, may be paraphrased thus: A meritorious volition infuses consciousness with a meritorious quality and thereby steers consciousness towards rebirth in a realm resulting from merit; a demeritorious volition infuses consciousness with a demeritorious quality and thereby steers consciousnes stowards rebirth in a realm resulting from demerit; an imperturbable volition infuses consciousness with an imperturbable quality (aane~nja) and thereby steers consciousness towards rebirth in an imperturbable realm, i.e. a realm corresponding to the fourth jhaana or the formless meditative attainments.
Ven. ~Naa.naviira himself rejects this interpretation of the passage. He writes (#15):
... Nothing in the Sutta suggests that pu~n~nuupagavi~n~naa.na is anything other than the meritorious consciousness of one who is determining or intending merit. (When merit is intended by an individual he is conscious of his world as 'world-for-doing-merit-in', and consciousness has thus 'arrived at merit'.)
My reading of the passage disagrees with that of Ven. ~Naa.naviira. Even if we disregard the commentarial explanation sketched above and focus solely on the text, we would find that the structure of the sutta itself suggests that a kamma-vipaaka relationship is intended by the link between sa"nkhaaraa and vi~n~naa.na. For the sutta continues: When a bhikkhu has abandoned ignorance and aroused knowledge, he does not form any of the three types of sa"nkhaaraa. Thereby he reaches arahantship, and when his body breaks up with the ending of his life, he attains Parinibbaana. Thus "all that is felt, not being delighted in, will become cool right here, and bodily elements only will remain." Hence, in its structure, the sutta establishes a contrast between the ignorant worldling and the arahant. The worldling, by fashioning meritorious, demeritorious, and imperturbable volitions, projects his consciousness into a new existence, setting in motion once again the entire cycle of birth and death. The arahant cuts off ignorance and stops forming sa"nkhaaraa, thus ending the grounding of consciousness and the consequent renewal of the cycle.
This conclusion can draw further support from a study of how the word 'upaga' is used in the Suttas. Ven. ~Naa.naviira's rendering "has arrived at" is actually an error: the word functions not as a past participle (that would be upagata) but as a suffix signifying present action. Hence I render it "goes on towards." In contexts similar to the one cited above (though perhaps not in all contexts) 'upaga' most commonly denotes movement towards the fruition of one's past kamma -- movement fulfilled by the process of rebirth. Consider the stock passage on the exercise of the divine eye:
"With the divine eye, which is purified and superhuman, he sees beings passing away and being reborn, inferior and superior, beautiful and ugly, fortunate and unfortunate, and he understands how beings go on in accordance with their kamma."
Then consider the Aane~njasappaaya Sutta, on a bhikkhu who practises the "imperturbable meditations" without reaching arahantship: "With the breakup of the body, after death, it is possible that his consciousness, evolving on, may go on towards the imperturbable." Note that the last expression (vi~n~naa.na.m aane~njuupaga.m), in the Pali, is identical with the expression found in the Nidaana Sa.myutta sutta cited above, and here, clearly, a transition from one life to another is involved.
We thus see that in the two main models for the sa"nkhaaraa factor of PS presented by the Nidaana Sa.myutta, the term signifies volitional activity, and its bearing on consciousness and feeling is that of kammic cause for a fruit generally maturing in a subsequent life. We should further stress that these two models are neither mutually exclusive nor do they concern different material. Rather, they structure the same material -- kammically potent volitions -- along different lines, depending on the perspective adopted, whether the perspective of door of action or that of ethical quality.
16. Besides these two major models, the Nidaana Sa.myutta contains two short suttas that help illuminate the role of sa"nkhaaraa in the PS formula. We may begin with the following:
"Bhikkhus, if there is lust, delight, craving for solid food (or any of the other three types of nutriment), consciousness becomes grounded in that and comes to growth. When consciousness is grounded and comes to growth, there is a descent of name-and-form. When there is a descent of name-and-form, there is the growth of sa"nkhaaraa. When there is the growth of sa"nkhaaraa, there is the production of re-becoming in the future. When there is the production of re-becoming in the future, there is future birth, aging and death."
Here we can see that sa"nkhaaraa are responsible for bringing about "re-becoming in the future," that is, for generating rebirth. The structure of the sutta is similar to that of the Bhava Sutta quoted above (AN 3:76), but here three existences are implied. The first is the existence in which there is craving for food. This craving, accompanied by ignorance, grounds consciousness in its attachment to nutriment. Consciousness -- here the kammically active consciousness -- is the seed arisen in the old existence that sprouts forth as a new existence, causing a "descent" of name-and-form into the womb. Within that second existence the new being, on reaching maturity, engages in volitional activity, which brings on "the growth of sa"nkhaaraa." These sa"nkhaaraa in turn, enveloped by ignorance and craving, initiate the production of still another existence, the third of the series. This existence (like all others) commences with birth and terminates in aging and death.
17. Next, let us look at one short sutta in the Nidaana Sa.myutta which explicitly mentions neither avijjaa nor sa"nkhaaraa but refers to them obliquely:
"What one wills, and what one plans, and what lies latent within -- this is a support for the continuance of consciousness. When there is a support, there is a grounding of consciousness. When consciousness is grounded and comes to growth, there is the production of re-becoming in the future. When there is the production of re-becoming in the future, future birth, aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair arise. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering."
