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Nuclear weapons not for war: Army chief Gen. V.K. Singh

Amid reports of Pakistan and China augmenting their nuclear arsenals, Indian Army chief Gen. V.K. Singh Sunday rejected the threat of a nuclear war, saying such weapons primarily have a "strategic significance".

"Nuclear weapons are not for war fighting. Let's be quite clear on it," Singh said on the sidelines of the Army Day parade when asked about the nuclear postures and arsenals of Pakistan and China.

"They've got a strategic significance and that's where it should end. Me and my army are not bothered about who has nuclear weapons. We have our task cut out and we will progress along that," Singh said.

India maintains a credible minimum deterrence and its nuclear doctrine consists of, among other things, no first use as a matter of policy.

Singh's comments came a day before India hosts the meeting of officials of the Nuclear Security Summit that will focus on issues relating to nuclear terrorism and the safety of atomic materials and facilities.

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Nuke option only if attacked by n-weapons: Naval chief

Navy Chief Admiral Nirmal Verma today said the country will exercise the option of carrying out nuclear strikes if somebody does the "foolhardy" act of attacking it with atomic weapons.

"Only time this (India using nuclear weapons) could happen is when somebody who possesses nuclear weapons does something as foolhardy as to use them. That will be the only occasion when our country would be involved in (its) utilisation," the Navy Chief told reporters here.

Admiral Verma was responding to a media query on Army Chief Gen V K Singh's statement yesterday that nuclear weapons are not for fighting war but to have a strategic capability.

Noting that India had a 'no first use' policy with regard to nuclear weapons, Verma said, "It means there will be no occasion where we will use it (the weapons) first."

He said this policy was a "good one" and met all the requirements of the country.

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Jittery about Pakistanâ??s tactical nukes, India admits to and refines â??Cold Startâ??

Pakistan now has more nuclear weapons than Bharatâ??perhaps even more than France. This creates colossal problems for Bharatâ??s Cold Start, â??Pro-Activeâ?� and Pivot and Strikeâ?� strategic plans. While it used to take Bharat months to mobilize its forces, the Bharati Generals now seem to think that they can spring into action in a week or so, striking deep into Pakistani territory without actually holding Pakistan landâ??in other words, acting under the nuclear threshold, but at the same time inflicting losses on the Pakistan Army.

Pakistanâ??s Nuclear program has been Uranium based. The Chinese Nuclear program is Plutonium based. Pakistanâ??s Uranium based program was based on enriching Uranium using Gas Centrifugesâ??cheaper technology which none of the other Atomic powers had used before. After perfecting the larger Uranium based devices, now Pakistan has begun to miniaturize its weapons using Plutonium based bombs.

Delhi is a bit jittery about Pakistanâ??s nuclear program that focuses on â??low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons.â?� These Plutonium based weapons would be used to decimate Bharatâ??s â??Cold Startâ?� strategy that banks on rapid movement and deployment of Bharati forces.

Pakistanâ??s fourth reactor at the Khushab military facility is problematic for Bharat. This stops Delhi from invading Pakistan. Pakistan has the capability to add at least eight to 10 such weapons each year. Apparently the Pakistan are following the Chinese model of owning low-yield nuclear weapons. These tactical nukes are the â??Cold Startâ?� buster mechanism which will provide the Pakistani military a flexible response in case of an escalation with India and allow it to dominate.

Once Khushab is up to speed, Pakistan will be able to produce 35 Plutonium based tactical nuclear weapons per year. Pakistan is known to have a nuclear arsenal, however the quantity of the weapons has baffled Delhi.

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India’s nuclear choices - The Times of India

Last week's Agni V missile test should be a source of pride and strategic comfort for India. However, it also throws up challenging questions about the direction in which the country wants to take its nuclear weapons programme; questions that are far too important to leave to the scientists or even a narrow coterie of policymakers.


There is no doubt that this test and the technological advance it represents will strengthen nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in Asia. Nearly 40 years after India's first nuclear test at Pokhran, and a quarter-century after the first Indian nuclear warhead was put together in the late 1980s, India has finally put Beijing and Shanghai within the reach of its nuclear forces. The mobility and range of the Agni V makes it India's most survivable missile yet.


