[nofkayalk]

Link 'Drunk' Yahya hinted at India attack 10 days before '71 war

Around 10 days before war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1971, the then President of Pakistan Yahya Khan had given an inkling of his intentions to attack this country after taking a few drinks with an American journalist.

Yahya had told the journalist on the day of their meeting that he would be "at the front within 10 days" when the American talked about getting back to the General in ten days time on the issue of meeting the President again, according to recently declassified ministry of external affairs documents.

And Yahya's word, perhaps made unwittingly, came true when Pakistan launched air attacks on military targets in India's northwest on the evening of December 3, 1971. Shortly after, the Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi said the air strikes were a declaration of war and at midnight, India launched an integrated ground, sea and air attack on East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and West Pakistan.

Next day, the then US envoy to India Kenneth Barnard Keating called foreign secretary T N Kaul to talk and mentioned how Khan had told Bob Shapley, a New Yorker correspondent, that Pakistan would be at war with India in 10 days, MEA files show.

[slimfifa]

Link Operation Parakram Revisited The author Major General (Retd) PJS Sandhu was the Chief of Staff of a Strike Corps during Operation Parakram

Yet, there were indicators below the surface which were pointing otherwise. These can be listed as (a) The BSF units deployed along the international border and those earmarked for operational duty had not been placed under the operational control of the Army immediately on mobilisation, as the Union War Book requires. This measure was taken at a belated stage. (b) The mobilisation of ad hoc units was half-hearted and slow which indicated that we were not preparing for war. (c) The railways did not accord the requisite priority to the movement of military special trains. As a result, our strategic reserves took much longer to reach their destinations than planned. (d) There was no re-orientation of the industry or boosting up of production by the Ordnance factories to make up our inventories of war materials. The Army continued to function with shortages. (e) The civil transport required by the Army to move and to make up the deficiencies of the integral military transport was hired and not impressed (requisitioned for service with the Army) into service. Hiring of transport is a tardy and time-consuming process at the best of times. (f) The railways acted with great sense of urgency. However, since no civilian trains were cancelled the military special trains took longer to be marshalled to reach their destinations. This explains the criticism that the mobilisation took inordinately longer than planned. (g) Above all, neither was a â??state of emergencyâ?? declared, nor were the provisions of the Union War Book invoked. As a result, various ministries did not orient their functioning towards the war effort.

We not only allowed the Gujarat riots to occur during 2002 and continue for a number of days but diverted our army formations from the trenches to deal with them. The troops were up-stuck from their deployment areas and flown to quell the riots. Naturally, the adversary would know that we were not serious (about waging war), even if the rest of the Army remained deployed on the border. No sooner was the sordid affair over, there was a fresh crisis in Ayodhya with the government acting as the silent spectator. Again there were demands to send in troops, albeit even from scanty and adhoc rear parties to assist in controlling the situation. Mercifully, this time the Army resisted any such move and no formations from the border were diverted, nor were the rear parties deployed to control the situation. Pakistan would have watched these developments from across the border with relief.

No wonder, from March 2002 onwards, there was a noticeable change in Pakistanâ??s responses to our continued mobilisation. Its strategic reserves moved out of their deployment areas to the cantonments or to training areas and never returned. Even the manning levels at the border were reduced, especially theatre reserves. Obviously, Pakistan had concluded that we posed no threat; yet we were to remain deployed for another six months. Our Prime Minister while addressing troops in a forward area in J&K exhorted them by calling the forthcoming battle â??Aar Par Ki Ladhaiâ??. The same evening while talking to the media in Srinagar, he said that when he looked up he did not see any war clouds - or words to that effect. This left those of us deployed for war wondering as to what was the real intention. Such talk was demoralising, to say the least.

We had played out our last card and were left with no further option. This became amply clear, after the Kaluchak massacre in which the terrorists from across the border struck at the families of the defence personnel. Our deployment could neither deter such an outrage, nor could we respond in a punitive manner. By June 2002 we were quite sure that there was no possibility of war and that our continued stay at the border and in our deployment areas was futile. Perhaps, we had no exit route to save face. This was the most trying period for the commanders and the troops. Depending upon the circumstances, the formations started organising rest and recreation as best as they could but the weather continued to take a toll of the equipment which was subjected to the elements.



