[duawLauff]

I think its important for us to build our understanding of these types of issues. Wallahu a'lam:


http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...89/hurley.html




The BEKAA Valley Air Battle,
June 1982:
Lessons Mislearned?
C1C Matthew M. Hurley, USAFA

MILITARY analysts are always eager to derive "lessons" from recent military conflicts, but our perceptions of such lessons are often clouded by national biases; interservice rivalries; incomplete information; and differing needs, desires, and viewpoints. For example, the Bekaa Valley (Lebanon) air battle of June 1982 is widely regarded as a significant development in modern warfare. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) achieved a remarkable military victory, and certainly there are lessons to be learned from it. Unfortunately, most literature on the battle suffers from distortions resulting from the above factors. The problem lies in determining which lessons are applicable to the US military and which merely draw attention away from what is truly significant. Many of the lessons from the Bekaa were rather short-lived in their usefulness, and others-while of great interest to military historians-simply do not apply to the American military situation.

It is, of course, essential to first summarize the events preceding and during the battle, as well as the factors contributing to the Israeli victory. The circumstances that determined the outcome of the Bekaa Valley battle can easily be traced back to 1967, when the Israelis launched a devastating surprise air attack on Egyptian airfields to begin the Six Day War. The Arab states, particularly Egypt, responded by establishing a system of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to deal with any future Israel incursions into their airspace. During the War of Attrition from 1967-70 the IAF admitted losing at least 22 aircraft to the new Arab missile defenses, though Egypt claimed 21 in July 1970 alone. Even so, it was not until the three-week-long October War in 1973 that SAM warfare came of age in the Middle East. Egyptian SAMs (SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-6s) along with 23-mm ZSU23-4 antiaircraft cannons destroyed some 40 Israeli aircraft in the first 48 hours of the war, or 14 percent of the frontline strength of the IAF.3 In contrast, only five Israeli aircraft were destroyed in air-to-air combat during the entire conflict.4 Coupled with the high number of aircraft lost to groundbased air defenses in Vietnam, the results of the October War prompted some analysts to ask whether tactical aircraft had outlived their usefulness on the modern battlefield.

In retrospect, it appears obvious that the Israelis were not prepared to counter the "missile umbrella" Egypt had erected before and during the 1973 war. Instead, their doctrine reflected the experiences of the Six Day War, in which SAMs were not a factor. But after sustaining heavy losses in the October War, the Israelis adjusted with a coherent SAM-suppression doctrine.6 Should hostilities resume, the IAF would now be prepared for SAM suppression and could adapt as necessary to meet new contingencies.

During the spring of 1981, the Israelis came close to putting their new doctrine and capability to the test. On 28 April the IAF shot down two Syrian helicopters while providing air cover for Christian militiamen in Zahle, Lebanon. Damascus reacted by deploying three SA-6 batteries to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley the next day.7 The Israelis regarded the newly emplaced SAMs as a violation of a tacit Syrian-Israeli agreement regarding the Syrian presence in Lebanon and as a threat to vital air reconnaissance. Although the Israelis threatened to remove the missile batteries by force, the crisis was defused by diplomatic means; Syrian missiles and troops, however, remained in Lebanon.8

For the next year the IAF conducted extensive air reconnaissance over the Bekaa and trained in the Negev Desert against mock SAM sites identical to those in Lebanon.9 Meanwhile, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Lt Gen Rafael Eitan, chief of staff of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), developed the plans for an invasion to rid northern Israel of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) raids and shelling from southern Lebanon, which had killed 25 Israelis and wounded 250 more between July 1981 and June 1982.10

On 3 June 1982 Palestinian terrorists made an assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador in London. After three years of frenzied shelling and countershelling, the IDF launched the long-planned, often-delayed invasion Operation Peace for Galilee.11 Its goal was to destroy the infrastructure and bases of the PLO in southern Lebanon and remove the artillery threat to northern Israel.12 Although Israel proclaimed a desire to avoid any unpleasantries with Syrian forces in Lebanon, Damascus decided to reinforce its Lebanon contingent, including the 19 Syrian SAM batteries now deployed in the Bekaa.13 Though Syria intended this action as a deterrent gesture, the Israelis decided that the batteries must be destroyed, for by now hostilities had erupted between Syrian and Israeli forces.14

Reports of what happened next vary. It is generally accepted that in the course of the first attack against the Bekaa an 9 June 1982, the IAF destroyed 17 of the 19 Syrian SAM batteries and their radar sites, as well as 29 Syrian Air Force (SAF) fighters, without loss.15 The following day, the IAF destroyed the remaining two missile batteries. The SAF once more challenged the Israelis and lost approximately 35 more aircraft, again without downing an Israeli aircraft. By the end of July, Syria had lost at least 87 aircraft, while Israeli losses amounted to a few helicopters, one RF-4E, and an A-4 Skyhawk downed by a PLO SA-7.16

