[Big A]

By George Friedman

U.S. President George W. Bush made an appearance in Iraq's restive Anbar province on Sept. 3 -- in part to tout the success of the military surge there ahead of the presentation in Washington of the Petraeus report. For the next month or two, the battle over Iraq will be waged in Washington -- and one country will come up over and over again, from any number of directions: Israel. Israel will be invoked as an ally in the war on terrorism -- the reason the United States is in the war in the first place. Some will say that Israel maneuvered the United States into Iraq to serve its own purposes. Some will say it orchestrated 9/11 for its own ends. Others will say that, had the United States supported Israel more resolutely, there would not have been a 9/11.

There is probably no relationship on which people have more diverging views than on that between the United States and Israel. Therefore, since it is going to be invoked in the coming weeks -- and Bush is taking a fairly irrelevant pause at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Australia -- this is an opportune time to consider the geopolitics of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

Let's begin with some obvious political points. There is a relatively small Jewish community in the United States, though its political influence is magnified by its strategic location in critical states such as New York and the fact that it is more actively involved in politics than some other ethnic groups.

The Jewish community, as tends to be the case with groups, is deeply divided on many issues. It tends to be united on one issue -- Israel -- but not with the same intensity as in the past, nor with even a semblance of agreement on the specifics. The American Jewish community is as divided as the Israeli Jewish community, with a large segment of people who don't much care thrown in. At the same time, this community donates large sums of money to American and Israeli organizations, including groups that lobby on behalf of Israeli issues in Washington. These lobbying entities lean toward the right wing of Israel's political spectrum, in large part because the Israeli right has tended to govern in the past generation and these groups tend to follow the dominant Israeli strand. It also is because American Jews who contribute to Israel lobby organizations lean right in both Israeli and American politics.

The Israel lobby, which has a great deal of money and experience, is extremely influential in Washington. For decades now, it has done a good job of ensuring that Israeli interests are attended to in Washington, and certainly on some issues it has skewed U.S. policy on the Middle East. There are Jews who practice being shocked at this assertion, but they must not be taken seriously. They know better, which is why they donate money. Others pretend to be shocked at the idea of a lobbyist influencing U.S. policy on the Middle East, but they also need not be taken seriously, because they are trying to influence Washington as well, though they are not as successful. Obviously there is an influential Israel lobby in Washington.

There are, however, two important questions. The first is whether this is in any way unique. Is a strong Israel lobby an unprecedented intrusion into foreign policy? The key question, though, is whether Israeli interests diverge from U.S. interests to the extent that the Israel lobby is taking U.S. foreign policy in directions it wouldn't go otherwise, in directions that counter the U.S. national interest.

Begin with the first question. Prior to both World wars there was extensive debate on whether the United States should intervene in the war. In both cases, the British government lobbied extensively for U.S. intervention on behalf of the United Kingdom. The British made two arguments. The first was that the United States shared a heritage with England -- code for the idea that white Anglo-Saxon Protestants should stand with white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The second was that there was a fundamental political affinity between British and U.S. democracy and that it was in the U.S. interest to protect British democracy from German authoritarianism.

Many Americans, including President Franklin Roosevelt, believed both arguments. The British lobby was quite powerful. There was a German lobby as well, but it lacked the numbers, the money and the traditions to draw on.

From a geopolitical point of view, both arguments were weak. The United States and the United Kingdom not only were separate countries, they had fought some bitter wars over the question. As for political institutions, geopolitics, as a method, is fairly insensitive to the moral claims of regimes. It works on the basis of interest. On that basis, an intervention on behalf of the United Kingdom in both wars made sense because it provided a relatively low-cost way of preventing Germany from dominating Europe and challenging American sea power. In the end, it wasn't the lobbying interest, massive though it was, but geopolitical necessity that drove U.S. intervention.

The second question, then, is: Has the Israel lobby caused the United States to act in ways that contravene U.S. interests? For example, by getting the United States to support Israel, did it turn the Arab world against the Americans? Did it support Israeli repression of Palestinians, and thereby generate an Islamist radicalism that led to 9/11? Did it manipulate U.S. policy on Iraq so that the United States invaded Iraq on behalf of Israel? These allegations have all been made. If true, they are very serious charges.

It is important to remember that U.S.-Israeli ties were not extraordinarily close prior to 1967. President Harry Truman recognized Israel, but the United States had not provided major military aid and support. Israel, always in need of an outside supply of weapons, first depended on the Soviet Union, which shipped weapons to Israel via Czechoslovakia. When the Soviets realized that Israeli socialists were anti-Soviet as well, they dropped Israel. Israel's next patron was France. France was fighting to hold on to Algeria and maintain its influence in Lebanon and Syria, both former French protectorates. The French saw Israel as a natural ally. It was France that really created the Israeli air force and provided the first technology for Israeli nuclear weapons.