Once it is inducted, Indian policymakers can be absolutely certain that, even in the worst-case scenario of a devastating nuclear attack on the Indian homeland, the country will retain the means of retaliation.


Diplomatically, too, the Agni V is a symbol of India's changed place in the world. In 1994, the United States pressured India to suspend testing of the Agni series after just three test flights. India formally suspended the programme at the end of 1996, although it resumed testing in 1997.


The muted American res-ponse to the test of the Agni V, despite Washington's concern over the missile programmes of Iran and North Korea, is indicative of the rapid improvement in the US-India bilateral relationship over the past 15 years. Some Indians sneer at the efforts made by successive Indian governments to improve ties with Washington. These sceptics should consider the diplomatic nightmare that India would have faced had it conducted this test 15 years ago.


However, the most important question is whether this missile heralds a new plateau in India's nuclear ambitions, or merely serves a bridge to a yet more advanced arsenal.


Following its 1998 nuclear tests, India released a semi-official draft nuclear doctrine committing to a policy of 'no-first use' and 'credible minimum deterrence'. In 2003, an official doctrine was issued along similar lines. Since that doctrinal statement, however, the Indian government has said little about what it sees as necessary to attain credibility, whether in terms of numbers or weapons systems. In the absence of a new doctrinal direction, the future of the Agni V will shed some light on India's nuclear intentions.


In the years since 2003, it became apparent that credible minimum deterrence would be a highly elastic concept. It was never quite clear how much the arsenal size and posture of India's two nuclear neighbours, Pakistan and China, would determine India's own nuclear needs. Pakistan's arsenal is estimated at 90-110 warheads and China's at 170, the latter bolstered by an ICBM of over 11,000 km range.


Indian analysts have expressed particular concern over the adverse missile balance with China. The test of the Agni V is the culmination of many years of cumulative research and development, and is not directly related to the immediate state of the Sino-Indian relationship. However, that relationship has been especially turbulent in recent years.


Consequently, the Agni V has been imparted with political status and symbolism much greater than prior missiles. Even as questions over Indian military readiness remain worryingly open, the ripening of India's second-strike capability will provide reassurance to India about the strategic balance. Yet India would do well not to get caught in the intellectual trap of thinking that nuclear deterrence is a numbers game. China's numerical or qualitative advantage - or Pakistan's, for that matter - counts for basically nothing.


This is where India has choices to make. An Agni V deployed in modest numbers, and accompanied by political signals that the system's development represents the maturity of India's nuclear forces, would most closely accord with the initial spirit of credible minimum deterrence.


By contrast, if the Agni V is seen as a 'bridge' to a much more diverse and sizeable Indian arsenal, and its production and deployment eventually takes place in large numbers, this could herald a strengthening of the more assertive strand in Indian nuclear thinking.


There are two risks. The first is that bureaucrats and scientists, rather than elected politi-cians and a well-informed public, make these choices. Last year, MIT professor Vipin Narang, writing for the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, warned that "DRDO's press releases and post-test comments unnecessarily - and dangerously - confuse India's nuclear posture".


Perhaps India should build on the Agni V test to make longer-range missiles, as DRDO director V K Saraswat promised to do last week, but this has big financial, diplomatic and strategic implications - and is therefore a matter for political leaders. A national security strategy and nuclear posture review - like those we see in other nuclear weapons states - would be a good start.


The second danger is that we begin to see all technological advances as desirable. To be sure, anything that makes India's missiles more survivable - for example, increasing their mobility on the ground - is unambiguously a good thing. But other improvements mentioned by Saraswat, like MIRV technology that puts multiple warheads on a single missile, presents trade-offs: the missiles will pack a greater punch, but could generate fears that India is abandoning credible minimum deterrence.


As India's former army chief, General K Sundarji, once obser-ved, "In war-fighting, whether conventional or nuclear, whilst calculating relative strengths, more is always better. But for deterrence, more is not better if less is adequate". As India rightly celebrates the improvement of its national deterrent, this is sound advice.


Joshi is a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute and a doctoral candidate at Harvard Univer-sity. O'Donnell is a doctoral candidate at King's College, London.