Naturally, Arab claims differed from Western and Israeli accounts. The Syrian news agency SANA claimed that 19 Israeli and 14 Syrian planes had been downed on 9 June. The next day, the Syrians maintained that six Israeli and seven Syrian aircraft had been destroyed, while no mention was made on either day of any damage to their SAMS.17 The Soviets went even further in extolling the SAF's combat virtues: the military newspaper Red Star announced triumphantly that "sixty-seven Israeli aircraft, including modern US-made F-15 and F-16 fighters, were downed" in the fighting.18 Further Soviet reports included an account in Red Star about a meeting with a Syrian airman who eagerly recounted an engagement in which he shot down an Israeli F-15: "The victory had not been easy; the enemy had been subtle."19

These claims met with great skepticism, even within Soviet ranks. After the Bekaa Valley debacle, for example, a story circulated around the Soviet military about how the Syrian Air Force maintained a departure control but no approach control.20 Even the Syrians themselves privately admitted defeat. After the Bekaa turkey shoot, Gen Mustafa Tlas, the defense minister, told President Hafez Assad and other government leaders that "the Syrian Air Force was outclassed, the ground-to-air missiles useless, and that without air cover, the army could not fight on."21 Indeed, it seems a bit odd that the Soviets would celebrate a great Syrian victory by sending the first deputy commander of the Soviet air defense forces to find out what went wrong. It seems even stranger that they would conclude that a new SAM system of SA-8s, SA-9s, and long-range SA-5s was necessary, manned by some 1,000 to 1,500 Soviet "advisers."22

The lopsided results of the battle stem from a number of factors. The most visible in any air engagement are the quality and capabilities of the weapon systems employed, especially aircraft and air-to-air armament. The IAF had a definite qualitative advantage in both. The primary Syrian fighter during the Lebanon War was the relatively obsolescent MiG-21, with considerable numbers of export model MiG-23s and Su-20s also deployed.23 The Israelis, on the other hand, were flying new-generation McDonnell Douglas F-15s and General Dynamics F-16s, as well as older but still effective McDonnell Douglas F-4s and Israeli Aircraft Industries Kfirs.24

The F-15 and the F-16, which were specifically designed for air superiority,25 both have a thrust-to-weight ratio greater than one (i.e., the thrust provided by their engines exceeds their loaded takeoff weight, thus allowing the aircraft to accelerate even while maneuvering or climbing).26 In addition to better acceleration and maneuverability at combat speeds, the F-15 and F-16 have superior radars and cockpit visibility that often resulted in early detection of the enemy and the delivery of undetected shots.27

These shots were quite lethal because of the high reliability of US-made AIM-7F Sparrow radar-guided missiles, AIM-9L Sidewinder infrared-guided missiles, and computer-aimed 20-mm cannons. The AIM-9L, which accounted for the majority of the kills, was particularly effective with its "all-aspect capability."28 Simply put, the missile could be launched at an opposing aircraft from any angle, including head-on, thus eliminating the need to maneuver behind the enemy to shoot.29 The AIM-9L had been used earlier during the Falklands campaign, where British Harriers scored 25 kills for 27 launches against faster aircraft in marginal weather. The resulting 93 percent success rate was quite an improvement over the 10-19 percent kill rate for earlier models of the AIM-9 in Vietnam.30 The Syrians had no comparable ordnance, relying instead on the 1960s vintage AA-2 "Atoll."31

The Israelis also demonstrated considerable technical prowess in command, control, and communications (C3). The Bekaa Valley battle was the first combat involving the use of modern airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, specifically, the US-made Grumman E-2C Hawkeye. The AWACS is an airborne radar platform responsible for vectoring fighters to their targets and managing the overall air battle situation.32 The E-2C has an APS-125 radar mounted in a "dish" above the fuselage, with which it can scan 3 million cubic miles of airspace. It can monitor over 200 aircraft simultaneously and control up to 130 separate air-to-air engagements at ranges up to 250 miles.33 In addition, the E-2C includes an ALR-59 passive detection system that can pick up radar signals 500 miles away, effectively doubling the Hawkeye's early detection range.34 This capability enabled the IAF to detect Syrian aircraft as they took off, allowing it to determine how many hostile aircraft were inbound and from what direction.35 The Israelis also used F-15s in the rear as "mini-AWACS" to help manage air-to-air engagements.36 This overall Israeli AWACS capability allowed the IAF to vector its fighters into "blindside" attacks on the Syrian MiGs, which had only nose- and tail-threat warning receivers to warn the pilot of a missile attack. SAF pilots were thus denied any advance warning of an attack by the IAF's all-aspect AIM-9Ls or AIM-7Fs; the latter could be fired well beyond visual range.37 Israeli aircraft could thus fire shots at their Syrian opponents--often undetected from launch until impact--and deny the Syrians any opportunity to evade or return fire.