The United States was actively hostile to Israel during this period. In 1956, following Gamal Abdul Nasser's seizure of power in Egypt, Cairo nationalized the Suez Canal. Without the canal, the British Empire was finished, and ultimately the French were as well. The United Kingdom and France worked secretly with Israel, and Israel invaded the Sinai. Then, in order to protect the Suez Canal from an Israeli-Egyptian war, a Franco-British force parachuted in to seize the canal. President Dwight Eisenhower forced the British and French to withdraw -- as well as the Israelis. U.S.-Israeli relations remained chilly for quite a while.

The break point with France came in 1967. The Israelis, under pressure from Egypt, decided to invade Egypt, Jordan and Syria -- ignoring French President Charles de Gaulle's demand that they not do so. As a result, France broke its alignment with Israel. This was the critical moment in U.S.-Israeli relations. Israel needed a source of weaponry as its national security needs vastly outstripped its industrial base. It was at this point that the Israel lobby in the United States became critical. Israel wanted a relationship with the United States and the Israel lobby brought tremendous pressure to bear, picturing Israel as a heroic, embattled democracy, surrounded by bloodthirsty neighbors, badly needing U.S. help. President Lyndon B. Johnson, bogged down in Vietnam and wanting to shore up his base, saw a popular cause in Israel and tilted toward it.

But there were critical strategic issues as well. Syria and Iraq had both shifted into the pro-Soviet camp, as had Egypt. Some have argued that, had the United States not supported Israel, this would not have happened. This, however, runs in the face of history. It was the United States that forced the Israelis out of the Sinai in 1956, but the Egyptians moved into the Soviet camp anyway. The argument that it was uncritical support for Israel that caused anti-Americanism in the Arab world doesn't hold water. The Egyptians became anti-American in spite of an essentially anti-Israeli position in 1956. By 1957 Egypt was a Soviet ally.

[Big A]

The Americans ultimately tilted toward Israel because of this, not the other way around. Egypt was not only providing the Soviets with naval and air bases, but also was running covert operations in the Arabian Peninsula to bring down the conservative sheikhdoms there, including Saudi Arabia's. The Soviets were seen as using Egypt as a base of operations against the United States. Syria was seen as another dangerous radical power, along with Iraq. The defense of the Arabian Peninsula from radical, pro-Soviet Arab movements, as well as the defense of Jordan, became a central interest of the United States.

Israel was seen as contributing by threatening the security of both Egypt and Syria. The Saudi fear of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was palpable. Riyadh saw the Soviet-inspired liberation movements as threatening Saudi Arabia's survival. Israel was engaged in a covert war against the PLO and related groups, and that was exactly what the Saudis wanted from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. Israel's covert capability against the PLO, coupled with its overt military power against Egypt and Syria, was very much in the American interest and that of its Arab allies. It was a low-cost solution to some very difficult strategic problems at a time when the United States was either in Vietnam or recovering from the war.

The occupation of the Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights in 1967 was not in the U.S. interest. The United States wanted Israel to carry out its mission against Soviet-backed paramilitaries and tie down Egypt and Syria, but the occupation was not seen as part of that mission. The Israelis initially expected to convert their occupation of the territories into a peace treaty, but that only happened, much later, with Egypt. At the Khartoum summit in 1967, the Arabs delivered the famous three noes: No negotiation. No recognition. No peace. Israel became an occupying power. It has never found its balance.

The claim has been made that if the United States forced the Israelis out of the West Bank and Gaza, then it would receive credit and peace would follow. There are three problems with that theory. First, the Israelis did not occupy these areas prior to 1967 and there was no peace. Second, groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have said that a withdrawal would not end the state of war with Israel. And therefore, third, the withdrawal would create friction with Israel without any clear payoff from the Arabs.

It must be remembered that Egypt and Jordan have both signed peace treaties with Israel and seem not to care one whit about the Palestinians. The Saudis have never risked a thing for the Palestinians, nor have the Iranians. The Syrians have, but they are far more interested in investing in Beirut hotels than in invading Israel. No Arab state is interested in the Palestinians, except for those that are actively hostile. There is Arab and Islamic public opinion and nonstate organizations, but none would be satisfied with Israeli withdrawal. They want Israel destroyed. Even if the United States withdrew all support for Israel, however, Israel would not be destroyed. The radical Arabs do not want withdrawal; they want destruction. And the moderate Arabs don't care about the Palestinians beyond rhetoric.

Now we get to the heart of the matter. If the United States broke ties with Israel, would the U.S. geopolitical position be improved? In other words, if it broke with Israel, would Iran or al Qaeda come to view the United States in a different way? Critics of the Israel lobby argue that, except for U.S. support for Israel, the United States would have better relations in the Muslim world, and would not be targeted by al Qaeda or threatened by Iran. In other words, except for the Israel lobby's influence, the United States would be much more secure.

Al Qaeda does not see Israel by itself as its central problem. Its goal is the resurrection of the caliphate -- and it sees U.S. support for Muslim regimes as the central problem. If the United States abandoned Israel, al Qaeda would still confront U.S. support for countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. For al Qaeda, Israel is an important issue, but for the United States to soothe al Qaeda, it would have to abandon not only Israel, but its non-Islamist allies in the Middle East.

