[CruzIzabella]

Obama's timing is stupid.

While Pakistan did feel compelled to try a policy of appeasement for awhile, they've now realized this was a mistake. They're now stepping up and are again taking on al Qaeda.

To threaten military invasion of one of our most critical allies when they've finally gotten off the mark is counter productive.

[Shootohoist]

Oh, just those nukie things...and IRBMs.

[inchaaruutaa]

Luckily, Obama will never be president.

[Zesavenue]

I didn't know you had a vote

[Ndptbudd]

Good call.

[UlceskLialels]

It's easy to caricature, but it's good policy. If we know exactly where Zawahiri is, and whoever running Pakistan in 2009+ (Musharraf probably will be gone by then - likely Bhutto) has a truce with the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan, what's wrong with a surgical strike? I don't think any of the Pres contenders (of either party) would disagree with that except maybe Kucinich and Gravel.

[77chawzence]

Surgical strike ???? Yeah, those have been so effective over the years. Not just by us, the Israelis have had great success since they decided to use them



At some point you have to put men on the ground to kill your enemy. Flying overhead and waving nasty signs doesnt cut it. Leave the soldiering to those who have the balls to do it.

[ToifvT5S]

Still, when one of your key allies is going through a particularly difficult time wrt teh terrorists, it's bad form to both imply that said ally is being deliberately insincere and that you'd be perfectly willing to bomb it if you thought it was in your interests.

But it's not a random threat, it's a specific criticism of the Bush policy. It's based on a recent Times story:

U.S. ABORTED RAID ON QAEDA CHIEFS IN PAKISTAN IN '05


By MARK MAZZETTI
Published: July 8, 2007

A secret military operation in early 2005 to capture senior members of Al Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas was aborted at the last minute after top Bush administration officials decided it was too risky and could jeopardize relations with Pakistan, according to intelligence and military officials.

The target was a meeting of Qaeda leaders that intelligence officials thought included Ayman al-Zawahri, Osama bin Laden's top deputy and the man believed to run the terrorist group's operations.

But the mission was called off after Donald H. Rumsfeld, then the defense secretary, rejected an 11th-hour appeal by Porter J. Goss, then the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, officials said. Members of a Navy Seals unit in parachute gear had already boarded C-130 cargo planes in Afghanistan when the mission was canceled, said a former senior intelligence official involved in the planning.

Mr. Rumsfeld decided that the operation, which had ballooned from a small number of military personnel and C.I.A. operatives to several hundred, was cumbersome and put too many American lives at risk, the current and former officials said. He was also concerned that it could cause a rift with Pakistan, an often reluctant ally that has barred the American military from operating in its tribal areas, the officials said.

The decision to halt the planned ''snatch and grab'' operation frustrated some top intelligence officials and members of the military's secret Special Operations units, who say the United States missed a significant opportunity to try to capture senior members of Al Qaeda.

Their frustration has only grown over the past two years, they said, as Al Qaeda has improved its abilities to plan global attacks and build new training compounds in Pakistan's tribal areas, which have become virtual havens for the terrorist network.

In recent months, the White House has become increasingly irritated with Pakistan's president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, for his inaction on the growing threat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

About a dozen current and former military and intelligence officials were interviewed for this article, all of whom requested anonymity because the planned 2005 mission remained classified.

Spokesmen for the Pentagon, the C.I.A. and the White House declined to comment. It is unclear whether President Bush was informed about the planned operation.

The officials acknowledge that they are not certain that Mr. Zawahri attended the 2005 meeting in North Waziristan, a mountainous province just miles from the Afghan border. But they said that the United States had communications intercepts that tipped them off to the meeting, and that intelligence officials had unusually high confidence that Mr. Zawahri was there.

Months later, in early May 2005, the C.I.A. launched a missile from a remotely piloted Predator drone, killing Haitham al-Yemeni, a senior Qaeda figure whom the C.I.A. had tracked since the meeting.

It has long been known that C.I.A. operatives conduct counterterrorism missions in Pakistan's tribal areas. Details of the aborted 2005 operation provide a glimpse into the Bush administration's internal negotiations over whether to take unilateral military action in Pakistan, where General Musharraf's fragile government is under pressure from dissidents who object to any cooperation with the United States.

