[Boripiomi]

There has been some discussion on this board about this phrase, "empty of inherent existence," a phrase that probably is best associated with the historic Madhyamka approach. Nagarjuna explains the idea in the Madhyama-kakarika 15 like this:
[Things with] inherent existence do not occur by way of conditions and causes. [Things with] inherent existence that are produced by causes and conditions would be created. But how could [something with] inherent existence be created? For [things with] inherent existence are uncreated, and independent of other [things]. There are differing views about this particular phrase. Some people take it as a statement to mean that nothing exists. (One person on this board has refered to it as a "turd"). Other people do not take it that way at all. There is valid disagreement about how to understand these words.

Regardless, the phrase itself sometimes has been used as a boilerplate phrase to help illustrate a facet of anatta, of not-self. This probably is not the clearest way to help explain anatta, because of the associations with this phrase. But taken on its face, and emptied of its baggage, the phrase does in fact work as a tool to help approach anatta.

The Buddha himself used language similar to this, as in the Dhammapada 277-297:
When you see with discernment,
'All fabrications are inconstant' —
you grow disenchanted with stress.
This is the path
to purity.

When you see with discernment,
'All fabrications are stressful' —
you grow disenchanted with stress.
This is the path
to purity.

When you see with discernment,
'All phenomena are not-self' —
you grow disenchanted with stress.
This is the path
to purity. The phrase "all phenomena are not-self" could be viewed as an ontological statement. It discusses how things are. The phrase also could be viewed as a speculative view. But we know that it is neither. Likewise, the phrase "empty of inherent existence" does not necessarily imply an ontological speculative view. Rather, it describes something that we can see with discernment, as the Buddha taught in his own words.

When someone uses this phrase, particularly in a discussion that draw in Theravada and Mahayana perspectives, it is not a mistatement of the Buddha's teachings. Rather, is is one window into the Buddha's teachings. Admittedly, this particular phrase is a window with some smudges on it, because so many people have poked their fingers at it over the years. But at its core, there's nothing wrong with using this phrase. It does not have to mean "nothing exists."

[AgindyMinnife]

The phrase "all phenomena are not-self" could be viewed as an ontological statement. It discusses how things are.

I view this as an ontological statement, despite everyone's objections. The impermanence of leaves falling from trees or the forming of planets in other solar system is not dependent on mental cognition.

And please do not quote the Sabba Sutta to me. One obscure sutta redefining Brahmistic concepts does not define the Buddha-Dhamma

Best wishes

[seicslybearee]

Jechbi,

What part of nagarjuna's explanation that you cite here is an ontological argument do you not understand?

[RichardFG435]

Personally, I have always struggled with the term "'empty of inherent existence". For me, the term is vague, does not have a direct discernable meaning, it must be interpreted.

For example, 'Empty of inherent existence', could mean 'Full of dependent existence', such as 'Inter-being'.

For me, the term 'Empty of inherent existence' does not directly promote dispassion (viraga), cessation (nirodha) and vossaga (relinquishment), in the same way impermanence, unsatisfactoriness & not-self ('not-mine') do.

Due to its vagueness, the term 'Empty of inherent existence', on its face value, can become a Kumbaya dhamma, such as "collective consciousness" or "collective self".

Just my opinion

Regards

[preachadaq]

It does not have to mean "nothing exists."

Hi Jechbi,
You are right here. This most certainly does not mean that nothing exists. It is an uninformed error to claim that the doctrine of inherent existence is claiming that nothing exists. The tenets of the Prasangika school present their teachings in terms of the middle way, avoiding extremes of eternalism and nihilism.

At no point do they claim that nothing exists. To assert this is to misrepresent the tenets.

The doctrine of the 'two truths' is a logical and philosophical analysis of what we call existence. It posits that things exist conventionally and thus serve the purpose of their designation. Upon investigation, however, they are found to not have the characteristics we attribute to them, (ie. a solid, independent existence from their own side). They are 'empty' of this mode of being but not non-existent.