As for Iran, the Iranian rhetoric, as we have said, has never been matched by action. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian military purchased weapons and parts from the Israelis. It was more delighted than anyone when Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. Iran's problem with the United States is its presence in Iraq, its naval presence in the Persian Gulf and its support for the Kurds. If Israel disappeared from the face of the Earth, Iran's problems would remain the same.

It has been said that the Israelis inspired the U.S. invasion of Iraq. There is no doubt that Israel was pleased when, after 9/11, the United States saw itself as an anti-Islamist power. Let us remind our more creative readers, however, that benefiting from something does not mean you caused it. However, it has never been clear that the Israelis were all that enthusiastic about invading Iraq. Neoconservative Jews like Paul Wolfowitz were enthusiastic, as were non-Jews like Dick Cheney. But the Israeli view of a U.S. invasion of Iraq was at most mixed, and to some extent dubious. The Israelis liked the Iran-Iraq balance of power and were close allies of Turkey, which certainly opposed the invasion. The claim that Israel supported the invasion comes from those who mistake neoconservatives, many of whom are Jews who support Israel, with Israeli foreign policy, which was much more nuanced than the neoconservatives. The Israelis were not at all clear about what the Americans were doing in Iraq, but they were in no position to complain.

Israeli-U.S. relations have gone through three phases. From 1948 to 1967, the United States supported Israel's right to exist but was not its patron. In the 1967-1991 period, the Israelis were a key American asset in the Cold War. From 1991 to the present, the relationship has remained close but it is not pivotal to either country. Washington cannot help Israel with Hezbollah or Hamas. The Israelis cannot help the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan. If the relationship were severed, it would have remarkably little impact on either country -- though keeping the relationship is more valuable than severing it.

To sum up: There is a powerful Jewish, pro-Israel lobby in Washington, though it was not very successful in the first 20 years or so of Israel's history. When U.S. policy toward Israel swung in 1967 it had far more to do with geopolitical interests than with lobbying. The United States needed help with Egypt and Syria and Israel could provide it. Lobbying appeared to be the key, but it wasn't; geopolitical necessity was. Egypt was anti-American even when the United States was anti-Israeli. Al Qaeda would be anti-American even if the United States were anti-Israel. Rhetoric aside, Iran has never taken direct action against Israel and has much more important things on its plate.

Portraying the Israel lobby as super-powerful behooves two groups: Critics of U.S. Middle Eastern policy and the Israel lobby itself. Critics get to say the U.S. relationship with Israel is the result of manipulation and corruption. Thus, they get to avoid discussing the actual history of Israel, the United States and the Middle East. The lobby benefits from having robust power because one of its jobs is to raise funds -- and the image of a killer lobby opens a lot more pocketbooks than does the idea that both Israel and the United States are simply pursuing their geopolitical interests and that things would go on pretty much the same even without slick lobbying.

The great irony is that the critics of U.S. policy and the Israel lobby both want to believe in the same myth -- that great powers can be manipulated to harm themselves by crafty politicians. The British didn't get the United States into the world wars, and the Israelis aren't maneuvering the Americans into being pro-Israel. Beyond its ability to exert itself on small things, the Israel lobby is powerful in influencing Washington to do what it is going to do anyway. What happens next in Iraq is not up to the Israel lobby -- though it and the Saudi Embassy have a different story.


Tell George what you think

[LottiFurmann]

By Ira Forman

Of all the lessons I learned in 19 years of school, none was more useful than this: "Minority groups maximize their political influence by organizing intensely and focusing narrowly." This notion, which came out of an undergraduate course in government, is simple yet powerful. It almost perfectly summarizes the success of the so-called "Israel Lobby" in the United States during the last 40 years.

Now in a new book — "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" (Farrar Strauss and Giroux) — John J. Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen M. Walt of Harvard University provide a very different interpretation of how the lobby operates. The book, out this week, has already received an enormous amount of attention because of the authors’ argument that the Israel lobby is not only responsible for warping U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also for pushing America into a war in Iraq.

This is controversial material, and Walt and Mearsheimer would have written a much better, if less "sexy," book if they had kept in mind my professor’s simple description of how minorities maximize political power.

Walt and Mearsheimer’s narrative begins with the argument that current levels of U.S. support for Israel cannot be justified on either strategic or moral grounds. Once they dismiss these justifications, they "examine" how the lobby operates and conclude that it is the lobby’s extraordinary power that is shaping much of U.S. foreign policy.
The authors pursue Israel with a one-sided, prosecutorial zeal that echoes the same arguments that Israel’s critics have made for decades. However, even more damaging to Walt and Mearsheimer’s credibility is the question of how well they understand the role of American Jews in domestic politics.

In fairness, the two professors demonstrate a basic understanding of how the Israel lobby operates. They recognize the central role the American Israel Public Affairs Committee plays in lobbying Congress and to a lesser extent the executive branch. They note the participation of a large array of other Jewish organizations and Zionist Christian groups. The authors also point out the significant levels of political contributions that come from American Jews. They even have some understanding of how the power of the lobby has grown and evolved over the last 60 years.