The IAF worked to obstruct Syrian C3 while enhancing its own, making especially effective use of modified Boeing 707s. These aircraft were equipped with standoff jammers capable of disrupting several enemy frequencies at once with very little out-of-phase disturbance, thereby minimizing self-jamming of frequencies used by the IDF.38 Effective jamming of Syrian communications and radar systems cut off SAF MiGs from ground control, leaving them isolated and vulnerable to AWACS-directed attacks from F-15s and F-16s.39The result was chaos within the Syrian formations. According to one Western military observer, "I watched a group of Syrian fighter planes fly figure-eights. They just flew around and around and obviously had no idea what to do next."40

The Israelis were also intent on preserving the integrity of their own C3 against Syrian electronic countermeasures (ECM). Israeli fighter aircraft were equipped with ECM pods, including the indigenously produced EL/L-8200 series, which provided protection against ground-based and airborne radar threats.41 To protect their digital and voice communications from Syrian interference, the IDF developed a very high frequency (VHF) FM radio system that changed radio frequencies across a 30 to 88 megahertz (MHz) band. Before the Syrians could identify and jam a utilized frequency, the radio would switch to a different frequency and continue to do so according to a complex mathematical formula that gave the appearance of random switching.42 Given the superior Israeli jamming capability, such an innovative radio system would have been useful to the Syrians; however, they had no such equipment.

Another technological innovation that contributed to the Israeli victory was the remotely piloted vehicle (RPV). The IAF used this drone aircraft in the months preceding the invasion to "fingerprint" surface-to-air radar, providing information vital to Israeli countermeasures.43 When the battle actually began, RPVs were used as "decoys" to simulate electronically the radar signature of full-size strike aircraft and trick the Syrians into activating their SAM target acquisition and tracking radars.44 This ruse provided ample targets for the AGM-78 Standard antiradiation missile (ARM) and AGM-45 Shrike air-launched ARMs that followed.45 Other RPVs served as cheap and survivable intelligence platforms because they were constructed out of aluminum and composite materials for a minimal radar and infrared signature.46 once launched, they were employed most often as photographic platforms or "real-time" video intelligence systems whose fields of view, zoom ratios, and flight plans could be preprogrammed or changed at the discretion of the commander.47 Once the tactical reconnaissance and deception functions were completed and strike aircraft were directed to the SAM sites, air-launched laser-guided ordnance was guided to the target by laser designators mounted on the RPVs.48

Despite their technological advantages, the Israelis placed considerable priority on the human element, maintaining that high technology is useless without the ability to employ it successfully. According to General Eitan, "Training is of greater importance and significance than the means of warfare, the weaponry systems, and the technology."49 It was precisely this philosophy that allowed the IAF to exploit fully the capabilities of their equipment during the Bekaa Valley battle.50 Pilots and ground crews were so well trained that the aircraft turnaround rate (the time it took to refuel, reload, and service an aircraft before the next mission) was in some cases reduced to less than 10 minutes.51 Furthermore, Israeli pilots were for years exposed to the most realistic training of all--combat. Besides conducting simulated strikes against mock SAM sites in the Negev Desert, the IAF had fought three major wars against their Arab opponents since 1967, including considerable combat experience between the wars. The IAF had also been flying virtually unopposed over Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley for years,52 affording it a familiarity with the target area and deployment of enemy forces unprecedented in modern warfare.

Qualitative advantages in equipment and manpower, however impressive, are relative; therefore, Syrian deficiencies-and there were plenty--were equally important in determining the outcome of the Bekaa Valley battle. In air combat, for example, the Syrians displayed a marked inferiority to the Israelis in tactics and training. The fact that they were largely dependent on ground control not only limited pilot initiative and independence but also encouraged the Israelis to continually jam their communication links.53 The constraints thus imposed on the Syrian pilots degraded their already inferior technological capabilities. An anonymous senior IAF officer concluded, "They could have flown the best fighter in the world, but if they flew it the way they were flying, we would have shot them down in exactly the same way. It wasn't the equipment at fault, but their tactics."54 General Eitan echoed this attitude, complaining that although the IAF encountered the MiG-25 during the Lebanon War, it was difficult to assess the aircraft's capabilities because "the Syrians don't know how to fly or operate the MiG, 25. If we could have been sitting in a MiG-25, nobody could have touched us."55

Syrian SAM operators also invited disaster upon themselves. Their Soviet equipment was generally regarded as quite good; Syrian handling of it was appalling. As noted by Lt Gen Leonard Perroots, director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, "The Syrians used mobile missiles in a

fixed configuration; they put the radars in the valley instead of the hills because they didn't want to dig latrines--seriously."56 The Syrian practice of stationing mobile missiles in one place for several months allowed Israeli reconnaissance to determine the exact location of the missiles and their radars, giving the IAF a definite tactical advantage on the eve of battle.57 Even so, the Syrians might have been able to avoid the complete destruction of their SAM complex had they effectively camouflaged their sites; instead, they used smoke to "hide" them, which actually made them easier to spot from the air.58 It is ironic that the Syrians, who have been criticized for their strict adherence to Soviet doctrine, chose to ignore the viable doctrine that emphasizes the utility of maneuver and camouflage. According to a 1981 article in Soviet Military Review, alternate firing positions, defensive ambushes, regular repositioning of mobile SAMs to confuse enemy intelligence, and the emplacement of dummy SAM sites are fundamental considerations for the effective deployment and survivability of ground-based air defenses.59

Three lessons of special relevance to the United States may be drawn from the Bekaa Valley battle. First is the overwhelming importance of winning the war in the fourth dimension (i.e., electronic warfare and C3). It is generally accepted today that to win the land and sea battle, a fighting force must first control the air. This concept--revolutionary in its genesis--was demonstrated numerous times in World War II and subsequent conflicts. Now, in order to win the air battle, one must first conquer the electromagnetic spectrum. What used to be "a minor side show to the real battles that raged on the land, on the sea, or in the air" is now a prerequisite for modern warfighting.60 The Bekaa Valley has shown that an effective electronic warfighting capability is no longer a luxury, but a necessity.