It was finally in October that the National Security Advisory Board came to the rescue of the Government by recommending â??strategic relocationâ?? of formations with a view to be able to respond to any threat. In fact, it was a move back to the permanent locations but for some obscure reason, we were averse to calling it that. There was an interesting side to it. Soon after â??strategic relocationâ??, (move back to permanent locations), we referred our claims to the Controllers of Defence Accounts. They turned these claims down saying that the government orders to move back to our permanent location had not been issued; as such the claims could not be processed. On taking up the matter through staff channels, such orders were later issued. I do not know about Pakistan, but at least our financial wizards were not fooled by this â??strategic relocationâ?? plan.

What was the Grand Strategy?

It seems that from the very beginning the mobilisation was ordered to support coercive diplomacy. Initially, it carried credibility and Pakistan was badly shaken. They imagined that the â??pot was about to boil overâ??. President Musharrafâ??s speech on TV around January 8, 2002 bears testimony to that. India had the initiative. However, by the end of February 2002, we were no longer in control of the situation and the credibility of our intent had started slipping. The HQ 2 Corps episode resulting in the removal of the Corps Commander further eroded the credibility of our intent. To this day, it is widely believed that this was done under American pressure. Their satellite surveillance had picked up move of 2 Corps elements dangerously close to the border and that Pakistan had raised the alarm. In retrospect, it seems that the difference between coercive diplomacy and full scale mobilisation of the military was not appreciated by the political leadership.

The Army maintains that the mobilisation gave ample opportunity to the formations to train for war. To some extent, it is correct. However, at the same time our moves and dispositions did to a great extent compromise the security of our operational plans. The effect on morale and credibility of commanders (in the eyes of the troops) was considerably impacted. After some time, it became difficult to explain to the troops as to why we were still there. We had laid extensive minefields in consonance with our operational plans. These mines caused many casualties to the civilian population as also to the troops involved in laying and lifting of these mines. The mines once laid had to be replaced from Ordnance factories and this meant time and money. The Army Engineers and even Infantry personnel suffered many casualties during demining, a process which continued for many more months. The civilian population too suffered losses as mined areas could not be sown or harvested for at least 2-3 seasons. The overall financial impact on the defence budget and to the nation was considerable but the returns were not commensurate with the effort. Did we manage to coerce Pakistan to end its support to militancy and waging of proxy war? The answer to this vital question, I am afraid, is in the negative. It was business as usual. The terrorist strike at Mumbai on 26 November 2008 is a stark example of that.

[movlabz]

Link India moves forces to border with Pakistan 50 Years ago |

KARACHI: The situation created by the massing of Indian troops on Pakistanâ??s borders in an atmosphere of open threats of aggression by highly placed Indian leaders is so serious and alarming that it can be the subject of a second complaint to the United Nations, informed sources said yesterday.

Six divisions of the Indian Army, and an armoured division, supported by an armoured brigade, are now deployed in areas close to West Pakistan and are within striking distance. One division is concentrated on the East Pakistan border as well.

Indian divisions are larger than the normal; each having four to five, or even more, brigades. The armoured strength of the Indian Army has been brought to the border area from Jhansi.

The concentration began about the time India invaded Goa, and still continues. It is noteworthy that only 44 per cent of Indiaâ??s land border is common with Pakistan, and yet, nearly 80 per cent of its army is concentrated on this border. It has only one division on the border with China.

[Catalogov]

Link India and its Hybrid War


Going by the definition of Hybrid Warfare, what we witnessed in 1971 was the preparation, provocation and successful execution of a first rate Hybrid War.

The 40th anniversary of the Bangladesh Liberation War passed by in the middle of December. As ever it was an occasion to reminisce independent Indiaâ??s greatest military success. Most of the writing and recollecting, therefore, remained confined to the positive aspects of the campaign.

What we heard was the purely conventional story as has been repeatedly told â?? from Mrs Indira Gandhiâ??s directive to General Sam Maneckshaw and his legendary refusal to initiate hostilities prematurely, to how the Pakistani Army persisted with digging itself into a hole that it found surrounded by the Indian Army on December 16, 1971. Various individual acts of brilliance and bravery were also recounted. Since times are changing, the sailing of the US Navyâ??s Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal found lesser space than in previous years. But that is par for the course.