Moreover, Walt and Mearsheimer have extensively reviewed both the American Jewish press and the English-language press. As a result they are familiar with the internal arguments within the Jewish communities in both the United States and Israel and they support their narrative with over 100 pages of footnotes.

However, in the final analysis, "The Israel Lobby" does not accurately reflect the realities of the U.S.-Israel relationship or the extent of the lobby’s power. Though the authors appear to understand the high level of political organization in the Jewish community, they totally misunderstand the limits of the lobby’s power. In particular they fail to understand that a narrow, laser-like focus on the U.S.-Israel relationship is what enhances the lobby’s power.

The American Jewish community’s ability to influence U.S. policy toward Israel is dramatically enhanced because of the unique role of Congress in American democracy. Members of Congress, unlike representatives in parliamentary systems, are extremely sensitive to voter and interest group opinion. The Jewish community’s political strength, combined with the weakness of the opposition and the public’s general support for Israel, allows the lobby to strongly influence U.S. policy toward Israel.

But as soon as a minority community tries to extend its organizational power to other public policy arenas, its power to affect policy is significantly reduced, as it must compete with other powerful interest groups. A good example of this dynamic is the battle over the 2007 Lobbying Reform Bill.

Walt and Mearsheimer argue that AIPAC won this legislative fight. While it is true that AIPAC’s position on third-party funded congressional travel was adopted, AIPAC failed in its attempt to allow congressional lobbyists to travel with members of Congress on such trips. AIPAC was no match for a public opinion environment where the notion of "lobbyist and congressional travel" became synonymous with scandal. For the same types of reasons, the lobby has never had a significant impact on campaign finance reform legislation. Walt and Mearsheimer don’t understand such subtleties of congressional behavior or the limits on ethnic group power.

The authors’ most spectacular accusation — that the lobby has significant responsibility for the Iraq war — is also an illustration of their limited understanding of the Israel lobby. The professors describe how a group of neoconservatives conspired to push for a war with Iraq, and they conflate these neocons with the Israel lobby. Not only do the authors attach a significant amount of blame to the Israel lobby for the morass in Iraq, but they go on to warn that any future military action in Iran must inevitably be laid at the door of the lobby.

To argue that a gang of largely Jewish neocons was able to bully Powell, Rumsfeld, Cheney and Bush into a war against their will is absurd. Even more ridiculous is the notion that these neocons were the Israel lobby.

[Slonopotam845]

At the beginning of the book Walt and Mearsheimer define the Israel lobby as a loose coalition of organizations and individuals. Thus in their worldview, organizations as diverse as the Israel Policy Forum and the Zionist Organization of America are part of the Israel lobby. Similarly, individuals as diverse as former UN ambassador John Bolton, New York Times columnist Tom Friedman, former Senate Majority Leader Tom DeLay and Sen. Russ Feingold constitute parts of this powerful lobby.

Even if one defines the lobby as "loose coalition," it presupposes some degree of coordinated action and information sharing toward specific legislative and policy goals. I can assure Walt and Mearsheimer that Weekly Standard Editor William Kristol and Democratic National Committee Chair Howard Dean have never joined the AIPAC staff on any phone call to discuss how to defeat a Saudi arm sale, let alone how to ensure a U.S. military strike on Iran.

The real Israel lobby (whether you define it as AIPAC or a bit more broadly to include a number of other organizations) did not meaningfully participate in the debate on Iraq because it did not have the power to meaningfully impact that debate — not when large arrays of very powerful interest and ideological groups clashed over the question of America going to war.

There are other portions of the Walt and Mearsheimer narrative that also fail to reflect the realities of the domestic politics behind the U.S.-Israel relationship. For example, in one chapter the authors attempt to demonstrate that the Israel lobby dominates the public relations battle. If the authors had bothered to interview nearly any Jewish communal leader, they would have found that the Jewish community’s lack of a public relations strategy on behalf of Israel has been a source of contention for decades.
For all of the book’s footnotes, there are a great many factual errors in the text. For example, the authors inflate the Jewish percentage of the U.S. population by 50 percent. At another point in the narrative they state that AIPAC’s former executive director, Tom Dine, was "reportedly" fired in 1993 because he was insufficiently hawkish. This was not the case, and a check of the authors’ own sources (as listed in the footnotes) contradicts their claim.

One of the professors’ arguments — their complaint that they and others who criticize Israel or the domestic Israel lobby are subject to charges of anti-Semitism — is not totally lacking in merit. Some of us in the Jewish community too quickly resort to the charge of anti-Semitism. Terms like anti-Semitism and racism should be reserved for only the most obvious cases lest they lose some of their power to shock and shame.
But if the charge of anti-Semitism is, at times, overused it appears that Walt and Mearsheimer are guilty themselves of overusing the charge of censorship. Time and time again they tell their readers how difficult it is to challenge Israel and its defenders. They tell us how difficult it is to find a forum for their views and complain of the personal price they must pay to speak the truth. Yet the authors have gained a great deal of press and fame for their original essay and this book. To paraphrase William Shakespeare, "methinks the gentleman doth protest too much."