That point was emphasized in the Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falklands only a few months earlier. HMS Sheffield, for example was destroyed by a single Exocet antiship missile fired by an Argentine Super Étendard, with substantial loss of life. Had the Royal Navy had an E-2C at its disposal, it would have been able to destroy the Argentine aircraft before it was within firing range.61 As Soviet missile and aircraft capabilities continue to grow, it become evident that without adequate electronic preparation the US Air Force may suffer unacceptable losses in the event of war. Certainly, the Syrians were outthought and outflown over the Bekaa Valley, but it must be noted that they were also outperformed in the electronic arena.62 For more evenly matched forces, that advantage (or the lack thereof) will make a considerable, if not decisive, difference.

The Bekaa Valley air battle also demonstrated the need for effective doctrine and organization. The Israelis had suffered in this respect between 1967 and 1973, but by 1962 had reorganized themselves into the effective fighting force that dominated the Bekaa Valley battle. Interservice cooperation has become the standard for the IDF; indeed, the Israeli Air Force and navy are incorporated into the ground forces staff at the national level.63 This integrated command structure allows a strict division of responsibility and gives the IAF an easily defined mission-- control of the air, both to support the ground forces and to protect Israel from air attack. Therefore, the IAF controls all the helicopters and since 1971 has controlled all the air defense forces as well, including air defense artillery.64 In short, the IAF controls all assets used in gaining and maintaining control of the air and in projecting power from the air. Perhaps this total control is due to the limited and specifically defined roles of the separate Israeli services, but the United States could nonetheless learn some valuable lessons from the Israeli example. Warren A. Trest has noted that in the US armed forces,

military air power, perhaps irrevocably, has been severed four ways. This fragmenting has led to overlap in all roles and mission areas, even to the conceptual extreme of extending rotary-wing operations into the realm of interdiction. Each service has developed its own air doctrine, oftentimes with disregard for the total air situation.65

Recent American military history reflects the results of this fragmentation. Names such as Rolling Thunder, Desert One, and Grenada recall misapplications of air power caused by insufficient interservice coordination--a coordination that should have already existed. The US raid on Libya in l986 provides an even more recent example of the complexities and problems that result when different services each want a "piece of the action." The US naval force in that operation included 14 A-6s, six A-7s, six F-18s, several F-14s and EA6Bs, and four E-2Cs from two carriers that based 155 aircraft.66 The 24 US Air Force F-111s in the operation required the support of over 30 more aircraft, including five EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft and some 28 KC-135 and KC-10 tankers; even so, nine of the F-111s did not complete the mission.67 The Air Force aircraft were further handicapped by the length of their mission--a round-trip of 5,600 miles lasting 14 hours and 34 minutes.68 It might have been easier, given the Navy assets described, simply to use carrier-based aircraft which had the advantages of proximity and relative immunity from such political prerequisites as overflight rights.

But perhaps the most important lesson from the Bekaa Valley is not to try to infer too many lessons. There are many factors that make the Lebanon War in general and the Bekaa Valley battle in particular of limited relevance to the US military.

The US Air Force may take comfort from the fact that its premier fighters and other equipment performed so well. However, these aircraft had been greatly modified by the relatively small but competent Israeli aircraft and electronics industry. The Israeli F-4, for example, had undergone 600 modifications, and the E-2C AWACS was specially modified by Elta--the electronics division of Israel Aircraft industries--to fit the unique requirements for Middle Eastern air warfare.69 Perhaps even more significantly, the Soviet-supplied Syrian aircraft were stripped-down export models. One cannot predict from the IAF's overwhelming victory against Syrian MiG-23s and MiG-21s in Lebanon that NATO would achieve a similar tally against Warsaw Pact air forces in central Europe. NATO pilots will face the latest models of older Soviet fighters, as well as increasing numbers of their next-generation fighters: the MiG-29, MiG-31, and Su-27. Of course, that is not saying that the technological advantage the West has traditionally enjoyed is no longer present, but a quality differential of the magnitude demonstrated over Lebanon will most likely not be repeated in a European warfighting environment.

Similarly, although Syrian pilots showed severe shortcomings in tactics and initiative in battle, it is dangerous to assume that their Soviet sponsor's performance in future air-to-air combat will be as poor. In fact, the past few years have seen a revolution in Soviet tactics. While Soviet training may be more rigid, more dependent upon ground control, and less realistic than American training, recent trends in the Soviet military press indicate a change toward more realistic training and tactics designed to enhance and encourage pilot initiative and independence.70 Moreover, every third pilot in a Soviet fighter regiment is designed as an "aerial sniper," with experience, flight time, and some skills comparable to those of Western fighter pilots.71 In short, the Soviets pilot of 1982-though far superior to his Syrian counterpart-is himself overshadowed by his 1989 successor.