Some of the more discerning comments were about how India managed a superb manoeuvre campaign. Instead of attacking conventionally, which it did initially, the Army bypassed dug-in Pakistani troops to get to the centre of gravity, Dhaka. Army-Air Force synergy came into play at this stage, and some suitably praised it, for it was exemplary. The mobility of the Indian military mind stood out in stark contrast to the Pakistani Armyâ??s reactive and confused state of thinking.

But that was only to be expected since the perpetrator of atrocities and the harbinger of freedom carry with them contrasting manuals of perceptions. The preconceived assessment of Indiaâ??s actions had already been made by the sheer scale of the Pakistani Armyâ??s brutality. It was a cake walk in the battle of global opinion polls. In the euphoria of analysis it is not surprising that two aspects of the Bangladesh Liberation War get short shrift.

It was, for starters, a just war in the global perception stakes. Not since World War II was it possible to define good and bad in terms as clearly as it was in the weeks and months running up to December 1971. The villain and the vanquisher had been determined long before the first shot was fired. This was as much on account of Pakistanâ??s villainy as it was on India playing the perception management game.

Which then leads on to the second aspect of the war that has gotten short shrift thus far. It still remains an unanswered query, but which begs asking. Did India do everything in its abilities to ensure hostilities happened? Was Indian policy designed to trigger a war, or was it really a sleeping neighbour roused to goodness by the scale of cruelty heaped on East Pakistan? Did Pakistan simply walk into a mate prepared by the brilliance of Indiaâ??s manoeuvres on the global chess board?

Asking questions in this direction does not take away from Pakistanâ??s perfidy toward its own people, and it doesnâ??t take away the goodness from Indiaâ??s actions. India as the initiator of conflict does not become the villain. What it does is to lead us to the crux of the second aspect of the war that has gotten short shrift. Did India in 1971 predate the 21st century global fixation with Hybrid Warfare? Going simply by the prevailing definitions of Hybrid Warfare, it is possible to credit India with the preparation, provocation and successful execution of a first rate Hybrid War.

Military analysts around the democratic world have been poring over writing, training, conflicts, skirmishes, and evolving ideologies to arrive at a greater understanding of the nature of Hybrid Warfare. It is regarded as the greatest threat to the global order of things. The genesis of this fascination lies in a Beijing pamphlet credited to two officers of the Peopleâ??s Liberation Army and mischievously titled â??Unrestricted Warfareâ??. It created a storm when published in the late-1990s.

The concept of Hybrid Warfare was thus born, and in the last decade it has moved from concept papers in high brow military journals, to seminar rooms, to possible field training manuals. India recently conducted its first brain storming session on Hybrid Warfare in a closed-door seminar at the prestigious Army War College in Mhow. The attendees included serving and retired officers, military and civilian. Organised and hosted by the Army War College, the seminar represents Indiaâ??s first attempt at understanding this phenomenon. Little wonder that the initiative was taken by the Army War College, doyen of military thought and teaching in India.

The widely accepted definition of Hybrid Warfare is credited to its most avid analyst, retired United States Marine Corps officer Frank Hoffman. Writing in Conflict in the 21st century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, published by the Potomac Institute of Policy Studies, Hoffman states, â??Hybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.

Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both state and a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict. The effects can be gained at all levels of war.â?�

The global benchmark of a hybrid campaign is currently regarded to be that of the Lebanese Hizbullah in 2006 when it succeeded in halting and overturning Israelâ??s incursion into south Lebanon. Panelists and participants at the Army War College seminar did allude to a Hizbullah scenario in the future, but there was mention too of India in 1971. In fact one of the participants brought out points from Kautilya that could easily be taken as preparations for a Hybrid War.

Going by the myriad of actions and activities that constitute Hybrid Warfare, there is no doubt aspects of it did exist in the mind and thinking of Kautilya. Just as there is no doubt that what India conducted in 1971 was not merely a war in the conventional sense of the word, but a hybrid campaign that covered almost all aspects as highlighted by Hoffman. India prepared for the campaign physically as well.

But lessons from the conduct of the Pakistani Army are equally important. They serve to highlight the mind as the centre of gravity, in every aspect of warfare. As the Commandant of Army War College, Lt Gen Anil Chait, said, â??The Army that rejects seminal thinkers, deprives itself of innovative ideas and intellectual self renewal. It will ultimately become a defeated Army, vanquished in the wake of foes who adapt more wisely and quickly, to the ever-evolving art and science of war.â?�

[UvgpXK0J]

Sandeep Unnithan New Delhi, March 16, 2012 | UPDATED 08:25 IST No secret deal with India during 1971 war: Henry Kissinger

Veteran diplomat Henry Kissinger denied that the United States had made a secret pact with India to prevent an attack on West Pakistan. After the 1971 war which saw the break up of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh, the US asked India not to strike against West Pakistan.