Yes, if this book were an undergraduate paper it might receive a passing grade — if nothing else for its extensive footnoting and basic understanding of how the Jewish community and allies are organized for Israel advocacy. And yes, as an ideological polemic it also has some merit — particularly for the straightforward way that it makes its debating points. But as a serious academic work that effectively shines the light on the domestic politics of the friends of Israel, it deserves a big fat "F."

By all appearances Walt and Mearsheimer started with their conclusions and then shoehorned their research into a narrative that fit their conclusions. It’s not what you’d expect from a couple of professor from Harvard and Chicago.

Ira Forman is the co-editor of "Jews In American Politics." He currently serves as the executive director of the National Jewish Democratic Council (NJDC). From 1978-1981 he served as a lobbyist and the first political director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

[Lt_Apple]

The 'Israel Lobby' Myth
by George Shultz

Questioning Israel for its actions is legitimate, but lies are something else.
Israel is a free, democratic, open, and relentlessly self-analytical place. To hear harsh criticism of Israel's policies and leaders, listen to the Israelis. So questioning Israel for its actions is legitimate, but lies are something else. Throughout human history, they have been used not only to vilify but to establish a basis for cruel and inhuman acts. The catalog of lies about Jews is long and astonishingly crude, matched only by the suffering that has followed their promulgation.

Defaming the Jews by disputing their rightful place among the peoples of the world has been a long-running, well-documented, and disgraceful series of episodes across history. Again and again a time has come when legitimate criticism slips across an invisible line into what might be called the "badlands," a place where those who should be regarded as worthy adversaries in debate are turned into scapegoats, targets, all-purpose objects of blame.

In America, we protect all speech, even the most hurtful lies. We allow a virtual free-for-all by which laws are adopted, enforced, and interpreted. Hundreds of millions of dollars are spent yearly to influence this process; thousands of groups vie for influence. Among these are Jewish groups that have come under renewed criticism for being part of an all-powerful "Israel lobby," most notably in a book published this week by Profs. Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer.

Jewish groups are influential. They also largely agree that the United States should support Israel. But the notion that they have anything like a uniform agenda and that U.S. policy in Israel and the Middle East is the result of this influence is simply wrong.

Some critics seem overly impressed with the way of thinking that says to itself, "Since there is a huge Arab Islamic world out there with all the oil, and it is opposed to this tiny little Israel with no natural resources, then realistically the United States has to be on the Arab side and against Israel on every issue, and since this isn't the case, there must be some underhanded Jewish plot at work." This is a conspiracy theory, pure and simple.

Another tried and true method for damaging the well-being and security of the Jewish people and the State of Israel is a dangerously false analogy. Witness former President Jimmy Carter's book Palestine-Peace Not Apartheid. Here the association on the one hand is between Israel's existentially threatened position and the measures it has taken to protect its population from terrorist attacks, driven by an ideology bent on the complete eradication of the State of Israel, and, on the other, the racist oppression of South Africa's black population by the white Boer regime.

The tendency of mind that lies behind such repulsive analogies remains and is reinforced by the former president's views, spread across his book, which come down on the anti-Israel side of every case. These false analogies stir up and lend legitimacy to more widely based movements that take the same dangerous direction.

Anyone who thinks that Jewish groups constitute a homogeneous "lobby" ought to spend some time dealing with them. For example, my decision to open a dialogue with Yasser Arafat after he met certain conditions evoked a wide spectrum of responses from the government of Israel, its political parties, and American Jewish groups who weighed in on one side or the other. Other examples in which the United States rejected Israel's view of an issue, or the view of the American Jewish community, include the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia and President Reagan's decision to go to the cemetery at Bitburg, Germany.

The United States supports Israel not because of favoritism based on political pressure or influence but because the American people, and their leaders, say that supporting Israel is politically sound and morally just.
We are a great nation. Mostly, we make good decisions. We are not babes in the woods. We act in our own interests. And when we mistakenly conclude from time to time -- as we will -- that an action or policy is in America's interest, we must take responsibility for the mistake.

So, on every level, those who blame Israel and its Jewish supporters for U.S. policies they do not support are wrong. They are wrong because, to begin with, support for Israel is in our best interests. They are also wrong because Israel and its supporters have the right to try to influence U.S. policy. And they are wrong because the U.S. government is responsible for the policies it adopts, not any other state or any of the myriad lobbies and groups that battle daily -- sometimes with lies -- to win America's support.

Author Biography:
George Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. This is excerpted from his introduction to The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control by Abraham Foxman (Palgrave Macmillan).