Nagarjuna was making a valid point from this perspective, thus: As we can all see that phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions, there can be no solidly existing 'thing' from it's own side. If there were, then paradoxically it could not ever be created. It's just pointing out the obvious absurdity of that idea and was used to counter the Hindu assertion of an eternal unchanging Atman amongst other things.

Furthermore, the understanding of this doctrine is a key factor in gaining enlightenment, as emptiness is in fact the 'emptiness of inherent existence' and not some mere 'space' or such.

Would you agree?

[gtyruzzel]

Hi all,

I mentioned this short article in the other thread - and I think its worth reading because he mentions the phrase 'empty of inherent existence':

"The Integrity of Emptiness" by Thanissaro Bhikkhu

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/a...emptiness.html




PS

I'm moving this thread to the 'Beyond Belief' debating forum


.

[Imalaycle]

Hi Jechbi,
You are right here. This most certainly does not mean that nothing exists. It is an uninformed error to claim that the doctrine of inherent existence is claiming that nothing exists. The tenets of the Prasangika school present their teachings in terms of the middle way, avoiding extremes of eternalism and nihilism.

Merely splitting the difference between extremes isn't "The Middle Way" -- When the Buddha speaks of "teaching from the Middle", he goes straight into a description of PS/PN.

At no point do they claim that nothing exists. To assert this is to misrepresent the tenets. The point of that characterization is that the "difference" between "nothing exists" and "things have no inherent existence" is merely specious and semantic, and that it is the same sort of speculative view that the Buddha refuted:

Things exist: That is one extreme of speculative view
Things do not exist: that is another
Things both exist and do not exist: the third
Things neither exist nor do not exist: That is the fourth

Things have inherent existence: That is one extreme of speculative view
Things have no inherent existence: That is the second, Nagarjuna's assertion
things both have inherent existence adn do not have inherent existence: that is the third
Things neither have nor do not have inherent existence: that is the fourth.

The only difference is the vague equivocation "inherent".


The doctrine of the 'two truths' is a logical and philosophical analysis of what we call existence.
Meaning, an ONTOLOGY.


It posits that things exist conventionally and thus serve the purpose of their designation. Upon investigation, however, they are found to not have the characteristics we attribute to them, (ie. a solid, independent existence from their own side). They are 'empty' of this mode of being but not non-existent. This is an ONTOLOGY.

Nagarjuna was making a valid point from this perspective, thus: As we can all see that phenomena arise in dependence on causes and conditions, there can be no solidly existing 'thing' from it's own side. If there were, then paradoxically it could not ever be created. It's just pointing out the obvious absurdity of that idea and was used to counter the Hindu assertion of an eternal unchanging Atman amongst other things. And it seems the Hindu representation is a Straw Man when applied to anything else in the universe besides the Atman.

Furthermore, the understanding of this doctrine is a key factor in gaining enlightenment, as emptiness is in fact the 'emptiness of inherent existence' and not some mere 'space' or such.

Would you agree? I wouldn't. Impermanence is easy to see. But of course, the above is in reference to an entirely different sort of "enlightenment" than what the Buddha taught, as well.

[topcasinobonua]

I view this as an ontological statement, despite everyone's objections. The impermanence of leaves falling from trees or the forming of planets in other solar system is not dependent on mental cognition.

Their being not-self does not say anything about the nature of their existence, though. It simply tells us that things are not me, not mine. Conversely, it matters not whether things are "inherently existent" or " exist from their own side" or not. Either way, the Buddha's teaching that they are "not me, not mine". "Me" and "Mine" are the source of dukkha here, not some irrelevant speculative equivocation of "inherent existence - or -not".

[meencegic]

http://www.buddhismwithoutboundaries...8821#post18821

Two Prasangikas fall out over a girl.

A short story.

Bob: Hi Josh, what's this I hear about you and Claire?

Josh: Well, it's true Bob. Sorry dude but hey, remember she's not inherently yours!