Other factors make the Bekaa Valley battle unique in the history of air power and limit its relevance. In addition to their qualitative advantage, the Israelis enjoyed numerical preponderance over the Bekaa Valley, outnumbering the Syrian Air Force by a ratio of about three aircraft to two.72 NATO air forces cannot count on this numerical advantage against the Warsaw Pact. The IAF also enjoyed the advantage of superior combat experience, having fought the Syrians in 1967, 1973, and in other engagements before the 1982 affair; US Air Force pilots have not fought any likely enemy so often or so recently.

Furthermore, the IAF had been flying unopposed over the Bekaa Valley for years, familiarizing itself with the terrain and the location of Syrian SAM emplacements.73 The Israelis also trained a full year for one specific mission, fought a well-known and less-than-capable foe fit a relatively small area, and had the opportunity to employ strategic initiative and surprise. These considerations simplified the Israeli SAM-suppression situation immensely, but, again, the US Air Force can seldom hope for such advantages. No US Air Force pilots have routinely flown reconnaissance over Czechoslovakia or East Germany. Despite considerable experience in West German airspace, US pilots would certainly benefit from familiarity with enemy airspace in preparing themselves for deep strikes, rear-area interdiction, and SAM-suppression operations beyond the Fulda Gap (West Germany). In addition, the SA-10, SA-11, SA-12A, and SA-13 systems now deployed with Warsaw Pact forces are considered to be marked improvements over their predecessors deployed in the Bekaa. They are far more mobile, more accurate, harder to jam, and are in the hands of competent personnel who know how to use them.74 NATO pilots can thus expect a greater concentration of superior missiles than those faced by the Israelis. Additionally, the potential area of SAM suppression and counterair operations in Europe is likely to be somewhat larger than the Bekaa Valley and its surroundings, which roughly equate to the size of Luxembourg.75

There are obviously many possible interpretations of any military event, hence many different "lessons." The problem, again, lies in determining which lessons apply to a given nation or armed service. To make this vital distinction, the US Air Force needs to abandon any tendency toward self-aggrandizement and realize that the Israelis had a much easier task than US Air Force pilots can ever hope to expect against their chief potential adversaries. Instead of merely praising the performance of its equipment and allies, the US armed forces must focus on those lessons that truly do apply to the future possibilities of air war, rather than on self-serving "lessons" that merely highlight the dangers of living in the past. If the US Air Force focuses on the latter, it may find itself burdened with outdated doctrine and weapons. In that case, rather than following the Israeli example of victory, the US Air Force might find itself conforming to the Syrian model of humiliation and defeat.

[duawLauff]

the war tactics doesn't change!! So is the lesson from history. I pay no attention to these reports as it doesn't concern me and am not interested in Syria or Israeli govrnment. All are as bad as one another!!

the issue is not the governments involved, i was highlighting military tactics and analysis. i dont agree that they remain the same. a strong army in the 21st century must know if his ground defense can take out certain types of air craft and also what they cant take out. that way they will know how they would manage against various countries. also otehr aspects and analysis such as water superiority etc. if the muslims ever build strong empires they need understanding of this stuff. also, notice the fatal errors such as the syrians placing the radars in valleys because they didnt want to dig a latrine in the hills and also hiding themselves with smoke, making them very visible to israeli attack. We need armies that are capable and ready. if you are relying on your ground defences to take out teh enemy you must know they will be capable. saudi has a reliance on ground defences for example and so the men must be ready and saudi must know which aircrafts it wont be able to stop and which countries have those aircraft. all the muslim lands who wish to defend islam must understand their military stregnths and weajknesses. currently muslims are lacking in military power and is crippling us. Also we must start developing muslim made warfare technology inshAllah rather thahn relying on non muslim stuff. non muslim tec hnolgoy is ok for an interim period where we buildup our capabilities but in the long run, inshallah our own made equipment must be the aim inshallah

[tinetttstation]

the issue is not the governments involved, i was highlighting military tactics and analysis. i dont agree that they remain the same. a strong army in the 21st century must know if his ground defense can take out certain types of air craft and also what they cant take out. that way they will know how they would manage against various countries. also otehr aspects and analysis such as water superiority etc. if the muslims ever build strong empires they need understanding of this stuff. also, notice the fatal errors such as the syrians placing the radars in valleys because they didnt want to dig a latrine in the hills and also hiding themselves with smoke, making them very visible to israeli attack. We need armies that are capable and ready. if you are relying on your ground defences to take out teh enemy you must know they will be capable. saudi has a reliance on ground defences for example and so the men must be ready and saudi must know which aircrafts it wont be able to stop and which countries have those aircraft. all the muslim lands who wish to defend islam must understand their military stregnths and weajknesses. currently muslims are lacking in military power and is crippling us. Also we must start developing muslim made warfare technology inshAllah rather thahn relying on non muslim stuff. non muslim tec hnolgoy is ok for an interim period where we buildup our capabilities but in the long run, inshallah our own made equipment must be the aim inshallah

Muslims can make more money by selling chicken kebap and biryani in the European countries. They are not interested in making weapons. Check this thread.