[Beerinkol]

Mark LaVine is fairly well known history professor who rarely if ever has a positive thing to say about the 'Zionist entity'. But even he thinks Walt/Mearsheimer are wrong.

http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/42454.html

No, It's the Dog that Wags the Tail

Ever since the London Review of Books published the controversial findings of Universities of Chicago and Harvard professors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's research into the power of the Jewish, or Israesl lobby, the two men have been demonized as anti-Israel and even anti-Semitic. Now that the full product of their research has been published, as "The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy"(Farrar, Straus and Giroux ), and it's generated even more controversy because of its detailed, well-footnoted argument, that unquestioning US support for Israel goes against core US strategic interests and continues because of the undue influence and power of the so-called "Israel Lobby."


The Book is being severely criticized because it seems to confirm long-held anti-Semitic beliefs about undue Jewish political power. But in reality, the authors premise, and conclusions, are all wrong, or more precisely, backwards. Mearheimer and Walt seem to know little about the Middle East, Israel's role in US foreign policy, and what are core US goals and strategic interests in the region. They argue that this is a case of the 'tail wagging the dog'--a small client state and its allies in thee US leading the American government to engage in policies that are manifestly against its interests because of undue political power.

But this is nonsense. In fact, it is the other way around. The United States has been using Israel to fulfill its policies objectives for decades, from its role as a regional "pillar" (along with Saudi Arabia and Iran) in US containment strategies against the Soviet Union in the 1970s up until last summer, when the Bush administration encouraged a disastrous proxy war with Hezbollah as a way of testing the weapons and tactics of Iran, Hezbollah's main sponsor, in the event of a US attack.

Mearsheimer and Walt's book is also naive. It assumes that US political and economic leaders, especially those close to the Bush Administration, want to build peace and democracy in the Middle East, and that therefore supporting Israel's occupation hurts this cause. In reality, nothing could be further from the truth. As I showed in great detail in my last book, "Why They Don't Hate Us," and my new book on the Oslo peace process "An Impossible Peace: Oslo and the Burdens of History," the United States has never supported democracy and peace in the region. Instead, its strategic goals center around the perpetuation of continuous but manageable levels of conflict, punctuated every decade or so by major wars, as the way to ensure relatively high oil prices, control over key petroleum reserves or at least denying China uncontrolled access to them, disproportionate level of arms spending across the region (by far the highest in the world, with the majority of funds spent on US weapons systems), and the continued survival of the authoritarian regimes that ensure the perpetuation of a system that has generated over a trillion dollars in profits to US oil and arms countries just since September 11.

This pattern was made evident most recently by the announcement of a $20 billion arms sale to the Saudis, which was naturally compensated for by a $30 billion sale to Israel (much of it paid to US arms companies by the US government in one of the largest corporate welfare schemes in history, under the guise of "aid to Israel") and at least $20 billion more to Egypt (much of that also in the form of aid paid directly to defense manufacturers) and other allies. That's $70 billion for US weapons manufacturers in the next decade or so, just to keep the "balance of power" in the region.

Viewed this way, the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by all accounts one of the main fulcrums of the larger problems of the region, would be a strategic disaster for the United States. It would lead to lower oil prices, less spending on arms, and a loss of whatever slim levels of legitimacy is possessed by Arab dictators and monarchs, and open up the chance the the people of the region would decide to spend their money on things other than buying up overpriced US weapons, consumer debt, and high end real estate.

The authors have it wrong: it's not Americans who are suffering from undo influence of the Jewish Lobby; it's Israelis and Palestinians, and now the families of American servicemen and women deployed in the conflict zones of the "arc of instability" in the Middle East and Central Asia, who are suffering so that some of the most powerful and wealthy corporations in world history can continue to reap hundreds of billions of dollars in profits without anyone questioning why this system continues and whose interests it actually benefits.

One thing's for sure, aside from the "Jewish Lobby" (for whom the book is a God-send of a fundraising tool), the two groups most happy about the publication of "The Israel Lobby" are the oil and arms lobbies, unquestionably the most powerful, and invisible, lobbies in the United States.

[Peptobismol]

http://maurice-ostroff.tripod.com/id153.html

Maurice Ostroff

In response to my letter of May 6, 2006, you replied that you were preparing a lengthy "response to critics" in which you would address many of the issues I had raised. And indeed in December you kindly sent me a copy of your 81-page paper �Setting the record straight�.

While you did address some of the minor criticisms which had had been leveled against your published articles on the Israel lobby, I am disappointed that you ignored almost all the points I had raised. As my readers and I are anxious to learn your views on these matters, I would very much appreciate your considered response to the following.

1. The iraq war
You claim that were it not for the Jewish lobby, the US would almost certainly not have gone to war against Iraq in 2003 and I ask why you ignore reliable reports that PM Sharon and Israeli officials had warned the Bush administration against invading Iraq. This has been confirmed recently by Lawrence Wilkerson, a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff as reported by IPS.

Although you advise that you relied on Jewish newspapers like the Forward, you ignore a report in that paper confirming that prior to March 2003, PM Sharon advised Bush not to occupy Iraq and that AIPAC officials in Washington told visiting Arab intellectuals they would rather the United States deal militarily with Iran than with Iraq.