Pentagon officials familiar with covert operations said that planners had to consider the political and human risks of undertaking a military campaign in a sovereign country, even in an area like Pakistan's tribal lands, where the government has only tenuous control. Even with its shortcomings, Pakistan has been a vital American ally since the Sept. 11 attacks, and the militaries of the two countries have close ties.

The Pentagon officials said tension was inherent in any decision to approve such a mission: a smaller military footprint allows a better chance of a mission going undetected, but it also exposes the units to greater risk of being killed or captured.

Officials said one reason Mr. Rumsfeld called off the 2005 operation was that the number of troops involved in the mission had grown to several hundred, including Army Rangers, members of the Navy Seals and C.I.A. operatives, and he determined that the United States could no longer carry out the mission without General Musharraf's permission. It is unlikely that the Pakistani president would have approved an operation of that size, officials said.

Some outside experts said American counterterrorism operations had been hamstrung because of concerns about General Musharraf's shaky government.

''The reluctance to take risk or jeopardize our political relationship with Musharraf may well account for the fact that five and half years after 9/11 we are still trying to run bin Laden and Zawahri to ground,'' said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University.

Those political considerations have created resentment among some members of the military's Special Operations forces.

''The Special Operations guys are tearing their hair out at the highest levels,'' said a former Bush administration official with close ties to those troops. While they have not received good intelligence on the whereabouts of top Qaeda members recently, he said, they say they believe they have sometimes had useful information on lower-level figures.

''There is a degree of frustration that is off the charts, because they are looking at targets on a daily basis and can't move against them,'' he said.

In early 2005, after learning about the Qaeda meeting, the military developed a plan for a small Navy Seals unit to parachute into Pakistan to carry out a quick operation, former officials said.

But as the operation moved up the military chain of command, officials said, various planners bulked up the force's size to provide security for the Special Operations forces.

''The whole thing turned into the invasion of Pakistan,'' said the former senior intelligence official involved in the planning. Still, he said he thought the mission was worth the risk. ''We were frustrated because we wanted to take a shot,'' he said.

Several former officials interviewed said the operation was not the only occasion since the Sept. 11 attacks that plans were developed to use a large American military force in Pakistan. It is unclear whether any of those missions have been executed.

Some of the military and intelligence officials familiar with the 2005 events say it showed a rift between operators in the field and a military bureaucracy that has still not effectively adapted to hunt for global terrorists, moving too cautiously to use Special Operations troops against terrorist targets.

That criticism has echoes of the risk aversion that the officials said pervaded efforts against Al Qaeda during the Clinton administration, when missions to use American troops to capture or kill Mr. bin Laden in Afghanistan were never executed because they were considered too perilous, risked killing civilians or were based on inadequate intelligence. Rather than sending in ground troops, the Clinton White House instead chose to fire cruise missiles in what became failed attempts to kill Mr. bin Laden and his deputies -- a tactic Mr. Bush criticized shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks.

Since then, the C.I.A. has launched missiles from Predator aircraft in the tribal areas several times, with varying degrees of success. Intelligence officials say they believe that in January 2006, an airstrike narrowly missed killing Mr. Zawahri, who hours earlier had attended a dinner in Damadola, a Pakistani village.

General Musharraf cast his lot with the Bush administration in the hunt for Al Qaeda after the 2001 attacks, and he has periodically ordered Pakistan's military to conduct counterterrorism missions in the tribal areas, provoking fierce resistance there. But in recent months he has pulled back, prompting Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney to issue stern warnings in private that he risked losing American aid if he did not step up efforts against Al Qaeda, senior administration officials have said.

Officials said that mid-2005 was a period when they were gathering good intelligence about Al Qaeda's leaders in Pakistan's tribal areas. By the next year, however, the White House had become frustrated by the lack of progress in the hunt for Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri.

In early 2006, President Bush ordered a ''surge'' of dozens of C.I.A. agents to Pakistan, hoping that an influx of intelligence operatives would lead to better information, officials said. But that has brought the United States no closer to locating Al Qaeda's top two leaders. The latest message from them came this week, in a new tape in which Mr. Zawahri urged Iraqis and Muslims around the world to show more support for Islamist insurgents in Iraq.

In his recently published memoir, George J. Tenet, the former C.I.A. director, said the intelligence about Mr. bin Laden's whereabouts during the Clinton years was similarly sparse. The information was usually only at the ''50-60% confidence level,'' he wrote, not sufficient to justify American military action.