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http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/show...-science-only-!!
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[duawLauff]

Im not a big fan of criticisms that are easy for someone not in the situation themselves. Tell me brother nomadic and anyone else, realisticly speaking, if you were the king of saudi, what would you do, what would your policies be? What would you do for weaponry and also generally what policies would you implement? Same question to everyone else. I dont believe being a muslim ruler is easy in our times and i think people should hold back on unfair criticisms because its easy to say while ur sitting back in dar al kufr with not a responsibility in teh world. Saudi are in a very tight situation and in my oppinion are trying their best, as are some other muslim lands and we have to be fair with criticism

[duawLauff]

brother, calm down and dont be so emotional when discussing. Im sure this is not the say of the sufis.

Who is running the compound? Which company was it and who runs that company because I'll be very surprised if its a saudi run compound. Im sure whoever made that decision is not the same people who are against bid'ah and shirk bro. Dont lump all saudis into one category. Some, including princes are very religious and some are absolute shatyaans who are secularists. you cant just dump all of saudi into one box. Its made up of individuals who all are doing different thins. some working for islam, some for the kuffar. Just the same as pakistan or any muslim country right now. People need to chill and not be so emotional

[duawLauff]

Saudis are not trying anything!! they sit and pretend the oil will last forever!! First put education in order and establish govrnance and proper workable social wellfare 3. Invite educated muslim from the west and pakistan and the east to do proper job 4. Limit relegious bigotory directed towards others (muslim and non muslim). 5. Dont buy weapons 6. Go to place like malaysia or other muslim countries where there is industry and invest money 7. Charge American Army for every day of their stay and impose tax that becomes financially difficult for them to stay 8. Provide halal outlet for the youth .. 9. Develop close economic and military ties with neighbouring countries using OIC as a venue. 10. implement shariah equally 11. Limit or restrict western media machine 12. Rely soly on eastern media outlet 13.Invite more labour from 3rd countries (mainly muslim). The list can go on.

I have to go now but soon I am going to address your policies inshAllah. Your being very unfair and its difficult to have a discussion with anyone who is unfair. To say no efforts are being made in saudi is totally unfair. Be just brother

[zueqhbyhp]

I think its important for us to build our understanding of these types of issues. Wallahu a'lam:


http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...89/hurley.html

I, for one, completely agree. I'll say the same thing about economics issues. Brother Pluto and MujahidAbdullah some times bring them up but there is no regular discussion. same is true about science. So I shall urge you to pay regular visits to talk about strategic matters.

[duawLauff]

who knows about the principles of guerilla warefare? Its currently being utilised in syria against asssad:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_warfare

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Syrian_Army

[mincarlie.frymyer]

no country on earth claims to be islamic unlike the KSA? So it is hypocritical. this proved my earlier point one law for some and different law for the other. I know not all saudis are the same! But there seems to be symptom of anti relegious stance. It is odd they demand non muslim women to wear hijab outside the compound but muslim women or men can't wear their attaire in the land of Saudia!!
They follow no road rules, impatient. One of my collegue was attacked by saudi thugs, not to mention stone being thrown at western women for not wearing headscarf? Where in Shairah does it say non muslim women have to cover their head? Where does it state in book of fiqh women can't venture out of their home (within 60 km)? i doubt this is in hambaly fiqh? It is odd they have no problem allowing women to go to the grave when there are clear narration against it?

I'm not in the path of tassawuf. I would be reprimanded by a shaikh if they hear what I say.

Allahualam

[duawLauff]

bro i dont think your being fair. non of what you desrcibed is any worse than what i have personally seen throughout the muslim lands. Its hard to discuss teh topic if you take such small stabs at them given teh monstrous acts some muslim governments are doing right now. Claiming to be islamic or not makes no difference, we judge anyone according to their actions and saudi are better than most.

Its like when teh non muslims say proper bad things about teh prophet salallhahu alayhi wassalam. They must understand that in order for me to even take them seriously they need to be fair. Even if we didnt believe that teh prophet was a messenger on behalf of god, i still would consider him to be someone who brought amazing rights for the people of makka that are unparralled anywhere in terms of rights for women, ethnic minorities, teh poor etc. the point is, when they criticise, if they are not fair in tehir criticism then i cant take their arguement seriously because i know their arguement is baseless.

I know taht you arguement is very weak because you are attacking them for minor occurences and you are talking about "them" like the saudis who incist on hijab are the same as the europeans who run the firm you were supposed to be working for. I came to islam through logic and any arguyements that are illogical i can never except. Did you read about teh forced sterilisation of women in uzbekistan. there is nothing taht saudi ever did taht i saw that even remotely compares with that. Honestly bro dont take petty swipes, and be just in your criticisms

[teridbruse]

I have heard of the drone that the Iranians captured. Some said the Iranians did not shoot it down, but used electronic warfare to override the controls and force it to land.

You may despise the Iranians, but that's still pretty impressive.