Addressing the opening gala dinner keynote address at the India Today Conclave, the former US Secretary of State said that the war broke out just when the US was conducting negotiations with China through Pakistan. "India and the former Soviet Union had made a near-alliance around this time. It was in the national interest of the US to preserve West Pakistan," he said.

The Indian army moved into East Pakistan on December 4, 1971. The Indian offensive led to the creation of Bangladesh. The US responded with gunboat diplomacy. President Nixon sent the Seventh Fleet led by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. "Each side did what it had to do. Each acted on its own national interest which clashed for a brief moment," he said.

Kissinger also laid another Cold War ghost to rest. White House tapes of the Nixon presidency declassified in 2005 reveal the former Secretary of state used unparliamentary language while referring to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. "I was under pressure and made those comments in the heat of the moment. People took those remarks out of context," Kissinger said, adding that he had the highest regard for Indira Gandhi.

The veteran statesman who turns 90 next year, spoke on 'the making of an Asian century'. Clearly, an issue consuming global attention. Israel has threatened to attack Iran destabilising the Middle East. The US in embroiled in the Afghan quagmire. India, meanwhile, wearily watches the rise of China.

Kissinger, the architect of President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, had a word of advise for India. It would not be in India's national interests to allow a dominant power or a transnational power that would intrude into its sphere of influence: from Singapore to East Africa.

He also said that China would treat India with respect and that India, China and the US would have to work together to balance China's internal forces that had the potential to destabilize it.

Dr Kissinger signed off with his interpretation of the art of foreign policy: "to have a vision of the future and the courage to pursue it".

[tipoketpu]

Acknowledging Indian help Link

Posted on March 18, 2012

Shamsuzzuha

Bangladesh will be celebrating its Independence Day on 26th of March. The day will be utilised to acknowledge Indian help in creating the state of Bangladesh.

Hasina Wajid’s government which had regained power through Indian money and clandestine support of Indian intelligence agency has invited Lt Gen (R) J F R Jacobs of the Indian Army to honour him for his services in creating Bangladesh.

The General had served as the Eastern Military Commander at that time when 1971 war took place. While talking to the ‘Indian Express’, General Jacob thanked the Bangladeshis for acknowledging Indian help in creating a separate homeland for them.

This has not been the first time that Bangladesh acknowledged India’s clandestine support in crafting out Bangladesh. Hasina Wajid is on record to have acknowledged the Indian connection when she revealed that she was a privy to formal plans devised by his father in London in 1969 to secede eastern wing from Pakistan and re-name it as Bangladesh. General Manekshaw, the Indian army chief wrote in one of his books that India had recruited around 80,000 Hindus to help Bengali secessionists free Bangladesh.
Also one of the only surviving conspirators of ‘Agartala Conspiracy’ Colonel ® Shawkat Ali while giving an interview to ‘Dhaka Courier’ in February this year confessed that, “Until recently it was believed that this case was a ploy to get rid of Sheikh Mujib, when in reality it was a case filed on very concrete and true accusations. We did conspire for secession of East Pakistan! The accusations were 100 per cent true”. The Colonel is serving as Deputy Speaker of Bangladesh Parliament. The increasing acceptance of the ‘Conspiracy’ has taken me back in the history and completely saddened me as I remembered my Bengali friends with whom I shared a very affectionate time while being in Bangladesh.

India’s role in dismembering Pakistan was very much known to our Government and the military then however, it was only for our Bengali brothers that it was able to materialize its sinister plans. It had hoped that by doing this intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan it would achieve two aims one: that it will have a much weakened enemy (Pakistan) on one side and two: that it will have a friendly country (Bangladesh) on the other side that will also act as an extension of its economy. Whereas it failed to tame Pakistan for its strength, it did manage to have ingress in the Bangladesh’s affairs making it subservient to its hegemonic designs.

It has already starved Bangladesh by diverting waters of River Ganga and now forcing to accept its terms for granting transit rights through Bangladesh. While the Awami League is in power India is likely to achieve its strategic objectives in that part of the world. The close association between the present Government with India has also become a point of concern for educated Bengalis who foresee India turning their country virtually into a vassal state.