2. Your claim that US policy towards Israel contributes to America's terrorism problem.
I still look forward to your response to my quotation by Alex Alexiev, that Riyad has been the paymaster of most of the militant Islamic movements advocating terror unrelated to Israel. And that Islamist and anti-American agendas dominate the majority of Muslim Student Associations at U.S. colleges.

3. Ehud Barak and Arafat
Referring to your use of the expression "Barak�s purportedly generous" offer at Camp David, I suggested that as scholars, the loaded word "purportedly" was inappropriate. Don't you owe it to your readers to present them with the facts and allow them to form their own opinions as to whether the offer was generous or purportedly generous?

4. Campus Watch
You wrote about Campus Watch
"Pipes does not deny that his organization, Campus Watch, was created in order to monitor what academics say, write and teach, so as to discourage them from engaging in open discourse about the Middle East".

As I understand that Campus Watch very much encourages open discourse, please respond to my request for explanation of your allegation that it attempts to discourage academics from doing just that.

5. Apparent bias
You have not responded to my suspicion of bias where you wrote about relations between "Tel Aviv" and Washington, rather than Jerusalem (Israel's seat of government ), and Washington.

6. Lobbies in context
6.1 The Culture of Lobbies
I wrote that of course there is a Jewish lobby, in fact there are several, some of which oppose each other. They are part of the many competing influences that are integral to the Washington scene. You did not respond to my contention that your concentrated focus on the Israel Lobby creates the completely misleading impression that it is the only influence on Congress, whereas in reality, dozens of interest groups spend billions to convince politicians to pass or oppose particular laws.

6.2. The Pharmaceutical Lobby
Since your worthy motive appears to be protecting the public from lobbies that influence congress against the interests of USA citizens, let's look at the pharmaceutical lobby. As reported by CBS, it is responsible for millions of citizens being unable to afford much-needed prescription drugs. Due to its efforts, the cost of medications in the USA is highest in the world, while the lobby prevents importation of cheaper drugs from Canada or Mexico.

You could perform a great service to your fellow citizens if you were to apply your exceptional proven ability in marketing your Israel lobby campaign, to a similar campaign against some of the actions of this lobby.

I don't suggest this lightly. As 60 Minutes has pointed out, pharmaceutical lobbyists outnumber congressmen by two to one and the lobby spends roughly $100 million a year in lobbying expenses. Moreover, the Medicare prescription drug bill, one of the most expensive bills ever, was written by pharmaceutical lobbyists.

Commenting on the Medicare vote which by design took place at 3 AM, U.S. Representative, Jones, R-NC was quoted as saying "I've been in politics for 22 years and it was the ugliest night I have ever seen in 22 years"the arm-twisting was horrible". At an estimated cost of just under $400 billion over 10 years, it was the largest entitlement program in more than 40 years, Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich. said "I can tell you that when the bill passed, there were better than 1,000 pharmaceutical lobbyists working on this".

The complete CBS report may be viewed at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/29/60minutes/main2625305.shtml

6.3. The Arab Lobby
Of course any serious study of the Jewish Lobby cannot avoid comparison with Arab influence on Washington. I cannot understand how, in the face of extensive evidence to the contrary, you conclude in "setting the record straight" that there is no well-organized and politically potent Arab Lobby and little evidence that US politicians ever feel much pressure from pro-Arab groups.

I was expecting you to address for example my comments about Prince Bandar Bin Sultan who is reported to have participated in backstage intrigues, clandestine negotiations, and billion-dollar deals, all having to do with US interests in the Middle East and who was rated by Axis Information And Analysis (Aia), as almost the most influential foreigner in the USA.

I also mentioned that Aia refers to U.S.A.-Engage as one of the largest lobbying groups, uniting 640 giants of the American economy, a tenth of the leading banks, as well as associations of industrialists and farmers. The most prominent and influential members of U.S.A.-Engage work almost permanently in the Congress and have great influence over the mass media (partly because of their advertising expenditure).

Surely you cannot be unaware of the influence of Saudi funding of programs, advocacy groups and community centers on your own turfs in academia. You must know that Harvard and Georgetown intend to rename centers after Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud in return for receiving gifts of $20 million each to further Islamic studies. The gift to Georgetown is the second largest in its history and the gift to Harvard ranks among the 25 largest it has received.

It is also common knowledge that the Carter Center has received large donations from Arab sources including the late King Fahd and his nephew, Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal.

You will recall that the Zayed Centre funded by Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyanis hit the news when Harvard returned a $2.5 million gift because of the Center�s objectionable activities.

Despite being aware of the reason for Harvard's rejection of the gift from Sheik Zayed, former President Carter was, by contrast, proud to accept a gift from him and to call him a special friend. In a speech published on the Carter Center web site, he said
".. This award has special significance for me because it is named for my personal friend, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan".

In Craig Unger's book, "House of Bush, House of Saud" Unger tells of Saudis investing as much as $800 billion into American Equities, not only in blue chip companies but also in companies not doing so well, but linked to powerful politicians.

He also speaks of at least $1 million donated to each presidential library, emphasizing that the Saudis give to Democrats and Republicans alike. Prince Bandar has been quite frank. "If we give to our friends after they get out of office, the people in office will get the message".

