[FBtquXT8]

Bodhi says:

Before we go any further, we should point out that Ven. ~Naa.naviira does not cite any suttas to support his understanding of bhava, jaati, and jaraamara.na, and in fact there are no suttas to be found in the Pali Canon that explain the above terms in this way.

But in fact Nanavira cites three suttas to support this understanding: Majjhima v,3 , Majjhima ii,1 (for tanha, which, through upadana supports bhava), and Kosala Samy. i,3 .

Bodhi misses the Buddha's distinction between right view for putthujjanas and Noble right view in the last sutta that Nanavira cites:

-- For one who is born, lord, is there anything other than ageing-&-death?—For one who is born, great king, there is nothing other than ageing-&-death. Those, great king, who are wealthy warriors... wealthy divines... wealthy householders...,—for them, too, being born, there is nothing other than ageing-&-death. Those monks, great king, who are worthy ones, destroyers of the cankers...,—for them, too, it is the nature of this body to break up, to be laid down.

The Buddha is giving an ariyo answer to this king about birth and death, He says that for such putthujjanas (one who is "born"), there is "aging and death", that aging and death are concerns that cause fear and clinging to life. But for one who is "not subject to birth", and arahant. that one realizes that it is the nature of the body to break up and be laid down. There is still the breakup of the body, but the idea of "death", and specifically of "my death" does not arise. And along with that notion of "my death", fear of death (and thus any dukkha that would arise for a putthujjana over the notion of death) is dismissed, as well.

Bodhi misses -- or ignores -- this point because it does not fir into his misapprehension of the Buddha's teaching as a reincarnation/"re-birth" strategy.

But let's take a closer look at Bodhi's Straw Man:

Moreover, on Ven. ~Naa.naviira's interpretation it may not even be quite correct to say 'jaatipaccayaa jaraamara.na.m'. On his view, it seems, one would be obliged to say instead, 'bhavapaccayaa jaati, bhavapaccayaa jaraamara.na.m'. Since he regards the puthujjana's taking himself to be a self as the basis for his notions "my self was born" and "my self will die," it would follow that 'being' would be the condition for both 'birth' and 'aging-and-death'. But that is not what the Buddha himself asserts.


So, Bodhi is charging Nanavira with re-arranging the order of the Buddha's teaching of paticcasamuppada to suit Nanavira's own proclivities. And he is further claiming that the Buddha does not assert that 'being' ('becoming') is 'the condition' for both 'birth' and 'aging-and-death'.

There are a number of things wrong with Bodhi's assertion here:

First, 'being', is a condition for 'birth', which is in turn a condition for 'decay, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair; in short, this whole mass of suffering'; which makes 'being' a condition for 'decay, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair; in short, this whole mass of suffering'.

In the absence of 'being', there is no 'mass of suffering'.

Second, Bodhi consistently ignores that the last nidana in the paticcasamuppada chain explicitly includes 'sickness, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair; in short, this whole mass of suffering'. This is clearly because these factors do not shoe-horn into the Bodhi/Abhidhamma/commentarial mumbo-jumbo version of paticcasamuppada. Nor does the rest of the paticcasamuppada/paticcanirodha formula, which the Bodhi/Abhidhammic/commentarial tradition ignores altogether. But careful examination will make it obvious that the Buddha's intent with respect to the last nidana is to elucidate "the whole mass of suffering" pursuant to a phenomenological psychology rather than Bodhi & Co's "physical death" pursuant to a reincarnation/"re-birth" strategy. The influence of gnorance can lead one to physical death, surely -- but that is not the only form of suffering that the influence of ignorance leads one to.

Third, it is patently ludicrous for Bhikkhu Bodhi to portray Nanavira's description as rearranging the nidanas to suit his own proclivities unsupported by the Buddha's assertions, given that Bodhi's (and the abhidhammic/commentarial tradition's) own vision of "three-life" paticcasamuppada, in its overall design and in its particulars, depends completely and entirely upon that very same sort of rearranging the nidanas to suit his own proclivities unsupported by the Buddha's assertions -- but on an order way beyond what he accuses Nanamoli of -- and without this sort of Dhamma cherry-picking, the entire "three-lives" convolution collapses into a sorry mess of equivocation and superstition.

Fourth, and in light of the third, Bodhi himself jumps from decay/"aging" to "death", ignoring the mention of "sickness" within the last nidana. For Bodhi, all he sees is "birth-and-death". The rest of it, with the exception of "decay/old age" when it suits his proclivities, is simply ignored as it does not fit into his scheme.

Fifth, as has been mentioned earlier in this thread, it is simply preposterous to assert that the other forms of suffering mentioned in the last nidana come after aging and death, as would be required by Bodhi's schema: "If that is the case, you [in our discussion, Bodhi and Co.] appear to be asserting when teenagers commit suicide this is not due to their mental suffering because teenagers do not experience brokenness of teeth, greyness of hair, wrinkling of skin, etc."


Bodhi goes on to cherry-pick definition of "death", again completely ignoring the metaphorical nature of the phrases "The passing of beings out of the various orders of beings, their passing away, dissolution, disappearance, dying, completion of time, dissolution of the aggregates", and, even worse, again completely ignoring the other factors that are part of "the whole mass of suffering": 'decay, sickness, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair; in short, this whole mass of suffering'.

Then he cites the Buddha's definitions of birth, not only citing his own skewed eisegetical translation ("in a womb"), but also completely missing that all of the Buddha's descriptions of "birth" according to his Dhamma here are metaphorical.

The above definitions, with their strings of synonyms and concrete imagery, clearly indicate that 'birth' refers to biological birth and 'aging-and-death' to biological aging and biological death -- not to the puthujjana's notions "I was born; I will age and die," or "My self was born; my self ages and dies." The textual definitions are perfectly staightforward and unambiguous in meaning, and give no hint that the Buddha had some other idea to convey about the significance of these terms.

If Bodhi keeps telling himself the above, he might even start to believe it himself. Again, he completely ignores -- and asks us to ignore for the purposes of self-deception -- the rest of the final nidana, and the fact that it represents "the whole mass of suffering" rather than the "just aging and death" of his eisegesis.

Bodhi goes on to beg the question by titling his next section "Bhava and Rebirth", presuming us to forget that he has already admitted that "Jati" does not mean "re-birth". But, again, we have not forgotten this. He also presumes that no one will notice that, even according to Bodhi's own interpretation of the Buddha's description of the meaning of the word "birth", there is nothing whatsoever there, explicit or implicit, that suggests a notion of a process of reincarnation or "re-birth". And had the Buddha intended for this "birth" to mean "reincarnation" or "re-birth", he would have made it perfectly clear and in no uncertain terms, just as he does everything else, right here in this definition of jati, "birth".



(More to come....)