[omaculer]

A Kargil hero who is ready to fly again
G.P.S. Kaushik (43), a former Air Force pilot, when the Kargil war broke in May 1999, Kaushik, then in Srinagar, worked as rescue and operations head. Only Srinagar and Leh had airstrips from where defence aircraft could take off and land. Kaushik, in aircraft 33RNO (rescue and operations), had three main tasks to accomplish.
"We had to rescue our soldiers as fast as possible, map enemy positions and supply all possible support to the Indian army. It was challenging. But people like us wait for such assignments,” he told The Telegraph from his hospital bed at Apollo.
Obviously, manoeuvring the aircraft during a full-fledged war wasn’t easy.

“Exactly. Gunshots whiz around you. You never know when you’ll get hit. The enemy aims for craft’s fuel tank to make it explode. Casualties were massive on both sides. Rescue work is a very skilled job. Only films can recreate such scenes,” he grinned, minutes before being wheeled to the radiology department for tests.

[ResistNewWorldOrder]

Link A book by Major General (Retd) Kuldip Singh Bajwa, a local war veteran, on the 'falsehoods' in the account given by Lt Gen (Retd) J F R Jacob on the Indo-Pak War 1971, has set the cat among the pigeons. It has also sparked a fierce debate in the defence circles.

Lt Gen Jacob is considered the architect of the 1971 victory against Pakistan.

In his book 'India-Pakistan War 1971, Military Triumph and Political Failure', Maj Gen Bajwa has alleged that Jacob in his two books published after the death of Field Marshal Manekshaw and Lt Gen Aurora and in an article published in a Bangladesh newspaper has blatantly claimed that he was the architect of the military campaign that led to the liberation of Bangladesh.

"The final decision on to how to conduct the operation is that of the commander alone, as is the command ethos in the Indian Army as well as other armies. A staff officer, even at pinnacle of the staff ladder, howsoever brilliant he may be, neither claims any credit for success nor earns stigma for failure," the book says.

Lt Gen Jacob, who has also served as Punjab governor, was chief of staff (COS) of Army's Eastern Command during the 1971 war. Lt Gen J S Aurora was the Army Commander of the Eastern Command, which is credited to have won the war, and Field Marshal S H F J Manekshaw was the Army Chief at that time.

Bajwa's book, however, says that the contribution of Jacob in persuading Lt Gen Niazi of Pakistan to accept the terms of the unconditional surrender must be acknowledged. But adds that by ''proclaiming himself as the architect of the victory, Jacob has denigrated Indira Gandhi, Manekshaw as well as the chiefs of the Air Force and Navy''.

The credit for winning the 1971 India-Pakistan has become the subject of a new book by a war veteran Maj Gen Kuldip Singh Bajwa. Reacting to the Maj General's version, Lt Gen Jacob sent an email to TOI saying, "Bajwa is certainly entitled to his opinion, but all those who served in HQ Eastern Command during the 1971 war will confirm that Lt Gen Aurora left operations and logistics entirely to me. Why did Aurora shred all documents, perhaps all operational assessments and orders on logistics signed by me?"

"Why did Indira Gandhi not give him (Gen Aurora) anything despite his requests to her? Gandhi was well aware of his contribution in 1971. I was promoted to raise 16 Corps. The Akalis later nominated Aurora to the RS...I do not want to say more." Jacob also clarified that his book ''Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation '' was published in 1997 when Manekshaw and Aurora were alive. "I gave copies to Manekshaw and Aurora in 1997 and they never contested anything in the book.''

[wrewsTear]

The Hindu : Opinion / Op-Ed : Was there an Indian plot to break up Pakistan in 1971?

Following the victory of the Awami League, India hoped relations with a new democratic Pakistan would improve. But the Pakistani army's brutal crackdown on March 25 changed everything.

The sweeping victory of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman's Awami League in the 1970 Pakistani elections was warmly received in India. The Bengalis of East Pakistan had always favoured a more cooperative approach in relations with India. New Delhi hoped for a progressive improvement in bilateral relations with a new democratic Pakistan, in which the eastern wing had its rightful representation. However, some observers questioned the possibility of bridging the vast political divide between the two wings of Pakistan. They felt that the eastern wing was likely to secede.