In an interview with Sentient Times, Unger said that over the last 30 years, the Saudis spent $70 billion on propaganda, the biggest propaganda campaign in the history of the world.

Nor can the dramatic stranglehold of OPEC be ignored. This blatantly monopolistic cartel threatens not only the US, but also the world economy. With oil soaring around $80, it is mind-boggling to consider that production costs average only about $6 per barrel for non-OPEC producers; and $1.50 per barrel for OPEC producers (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists May/June 2005).

Surely, in light of such overwhelming evidence to the contrary, you cannot be comfortable continuing to claim that there is no well-organized, politically potent Arab Lobby.

7. Conclusion
I wholeheartedly support your call for a civilized discussion about the role of Israel in American foreign policy, though I fear that by focusing on Israel only, you are diverting attention from the serious threat of fundamentalist extremism as opposed to the moderate Muslim religion.

I will put aside, for the present, several other points that remain unanswered and I ask you to please treat this letter as intended, namely to pursue the civilized discussion you advocate.

[HedgeYourBets]

This is just another salvo. I'd say, in reply, there will be a far more critical look, perhaps a number of well documented books, that will chronicle the intense extra national [=Saudi, et al] involvement in US policy both foreign and domestic- in providing a retirement home for a non trivial population of the State Department; for theologically dominating, and browbeating non Wahhabi Muslim communities; for funding University chairs, and for even directly funding some of these recent attacks, by the likes of "independent" "academics". I'd guess the American public will be exactly where they are now, the sides have already been chosen.

[Big A]

B-

This was touched upon briefly in Michael Moore's Fahrenheit 911. That was before the Iraq War and the scapegoating of the Jews for said war. The left is too focused on Israel at the moment as the "biggest threat to world peace" to worry about SA, a brutal theocratic dictatorship funding terrorism throughout the world. I think the window of opportunity for examining SA and their role in all this has been closed, unfortunately.

For whatever it's worth, I think journalists, especially Jewish ones, are giving these W & M cretins far too much attention. Their thesis is boring and tired. They made a big deal out of their paper, the book should not get the same attention. It was published, neo-Nazis and the left love it and believe every word, end of story. They believe it b/c they want to believe it and no criticism from any Jewish journalist is going to change their mind. As Roger Cohen wrote the other day in the NYT, anyone not toeing the anti-war left's line to the tee is coined a "neocon."

[Ifroham4]

Yes there is an undercurrent of that on both counts... Jewish world reporting and previous attention paid to the "other lobby". I predict that by even next time this year a serious study of Saudi lobbying and influence will be published, and it will be CAIR that will ride the hot seat... for a lot longer than AIPAC or the Christian orgs. There's just so much to elucidate, Campus Watch for one has so much information on hidden charities paying for controversial chairs and studies. The Carter center is filthy with Saudi and Emirate funding. But the piece de la resistance will be a serious study of State Department retirees and associates.

Do you remember the promised billion dollar Saudi PR campaign? Where exactly did all those riyals land I wonder...

[Big A]

Well it all depends on who writes it. As I said, even Christopher Hitchens is regarded these days as a neocon. If it is written by someone in the anti-war camp who is not delusional, then it may get some traction. If it's written by Pipes, Horowitz or any conservative it will be dismissed. The funniest thing is when the NY Times refuses to review books that are #1 on their bestseller lists like Bill O' Reilly's "Culture Warrior"....so immature, really.

And if Michael Moore really believes what he said in F911 about SA and their influence and power in this country, he should make a full, proper movie about it.

[PhillipHer]

I doubt Moore will continue in that vein... not with the rest of his bedfellows (now theres a thought), so far on the other side of the issue.

[Drugmachine]

I doubt Moore will continue in that vein... not with the rest of his bedfellows (now theres a thought), so far on the other side of the issue.

Oh, I'm sure he won't. I only said he should. It would have to be someone like him, though, in order for it to become a discussion.

[Drugmachine]

I disagree. It doesn't (And shouldn't matter) where the criticism is coming from if it's substantiated, and better still, well argued/written- and even today we have enough circumstantial evidence to substantiate a thesis far more disturbing, in principle, than what M&W have proposed vis-a-vis the 'cabal' of the Jewish community. Remeber the undertone is very long... got a serious boost with attacking neocons 6 years ago. Now it's more public, but just as mainstream. So, whom ever writes these things will be attacked as partisan minimally, and among a loud minority: they will be branded as part of the greater ZOG. Charles Johnson is not Jewish IIRC.

If we are recognizing realities, which presumably you suggest it should be a liberal and [probably] non Jew responding in kind, the matter is simpler than that. The dividing line is already in place. The people who matter are already partisan, and the people who don't, wont contribute to the debate or the propaganda on either side.

[Fegasderty]

So you're saying, at least for the near future, that the lines are drawn and that there is no changing the left's mind on Israel or the Jewish lobby? And/or that no one from the left can/will write a book on the influence of the Saudi Lobby on the US and their foreign policy???