[duawLauff]

i dislike iran because of aqeedah and al wala wal bara but definitely I believe they have done some impressive things in terms of science and technology. I wouldnt ever support a country on the basis of their success in the dunya, a nation founded upon cursing companions, slandering the wives of the prophet salallahu alayhi wassalam, and deceiving ahlas sunnah and stabbing us in the back any chance they get is definitely a country i would never support regardless of their dunya acheivements but nontheless I will accept they have some good achievements. We know from history that shia have only ever stabbed us in the back and attacked us and aided the kuffar against us though and now is no exception and they are only concerned with spreading shia doctrine and have no concern with islam as an ummah, and salahuddin had the right idea when he took them out BEFORE even fighting the crusaders so dont let irans achievements fool you. We need to be aiming for the same sort of techniques they are using in tewrms of worldly things in military, economics etc in certain areas. they arent perfect though. i will still support the GCC, indonesia, malayisa, turkey etc and hope and pray for improvements in their dunya and akhirah and wil try to continrbute to taht inshallah by learning deen and dunya and then migrating and taking my knowledge to the muslim lands inshALlah

[Alex]

Shalom Aleikhom,

This reminds me of Israel vs 3 Arab nations. The six days war. Israel crushed the arabs like a snail crushed by a tank !! Israel's technology,strategy,planning,execution,timing,inte lligence all were REMARKABLE. The arabs should learn from them. Ofcourse Israel had the advantage of US back up. But boy, it was just like in the movies, Israel destroyed the 3 nation's military power.

Peace
----------- Student of Allah

[AlexBrith]

Shalom Aleikhom,

This reminds me of Israel vs 3 Arab nations. The six days war. Israel crushed the arabs like a snail crushed by a tank !! Israel's technology,strategy,planning,execution,timing,inte lligence all were REMARKABLE. The arabs should learn from them. Ofcourse Israel had the advantage of US back up. But boy, it was just like in the movies, Israel destroyed the 3 nation's military power.

Peace
----------- Student of Allah

We Muslims do not need to learn from bloody israelis or americans. The reason the Muslims were a defeated Ummah is the lack of Taqwa and attachment of Dunya. Best example is Battle of Badr, the Mushriks had 1000 odd soldiers with the best of weapons and technology. But the Muslims were ill equipped and a little over 300 in number. We defeated them in a matter of hours.


Now, Allah has lightened [the hardship] for you, and He knows that among you is weakness.
So if there are from you one hundred [who are] steadfast, they will overcome two hundred.
And if there are among you a thousand, they will overcome two thousand by permission of Allah.
And Allah is with the steadfast. (Suratul Anfal: 66)

[Alex]

We Muslims do not need to learn from bloody israelis or americans. The reason the Muslims were a defeated Ummah is the lack of Taqwa and attachment of Dunya. Best example is Battle of Badr, the Mushriks had 1000 odd soldiers with the best of weapons and technology. But the Muslims were ill equipped and a little over 300 in number. We defeated them in a matter of hours.


Now, Allah has lightened [the hardship] for you, and He knows that among you is weakness.
So if there are from you one hundred [who are] steadfast, they will overcome two hundred.
And if there are among you a thousand, they will overcome two thousand by permission of Allah.
And Allah is with the steadfast. (Suratul Anfal: 66)

Shalom,

I do not compare these arab nations with the great souls and angels in the Battle of Bad'r. The soldiers in Bad'r faught for Al-Haq, and Al-Haq is the last thing that today's politicians and leaders have in their minds. I like learning from Jews/non-believers, I like to learn the good and avoid their bad. I learn from everywhere. I utilize every halal resource. Because all knowledge is revealed to man by the permission of God, not by man himself all alone. The technology we are using right now to communicate in this forum was most definitly not invented/developed/made popular by the muslims.

Peace
------------- Student of Allah

[duawLauff]

We Muslims do not need to learn from bloody israelis or americans. The reason the Muslims were a defeated Ummah is the lack of Taqwa and attachment of Dunya. Best example is Battle of Badr, the Mushriks had 1000 odd soldiers with the best of weapons and technology. But the Muslims were ill equipped and a little over 300 in number. We defeated them in a matter of hours.


Now, Allah has lightened [the hardship] for you, and He knows that among you is weakness.
So if there are from you one hundred [who are] steadfast, they will overcome two hundred.
And if there are among you a thousand, they will overcome two thousand by permission of Allah.
And Allah is with the steadfast. (Suratul Anfal: 66)

i partly agree and partly disagree

definitely allah isnt going to give us success in our current situation unless we rectify our taqwa, But we need to build means for war also in terms of military strategy, technology etc. OUr armies are lazy, if anyone read the article in full you will see that the syrians had some surface to air missiles that killed 48 of 50 israeli planes. israel needed to take these air defences out or risk an obsolete air force, rendering them severely vulnerable. so they planned for a whole year an attack on this 20 or so misile sites, simulating the attack with their planes, doing reconasiance etc. over this time, the syrian army chose to place themselves in valleys instead of on top of hills (the radars they use to detect planes dont pick up from far away in valleys, shortening your response time) and the reason for doing it in a valley is because they didnt want to dig toilets in the hill. rather than camoflage themselves they covered their statiosn with smoke, making them more visible. they didnt bother to move for months at a time. so israel went in and destoryed them and syria had no defences against israels air force.

the prophet salallahu alayhi wassalam utilised the warfare of the persians when he saw they utilised trenches and it aided the muslims in battle so there is nothing wrong with us observing the western military and asking ourselves in a material sense how are they so powerfula nd hopw can we imporve our forces to match them. I do agree that total reliance on this is the other extreme as without taqwa our strategies will never work.

