[Gogogo]

From Mettiko Bhikkhu's "Overview":

Here the differences already loom up between Ven. Ñāṇavīra's subjective, existential approach and Bhikkhu Bodhi's scholastic, objective approach—by Bhikkhu Bodhi's inability to understand dukkha as 'existential fear', 'nor even the distorted sense of self of which such anxiety may be symptomatic' (Para. 5). For him dukkha is the 'bondage to saṃsara—the round of recurring births, ageing and death' and 'self' is apparently only a special, additional (optional?) problem. From this it follows that (explicit in Para. 6) dukkha ends because and when one is no longer reborn. The personal, subjective problem of suffering becomes scholastically and scientifically objectivated—wonderful illustrative material for Ven. Ñāṇavīra's criticism on the 'would-be synthesis of public facts' (compare Preface (c), (f), RŪPA and others). That nibbāna thereby comes out not as the end of subjectivity, but effectively as annihilation is inevitable: positivism by its own rules can only be 'transcended' with nihilism.

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One sign of the incompatibility of the two paradigms is the fact that for the most part Bhikkhu Bodhi uses the same Sutta passages as Ven. Ñāṇavīra Thera to support his position (e.g. D.15, M.44, S.12.2 and others).


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The Ven. Bodhi criticizes that Ven. Ñāṇavīra sees birth, ageing and death in relation to the 'self, whereas the Suttas talk about the birth, ageing and death of the body' (Para. 7). To see a contradiction between the two really means reducing 'self' to a 'phenomenon of purely grammatical interest' (Preface (b)). And: jāti means re-birth after all (at least implicitly). As a proof Bhikkhu Bodhi regards the fact that according to the Suttas birth happens in different classes of existence (Para. 7 and 8).

On the subject of saṅkhāra nothing else remains to be done for the Ven. Bodhi than to unwrap again the commentarial gimmicks, which were mentioned and refused by Ven. Ñāṇavīra—the diverse variants of the patchwork rug strategy ('here it means this, there it means that'):


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Bhikkhu Bodhi can't follow Ven. Ñāṇavīra's remarks, his lack of understanding is based on an entirely different point of view. So it's not a surprise that he fails to capture the twofold function of saṅkhāra (specific and general) which is shown in §§15, 20 and 21 of that Note.

Also based on those different paradigms are of course dissensions in translating, e.g. when Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation of paṭibaddha (he sees as 'dependent on' rather than 'associated with') is achieved only due to the anticipation of the result. He rightly writes that Ven. Ñāṇavīra Thera translates the word upaga mistakenly as past participle instead of present ('has arrived at', here correct as 'arriving'). But: The meaning of the sentence is not changed. The meaning of upaga does indeed change when Bhikkhu Bodhi falsely interprets the prefix upa- with his 'goes on towards'—upa- means 'here, here towards me (approaching me), related to me' (compare Hecker, Lesewörterbuch).


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On §4 he [Bodhi] bluntly denies the relation of the Sutta passage cited by Ven. Ñāṇavīra with paṭiccasamuppāda and accuses him of 'strangely careless misreading of the passage'. Ñāṇavīra recommends with a good reason to study this Sutta 'first-hand'. Bhikkhu Bodhi at least concedes that 'paṭiccasamuppāda is introduced later in the Sutta'. In the discourse, after the headline 'Which, bhikkhus is the teaching proclaimed by me?', all four categories are shown (the 'activity of the mind' mentioned by Ven. Ñāṇavīra in third place, paṭiccasamuppāda as an explanation of the 2nd and 3rd Noble Truth in the fourth position). Unmistakable the Buddha afterwards explains the relation of the four categories. To assume that he teaches incoherently, this is indeed 'strange and careless'.


http://nanavira.xtreemhost.com/index...sk=view&id=244



A lively and important debate, worth examining in detail, I would think.



Comments?