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Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival
-JULIA DAY HOWELL

http://www.indopubs.com/indosufism.pdf

Conclusions
Sufism, once strongly associated with the ‘‘traditional’’ rural sector of Indonesian
society, clearly has not died out. The rural institutional bases of classical Sufism, the
pesantren and tarekat, are intact and even show signs of vigorous growth associated
with adaptive changes in structure, recruitment styles, and memberships. And,
ironically, precisely in the period of Indonesia’s most rapid economic development
under the New Order government, Sufism has inspired new enthusiasm, even in the
sectors of Indonesian society most intensely engaged in modernization and
globalization: the urban middle and upper classes. This interest is expressed through
the participation of urbanites in the long-established, rural-based Sufi orders, the
tarekat, but also through novel institutional forms in the towns and cities. Further,
the intellectual basis of Sufism is being discovered by cosmopolitans, and the tradition
is being sympathetically reformulated, especially by Neo-Modernist intellectuals
better known for their work on Islamic law in modern society.
Sufism, then, is very much a part of the wider Islamic revival that heretofore has
been characterized in Western scholarship largely in scripturalist terms. A fervent
concern on the part of Muslims of both Traditionalist and Modernist backgrounds to
infuse ‘‘outward’’ expressions of faith (so strongly stressed in scripturalism) with an
‘‘inner’’ meaning and experiential richness by drawing on Islam’s mystical tradition
has been largely overlooked. Sufism, however, in its various manifestations, has played
an important part in inspiring increased commitment to ‘‘outer’’ acts of piety that
feature so prominently in accounts of Indonesia’s Islamic revival. Sufism has also
contributed to the softening of contrasts in religiosity associated with Islamic
Traditionalism and Modernism and therefore helped create the common ground in
civil society upon which political tensions, so acute in the period since the fall of the
Suharto regime, can, it is hoped, be resolved. Neo-Sufism in particular is strongly
linked with Neo-Modernist liberalism, not only because it is often espoused by the
same thinkers, but because Neo-Sufi practice, with its emphasis on felt connection
with the Divine as a basis for ethical social prescriptions, strongly reinforces tolerance
for religious pluralism.
These findings have implications for the broader sociology of Islam, which
presently is dominated by Gellner’s characterization of Sufism in Muslim majoritycountries as fatally implicated in disappearing rural social formations.38 The validity
of this view needs to be further examined through a reappraisal of the recent revival
experiences of other Muslim countries. In so doing, it will be important to assess the
extent to which representations of Islamic religiosity are colored by the affinity of
scholars for models of modernization that foretell the demise of religion, or faced with
its unexpected persistence, for ‘‘bookish’’ and ‘‘rational’’ styles of religiosity such as
are found in Islamic Modernism.
Returning to the Indonesian case, given that this essay is concerned with trends,
it is appropriate to conclude with some speculation as to the likely future of Sufism
there. Bearing in mind the conditions that have fostered its survival up until now, it
is reasonable to expect that Sufism will continue to be an important part of Indonesian
life as long as certain features of the political and social environment of religion remain
in place. These include the requirement for all Indonesians to practice one of five
recognized religions (agama)39 or a ‘‘faith’’ (kepercayaan/kebatinan) with significant legal
support behind the religions and significant opprobrium still attached to kebatinan.
The relaxation of attitudes toward kebatinan would erode the attraction of Sufism as
‘‘fully legitimate’’ mysticism and encourage the proliferation of syncretic and highly
privatized forms of ‘‘alternative’’ spirituality. Beyond the issue of restricted scope for
the social construction of religiosity is that of actual funding. Continued heavy
government financial support for religious education and religious projects of all sorts
will likely favor Sufism to the extent that it keeps spiritual concerns central to concepts
of Indonesian citizenship and promotes the means to engage with specifically Islamic
spirituality. Also, since enthusiasm for Sufism is part of the overall Islamic revival,
the continued importance of Islam to Indonesians (as to Muslims elsewhere in the
world) as a cultural counterweight to Westernization should be propitious. If,
however, sensitivities to Westernization should escalate, and for other reasons
‘‘fundamentalist’’ Islamist movements achieve political dominance in Indonesia, the
prospects for Sufism would become decidedly poor. As for Neo-Sufism, continued
economic and social development is likely to favor it over older Sufi expressions but
not lead to their replacement by it, since, as we have seen, even the orthodox tarekat
can be attractive to well-educated Muslims. Those tarekat with the best prospects for
urban support are those whose principals are sufficiently comfortable with urban
culture to put at ease people coming from the nonreligious education system and who
operate relatively openly. With the increasing integration of pesantren and general
education and the increasing penetration of urban culture into all areas of life, there
should be no shortage of such leadership.

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Any one from Indonesia-malaysia can comment on the analysis given in the paper above?