Secession, objectives
In December, High Commissioner B.K. Acharya expressed a view that was widely accepted in New Delhi. He recognised the possibility of secession but argued that majority control of the Central Pakistan Government by the East Pakistanis offered the only hope of achieving India's policy objectives towards Pakistan and overcoming the stonewall resistance of West Pakistan against better ties. Moreover, a secessionist East Bengal might demand integration with West Bengal and a United Bengal and might pass under the control of pro-Chinese Marxists. Such developments would further complicate India's defence and strategic problems. Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul agreed that India should do nothing to encourage the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan but he added that it did not lie in India's hands to stop it. Much would depend on the rulers of Pakistan and the realisation by West Pakistan of the need to come to an equitable arrangement with East Pakistan.

Indian officials reviewed the situation in early January. MEA Secretary S.K. Banerjee and Acharya observed that the question of a secessionist movement would arise only if the eastern wing failed to secure its six-point autonomy demand through constitutional means. Acharya observed that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan Peoples' Party, might accept the autonomy demand if he himself could be all-powerful in the western wing, or if each wing was allowed to go its own way. However, a basic point of disagreement was in regard to powers of taxation. The army would not accept an arrangement under which it would have to depend upon subventions from the provinces for its funding.

R.N. Kao, the head of India's Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), said that he had received information that Mujib himself considered secession to be a definite possibility and was preparing for such an eventuality. Kao's assessment was that Mujib's hands were tied. He would either have to adopt an unyielding stand on the six-point demand or be swept aside by popular opinion. He would go through the motions of seeking implementation of the demand through constitutional means but a secessionist movement was a definite possibility. In this case, India could expect appeals for assistance in a variety of fields, including arms, money and military training. He urged that India should position itself to offer the assistance that might be requested.

What the records show
The records show that New Delhi had no prior intention of dismembering Pakistan. However, events moved rapidly in East Pakistan. At the end of January 1971, RAW confirmed that the Awami League leadership was not very optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations on a new constitution and was preparing to launch a mass movement for an independent Bangladesh if the talks proved abortive. In early March, Tajuddin Ahmad met secretly with Deputy High Commissioner K.C. Sen Gupta, on Mujib's instructions, to explore whether India would provide political asylum and other assistance in the event of a liberation war. After consulting Delhi, Sen Gupta gave a response that was insufficiently specific to satisfy Sheikh Mujib. In mid-March, the latter repeated his appeal for assistance at this critical hour for his country, which was left with no alternative but to fight for independence.

India was not taken by surprise by the Pakistani crackdown on the Bengalis on March 25. She was not prepared, however, for the savagery of the onslaught. This drew impassioned condemnation from all sections of the Indian public. It also resulted in a refugee influx on a totally unexpected and unprecedented scale.
Though border inhabitants offered unstinting hospitality to the victims of the barbaric crackdown, it became evident that economic and political stability in the border provinces would be in danger unless conditions were created for the return of the millions of refugees to their homeland.

The plan
By the beginning of April, India's political aims had crystallised. New Delhi entertained deep apprehensions concerning a long-drawn guerrilla war in East Pakistan. It feared that a freedom struggle initially led by the moderate Awami League might eventually be taken over by pro-Chinese extremists if it dragged on for years. Thus the freedom fighters had to be assisted to bring the hostilities to the earliest possible conclusion and open military intervention might be required in the final stage.

Second, conditions had to be created to enable the return of the refugees to their homes as early as possible. In the absence of a political settlement between the Awami League leadership and Islamabad, the refugees would return only to an independent Bangladesh.

These cerebral reasons were powerfully reinforced by the moral outrage caused by Pakistan army atrocities and the strong public support for intervention on behalf of the victims. After March 25, Indian public opinion was unanimous in demanding that the government should extend full assistance to the Bangladesh freedom struggle.

At the beginning of the year, India had hoped for a united Pakistan in which the eastern wing exercised a degree of influence proportionate to its population. The prospect of secession was viewed with some misgiving. It soon became evident, however, that secession was a very real possibility as the dominant forces in Pakistan were not prepared to accept the six-point programme. The brutal crackdown of March 25 sealed the fate of a united Pakistan. The emergence of an independent Bangladesh was inevitable after the massacre. Public sympathy for the people of Bangladesh and India's national interests demanded that full cooperation be extended to the freedom struggle in order to ensure its speedy success.

(The writer, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, is a retired diplomat and author of War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48.)