''As much as we all wanted Bin Ladin dead, the use of force by a superpower requires information, discipline, and time,'' Mr. Tenet wrote. ''We rarely had the information in sufficient quantities or the time to evaluate and act on it.'' The Bush policy wrt Pakistan has always been based on a mostly irrational fear of an Islamist coup. It's good to see a break from that.

"And Pakistan needs more than F-16s to combat extremism. As the Pakistani government increases investment in secular education to counter radical madrasas, my Administration will increase America's commitment. We must help Pakistan invest in the provinces along the Afghan border, so that the extremists' program of hate is met with one of hope. And we must not turn a blind eye to elections that are neither free nor fair -- our goal is not simply an ally in Pakistan, it is a democratic ally."

[Haremporblape]

Originally posted by Ramo


That was never my objection to going into Iraq. Ever.
Hmm..

I had remembered differently. Apologies, then.

[b91ZmxzX]

Originally posted by Imran Siddiqui


QFT. If you are going to do a "snatch and grab" spin it later as a joint assault with the Pakistani army if its successful. Don't humiliate them in public in such fashion. "Elements of the US special forces and US Airforce assisted the Pakistani Armed forces in destroying an Al Qeada leadership conference. The White House praised the Pakistani government on its strong stand against terrorism and continued support of the War on Terror"

or

"The White House announced today that several US Air Force aircraft inadvertantly crossed temporarily into Pakistani Airspace in persuit of terrorist. The remote, and often disputed boarder area has been the site of several such accidental incursions in the past. Pakistani aircraft in the area communicated the error to US pilots and they returned to Afghan airspace. No word on the terrorist subjects fate was divulged. White House aids reinterated that Pakistani aircraft in the region were co-operating in the joint war on terror the two countries are conducting"

[fkjghfg]

And Pakistan needs more than F-16s to combat extremism. Are they going to bomb mosques?

Need F-16s to combat extremism... my arse!

[ulw7A8Po]

This thread is a waste of time anyway... I mean, any thread discussing something as fanatastical and meaningless as "Democrats on Foreign Policy" is doomed to failure ...

[ssyyyrruho]

Except he did exactly what Obama insinuated in 2006, twice.

Obama's policy writing monkeys are either retarded, or that assertion is false. I don't think Obama's speech writers are the ones who are retarded...

Let's recap. Bush doesn't take an action because of a specific reason. Later, he may have taken a similar action despite that reason being in play. That doesn't mean the first incident is beyond criticism.

BTW, which events are you referring to?

[zueqhbyhp]

From your article:

It is unclear whether the Pakistani government and military had pre-knowledge of the attack. But in the face of public outrage it has been compelled to issue a protest to the US ambassador and deplore the bombing of Damadola as “highly condemnable”.

[XIMHOTEP-X]

Obama criticizing policy that is not policy is retarded, as pretty much everyone in the country has said. Bush didn't engage in a snatch & grab op in Waziristan because he was afraid of destabilizing Musharraf's gov't. Obama says that he shouldn't have taken that into account. This isn't complicated.

[TpDoctorOneTp]

He knew about it, not agreed with it.

If you note, that is exactly what Obama said, not that he wouldn't ask but that he would do it anyways.

Nice that he has painted himself in a corner, he has to bomb now despite any other factors.

[chuecaloversvvp]

Actually Ramo, it says it was unclear whether they knew about it or not, so we are not even at the "did Musharraf agree to it" stage yet.

Because I only saw one - the stability of Musharraf's gov't. Theres a big one, but of no matter to Obama. And he said he would use troops, not airstrikes. Even better

[Emunsesoxmete]

Actually Ramo, it says it was unclear whether they knew about it or not, so we are not even at the "did Musharraf agree to it" stage yet. It doesn't say that he didn't agree either. Like I said, the implication of the article was that Musharraf protested only because of public outrage.

And he said he would use troops No, he didn't. He said he would "act."

[Ygd2qr8k]

And the point is that even IF Musharraf didn't agree, that hardly means that the earlier incident is beyond criticism. Of course not, but not for the reasons Obama has.

If not, Pakistan would risk a troop invasion and the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars of US aid during an Obama presidency, the candidate said. Troops.

[7HlBQS8j]

I don't care if you care