So a balance of means and reliance on Allah is whats needed. If you upset the balance in either direction you are destined to fail. The prophet never had a battle strategy of "trust in Allah" but he would always recognise that ultimately victory came from Allah

[AlexBrith]

i partly agree and partly disagree

definitely allah isnt going to give us success in our current situation unless we rectify our taqwa, But we need to build means for war also in terms of military strategy, technology etc.

Ofcourse brother, i agree with you, we should prepare for war and use strategy, it was the way of our beloved Rasoolullah.
But I get angry when I hear that we lost because the enemy had superior technology, and when people start glorifying the kaffirs. Thats not the reason, we lack taqwa and we are not steadfast. Thats why Allah doesn't give us victory. We will come out victorious.


"Our Lord! Pour forth on us patience, and set firm our feet and make us victorious over the disbelieving people." (Al Baqarah: 250 )
Ameen.

[duawLauff]

Shalom,

I do not compare these arab nations with the great souls and angels in the Battle of Bad'r. The soldiers in Bad'r faught for Al-Haq, and Al-Haq is the last thing that today's politicians and leaders have in their minds. I like learning from Jews/non-believers, I like to learn the good and avoid their bad. I learn from everywhere. I utilize every halal resource. Because all knowledge is revealed to man by the permission of God, not by man himself all alone. The technology we are using right now to communicate in this forum was most definitly not invented/developed/made popular by the muslims.

Peace
------------- Student of Allah

there is nothing wrong with utilising the technology of the non muslims for the benefit of islam bro, keep doing your thing inshallah. We dont need cleaned shaven doctors and engineers though. We dont need engineers who are muslim, we need muslims who are engineers, so keep firm in your faith while learning and utilising the dunya inshAllah. what are you hoping to study? Im doing electircal and electronic engineering at university and there is so much use for the ummah in what ime learning. inshAllah I hope the muslims move forward. I plan to help the gulf countries to develop their technology and i urge all of you to aid muslim lands in building technology inshallah. We need the muslim countries to form alliances and blocs inshAllah and work together such as turkey, GCC, indonesia, malaysia etc. Saudi and turkey are gettiong vewry friendly withe ach other now alhamdulillah and alsojordan norocco and egypt may join the GCC so inshAllah I predict this will be the bloc to watch. its far form perfect but it is what the people make it. For every good muslim invovled in it whether it be in government, engineering, the citzens of the country, etc, the GCC project becomes a bit better.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysi...abia_relations
http://stf.kcorp.net/data/ksa-tIRKEY-ReLATION.pdf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coopera...es_of_the_Gulf
http://farmlandgrab.org/7987

inshAllah this will be a strong political bloc and requires strong religious commitment from its citzens, advancements in every field linked to prosperous and powerful countries and aim for powerful military, economy, technological development etc.

Dont expect perfection and dont criticise too easily, be patient and appreciate every little change that is beneficial rather than expecting some big change to happen tomorrow. Aid in those developemtns whether it be goign to work their or helping in some otehr way.

My plans are to work in teh gul inshallah in engineering in an area i believe in crucial and also start some farming projects in somalia inshallah as ill be close to somalia inshallah, have somali family, have the money and will to do something needed, and i believe somali could be an excellent provider of food to the muslim world and could have a strong economy inshallah. if i bought land, brought in some new farming and irrigation techniques, employed some local somalis, sold the food IN somalia (even if i incur financial losses it doesnt matter as the aim is a project to benefit somalia not make money) and sell excess food to neighbourhing gulf and muslim african states inshallah. If we all have these aims and ideas and objectives inshallah we will slowly build up stregnth and self sufficiency so all do your best isnhallah and as ive stressed many times, dont be too quick to sit back and criticise while doing nothing, focus your time on something beneficial to the place you feel is most desrving. even if you dont have dunya skills, giving dawah and rectifying the population is a GREAT AND WEIGTHTY effort that will help no doubt. if your in the west you can send money back to teh poor muslim countries to boost the economies, help in charity projects, give dawah to non muslims etc. there is so much good we all can do instead of just attacking anyone trying to do something

[duawLauff]

Ofcourse brother, i agree with you, we should prepare for war and use strategy, it was the way of our beloved Rasoolullah.
But I get angry when I hear that we lost because the enemy had superior technology, and when people start glorifying the kaffirs. Thats not the reason, we lack taqwa and we are not steadfast. Thats why Allah doesn't give us victory. We will come out victorious.


"Our Lord! Pour forth on us patience, and set firm our feet and make us victorious over the disbelieving people." (Al Baqarah: 250 )
Ameen.

i agree putting it exclusively down to worldy issues is wrong. can we agree to say its a result of BOTH lack of imaan and lack of preparation (many many verses and hadeeth on teh need to prepare for war sos urely if we failed to folllow this prophetic advise the effects would be detrimental to our military efforts)

[teridbruse]

A) We need Taqwa

B) We need technological proficiency

How does A help B?

No, seriously, I think A does help B... just not clear how.