B. True dude. She can't be located as a collection of her parts... rather like my fist here. (smack)

J. Ouch! That actually only nominally hurt. Ultimately it didn't. Try mine Bob! (smack)

B. Umph! The blood trickling from my mouth is 'name only' and is therefore irrelevant.

J. Trust you to just look at it from a personal point of view Bob. Emptiness is emptiness of self and other. I think you've degenerated to a Hinayanist.

B. Oh right! Well despite its lack of ultimate existence my boot packs a fairly hefty payload, especially when contacting your non-inherent groin! (wham)

J. Oh Man, that fuc... I mean in an illusory sense it...

B. Whilst you're down there Josh how about a couple more (wham, wham).

J. Ouch my ribs. Call an ambulance!

B. You do reaslise that the mere designation 'ambulance' is impossible to locate, either within its components or elsewhere for that matter?

J. Just call one for God's sake!!!

B. For God's sake? Oh Josh not only is all this appearing to you to be established in its own right but now you're invoking theism. All that from a dude who called me a Hinayanist.

Well, because I wish to demonstrate true compassion, I'll do as you request but remember to keep your conventionally filthy hands off my ultimately empty girlfriend in the future.

The End

[Fksxneng]

The point of that characterization is that the "difference" between "nothing exists" and "things have no inherent existence" is merely specious and semantic, and that it is the same sort of speculative view that the Buddha refuted:

Things exist: That is one extreme of speculative view
Things do not exist: that is another
Things both exist and do not exist: the third
Things neither exist nor do not exist: That is the fourth

Things have inherent existence: That is one extreme of speculative view
Things have no inherent existence: That is the second, Nagarjuna's assertion
things both have inherent existence and do not have inherent existence: that is the third
Things neither have nor do not have inherent existence: that is the fourth.

The only difference is the vague equivocation "inherent".

One could characterize this sort of obfuscation as "moving the goalposts into the fog".

;-)

[AncewwewBus]

Their being not-self does not say anything about the nature of their existence, though. It simply tells us that things are not me, not mine. Conversely, it matters not whether things are "inherently existent" or " exist from their own side" or not. Either way, the Buddha's teaching that they are "not me, not mine". "Me" and "Mine" are the source of dukkha here, not some irrelevant speculative equivocation of "inherent existence - or -not".

I am not referring to dukkha here. I am referring to the characteristic of things, which includes their impermanence. My view is of course the "inherent" nature of things matters. If they were not inherently that way, there would be no need for the mind to realise their nature to facilitate letting go. My view is if there was no birth-aging-illness-death characteristic, the need for Dhamma would be reduced.

[suidinguilelf]

For me, the term 'Empty of inherent existence' does not directly promote dispassion (viraga), cessation (nirodha) and vossaga (relinquishment), in the same way impermanence, unsatisfactoriness & not-self ('not-mine') do.

Sure. This statement, Element, could not have been said better... I rely mostly in that experience.

When I came here for the first time I was deluded by the best sellers of Thich and others like the Dali Lama. Something was not working. Beautiful books... yes... inspiring... yes of course but useless to understand deeply the very issue of Buddha: To know impermanence, to experience it, to know the unsatisfactory nature of things and to explore not-self as the cornerstone for the confidence and reliance in the teachings of Buddha toward the goal of cessation of Dukkha.

That other teachings, sold under the general concept of "teachings of the Buddha", are like the books I have about Politics, Ecology, Human Ecology and Social Sustainability with the difference that the first ones are romantic, good for inspiration and mental amusement until the last are about how to work, deal and research, seriously, with hard social facts like children in the streets, adult re-education, action research, poverty and cultural accepted violence.

[Aluback]

I am not referring to dukkha here. I am referring to the characteristic of things, which includes their impermanence. My view is of course the "inherent" nature of things matters. If they were not inherently that way, there would be no need for the mind to realise their nature to facilitate letting go. My view is if there was no birth-aging-illness-death characteristic, the need for Dhamma would be reduced.

