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August 28, 2009

Separate Altitudes Suggested for Flights Over Hudson

By MATTHEW L. WALD and AL BAKER

The National Transportation Safety Board is recommending major changes to air traffic over the Hudson River — including having helicopters and planes fly at separate altitudes — to prevent another midair collision like the one that killed nine people on Aug. 8.

The board is also recommending that pilots who are to fly in the Hudson River air corridor and around the Statue of Liberty complete a special training course.

The board is probably months away from a final report about the accident this month, in which a single-engine plane collided with a tour helicopter during a flight in a low-altitude area that is not under the direction of air traffic controllers. The main responsibility for avoiding collisions in the area rests with the pilots themselves, who are supposed to look out the window for other traffic.

The safety board’s call for changes was made on Thursday in a 10-page letter to the Federal Aviation Administration administrator, J. Randolph Babbitt. The board, a purely advisory agency, usually makes recommendations after concluding its investigations, but does so sooner if it finds that there is a clear case for action to improve safety.

The board’s letter came shortly before a report on the same subject was expected from a special panel convened by the aviation administration, which actually regulates the pilots and the airspace. Agency officials sometimes complain that the safety board likes to time its recommendations to beat others to the punch.

The chairwoman of the safety board, Deborah A. P. Hersman, said in a statement on Thursday that the current procedures for flying in the Hudson air corridor are “not enough.”

“Our recommendations suggest operational changes that can make this corridor a safer place to fly,” she said.

In response, Laura J. Brown, an F.A.A. spokeswoman in Washington, noted that the agency had convened a panel on Aug. 17 to study operational issues in two air corridors over New York City: the one over the Hudson River and another over the East River. She said the panel, which includes air traffic and safety experts from the aviation agency, experienced air traffic controllers and a member of the union that represents the controllers, is expected to present its report to Mr. Babbitt Friday.

“They are looking at all these issues, and we won’t have any comment on the N.T.S.B.’s recommendations until we have a chance to look at the recommendations of our own working group,” Ms. Brown said.

The crash spurred an outcry by New York politicians over the airspace, a corridor between Governors Island and the George Washington Bridge, 1,100 feet and below, which one politician referred to as the Wild West.

Among the board’s recommendations is one that would require that planes intending to re-enter airspace that is under the direction of controllers be cleared to do so as soon as traffic permits. Another would require that pilots in the area be advised to listen to an established common radio frequency to announce their position and listen for other traffic. Currently, some pilots — possibly including the one involved in the crash on Aug. 8 — listen to air traffic controllers instead. The board’s letter said that the pilot of the airplane had asked controllers to watch him on radar and warn him of other traffic — a service known as flight-following that is provided when controllers are able.

The board’s letter said that using a common frequency “would have required the pilot to be actively transmitting and receiving on two different radios at the same time,” which it said was especially hard in a busy environment like New York City’s. Still, it said, listening in on that common frequency is a “fundamental component” of safety procedures in the area.

The safety board has not yet determined what frequency the airplane’s pilot was monitoring on Aug. 8. Since he was told by a controller at Teterboro to check in with the controller at Newark Liberty International Airport and acknowledged that instruction, but never actually did so, one possibility is that he tuned in to some other, inappropriate frequency.

The board has also not determined the significance of a “nonbusiness” phone call placed by the Teterboro controller after he cleared the plane for take-off. But it said Thursday that the absence of a supervisor from the tower at the time of the crash had allowed the controller to make the call, and slowed up emergency notifications afterward.


Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company