In this sutta, sa"nkhaaraa are referred to elliptically by the expressions 'ya.m ceteti', "what one wills," and 'ya.m pakappeti', "what one plans" ('pakappeti' is a rare term, apparently synonymous with 'ceteti'). The expression 'ya.m anuseti', "what lies latent within," points to the anusaya, the latent tendencies, which other texts tell us include the latent tendency of ignorance (avijjaanusaya) and the latent tendency of lust or craving (raagaanusaya). Thus the sutta is stating that when one forms volitions on the basis of ignorance and craving, these volitions become a support which grounds consciousness and establishes it in a new existence. Once consciousness becomes so established, it sets in motion the entire production of the new existence, beginning with birth and ending with death, accompanied by all its attendant suffering.
The text which immediately follows the afore mentioned sutta in the Nidaana Sa.myutta (SN 12:39), begins identically as far as "and comes to growth," then it continues with "there is a descent of name-and-form" and the rest of the standard series. This shows that in the PS context "the descent of name-and-form" (naamaruupassa avakkanti) is effectively synonymous with "the production of re-becoming in the future" (aayati.m punabbhavaabhinibbatti). Both signify the unfolding of the rebirth process once consciousness has gained a foothold in the new existence.
18. The above analysis should be sufficient to establish with reasonable certainty that the term 'sa"nkhaaraa' in the PS formula denotes nothing other than volition (cetanaa), and that volition enters into the formula because it is the factor primarily responsible for "grounding" consciousness in the round of repeated becoming and for driving it into a new form of existence in the future. When this much is recognized, it becomes unnecessary for me to say anything about the continuation of Ven. ~Naa.naviira's Note on PS from #18 to the end. This convoluted discussion rests upon Ven. ~Naa.naviira's assumption that the term 'sa"nkhaaraa' in the PS formula comprises all the varieties of sa"nkhaaraa spoken of in the Suttas, that is, all things that other things depend on. By adopting this thesis Ven. ~Naa.naviira finds himself obliged to explain how such things as the in-&-out breaths, etc., can be said to be conditioned by ignorance and to be conditions for consciousness. The explanation he devises may be ingenious, but as it receives no confirmation from the Suttas themselves, we can conclude that his account does not correctly represent the Buddha's intention in expounding the teaching of pa.ticca-samuppaada.
19. At this point we can pull together the main threads of our discussion. We have seen that the alternative, "more satisfactory approach" to pa.ticca-samuppaada that Ven. ~Naa.naviira proposes rests on two planks: one is his interpretation of the nexus of bhava, jaati, and jaraamara.na, the other his interpretation of the nexus of avijjaa, sa"nkhaaraa, and vi~n~naa.na. The first hinges on ascribing to all three terms meanings that cannot be substantiated by the texts. The second involves a merging of two contexts that the texts rigorously keep separate, namely, the PS context and the definition of the three sa"nkhaaraa stated in connection with the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling (found in the Cuu.lavedalla Sutta). This error leads Ven. ~Naa.naviira to assign to the term 'sa"nkhaaraa' in the PS context a much wider meaning than the texts allow. It also induces him to overlook the various passages from the Suttas that clearly show that sa"nkhaaraa in the PS formula must always be understood as volitional activities, considered principally by way of their role in projecting consciousness into a new existence in the future.
20. To round off this portion of my critique, I would like to take a quick look at a short sutta in the Nidaana Sa.myutta -- a terse and syntactically tricky text -- that confirms the three-life interpretation of PS almost as explicitly as one might wish. Our text -- the Baalapa.n.dita Sutta (SN 12:19/ii,23-24) -- opens thus:
"Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has thereby been obtained. Hence there is this body and external name-and-form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which -- or through a certain one of them -- the fool experiences pleasure and pain."
Exactly the same thing is said regarding the wise man. The Buddha then asks the monks to state the difference between the two, and when the monks defer, the Master continues:
"For the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has been obtained. But for the fool that ignorance has not been abandoned and that craving has not been eliminated. Why not? Because the fool has not lived the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering. Therefore, with the breakup of the body, the fool is one who goes on to (another) body. Being one who goes onto (another) body, he is not freed from birth, from aging and death, not freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, despair; he is not freed from suffering, I say."
The wise man, in contrast, having lived the holy life to the full, has abandoned ignorance and eliminated craving. Thus with the breakup of the body, he is not one who goes on to another body, and thus he is freed from birth, aging, death, etc.; he is freed from all kinds of suffering.
Having been included in the Nidaana Sa.myutta, this sutta must be an exemplification of PS; otherwise it would have no place in that collection. And we can detect, with minor variants and elisions, the main factors of the classical formula. Yet not only are three lifetimes explicitly depicted, but we also find two other basic exegetical tools of the Commentaries already well adumbrated: the three links (tisandhi) and the four groups (catusankhepa). The first group -- the causal factors of the past life -- are the ignorance and craving that brought both the fool and the wise man into the present existence; though sa"nkhaaraa are not mentioned, they are implied by the mention of ignorance. The first link -- that between past causes and present results -- connects past ignorance and craving with "this body." This, obviously, is a conscious body (savi~n~naa.naka kaaya), implying vi~n~naa.na. The text mentions the remaining factors of the present resultant group: naamaruupa, sa.laayatana, phassa, vedanaa. Then, in the case of the fool, a link takes place between the present resultant group -- epitomized by the experience of pleasure and pain -- and the present causal group productive of a future life. This group is represented by the present avijjaa and ta.nhaa that the fool has not discarded. We also know, despite the elision, that ta.nhaa will lead to upaadaana and a fresh surge of volitional activity motivated by clinging (the kammabhava of the Commentaries).
Because of his avijjaa and ta.nhaa the fool "goes on to another body" (kaayuupago hoti) -- note that here we meet once again the word upaga which I discussed above (#15), again in connection with the rebirth process.

(Continued)