I find "inherently impermanent" quite different from "inherently existent (or non-existent)".

[Tinasblue]

Personally, I have always struggled with the term "'empty of inherent existence". For me, the term is vague, does not have a direct discernable meaning, it must be interpreted.

For example, 'Empty of inherent existence', could mean 'Full of dependent existence', such as 'Inter-being'.

For me, the term 'Empty of inherent existence' does not directly promote dispassion (viraga), cessation (nirodha) and vossaga (relinquishment), in the same way impermanence, unsatisfactoriness & not-self ('not-mine') do.

Due to its vagueness, the term 'Empty of inherent existence', on its face value, can become a Kumbaya dhamma, such as "collective consciousness" or "collective self".

Just my opinion

Regards

That does sum it up nicely, El.

[mudozvonf]

I find "inherently impermanent" quite different from "inherently existent (or non-existent)".

Sure, but is not impermanence "inherently existent"? Or should this be phrased differently?

[ebookinfo]

Sure, but is not impermanence "inherently existent"? Or should this be phrased differently?

Impermanence is an abstract concept. The notion of "inherent existence" is just word-wallowing. Papanca.

[FourEsters]

The technical term for a concept such as "inherent existence" is "word salad".

[Poohoppesmase]

Impermanence is an abstract concept. The notion of "inherent existence" is just word-wallowing. Papanca.

The technical term for a concept such as "inherent existence" is "word salad".

...and so Nagarjuna rejected it.

Inherent existence/own-being (svabhava) was a notion cooked up by various Abhidhammic schools -- in particular, Sarvastivada -- which felt that it was needed in order to explain causality/conditionality. Nagurjuna was attacking this notion. He sought to demonstrate that it was both inconsistent logically and incompatible with the Buddha's teachings.

If there were inherent nature, all beings would be unborn and unceasing, would be fixed in place forever, separated from the variety of situations. If [things] were not empty, there could be no attainment of what had not been attained, no ending of anguish [dukkha] and no letting go of all actions and afflictions. Whatever is contingently related [i.e. via this/that conditionality], that is explained as emptiness. That is contingently configured; it is the central path. Emptiness, stated in positive terms, is this/that conditionality.
Stated in negative terms, it is the absence of the four mistaken views (exists, doesn't exist, both, neither). That is, abandon these and the result is realization of emptiness.

"Emptiness" itself is a provisional designation -- a signpost to the destination, not the destination itself.

[Uojeyak]

...and so Nagarjuna rejected it.

Yes. And instead of letting go of the whole mess, he turned around and embraced and clung to its opposite "no inherent existence".


Inherent existence/own-being (svabhava) was a notion cooked up by various Abhidhammic schools -- in particular, Sarvastivada -- which felt that it was needed in order to explain causality/conditionality. The abhidhammists claimed that phenomena are permanent and unchanging?

Nagurjuna was attacking this notion. He sought to demonstrate that it was both inconsistent logically and incompatible with the Buddha's teachings. And he came up with his own alternate absurdity that also is inconsistent logically and incompatible with the Buddha's teachings.


Emptiness, stated in positive terms, is this/that conditionality. If that were so, then we would have seen the Buddha saying this very thing, over and over, in his explanations of both emptiness and PS/IDP. he does not.

Stated in negative terms, it is the absence of the four mistaken views (exists, doesn't exist, both, neither). That is, abandon these and the result is realization of emptiness. "In negative terms" -- interesting. But the positive terms and negative terms contradict each other. And the negative term is exactly "doesn't exist", with the obscurative addition of meaningless word salad. The Buddha's approach was to point out that all of these assertions are irrelevant speculative view, and to point instead to his own teachings.


"Emptiness" itself is a provisional designation -- a signpost to the destination, not the destination itself. Nagarjuna's cargo-cult "emptiness" you have expounded here is just word salad.

[StevenS]

SoI'll ask you the same thing I asked Jechbi:


LazyEye,

What part of nagarjuna's explanation that you cite here is an ontological argument do you not understand?