[Illisezek]

To what extent could humans be said to have soul, a mind that is, not something supernatural, and regarding all that goes into mental states are feelings observer independent real things having a real existance? Ignoring the words we use to make reference to it or them, are they a real thing as hard science would see it?

Or, is it the case that it requires a mind to comprehend a mind, that using an internal concept of mind is required to understand mind, that it is somewhat a generator of concepts of itself?

Not far back it was thought a small percentage of genes was useful and the rest were junk, then understanding of transcription, methylation, epigenetics etc came along and somewhat changed that picture.

What's the chances something similar will happen re the brain?

[kaiayout]

.
Or, is it the case that it requires a mind to comprehend a mind, that using an internal concept of mind is required to understand mind, that it is somewhat a generator of concepts of itself?
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Shirley the brain is only a decoder box and the mind the reciever...

[Arkadiyas]

I really don't understand what the OP is asking.

[slimfifa]

I really don't understand what the OP is asking.

That's ok.

[Grainiary]

Thanks.

Souls don't exist. I don't think we even have a "self".

Our "self" is a bundle* of ever-changing memories, experiences and opinions, not a fixed and constant "pearl".

*Julian Baggini uses this term in his fascinating book, The Ego Trick.

[chadnezzrr]

I really don't understand what the OP is asking.

ok I thought it was just me.

[BrianGoldsmith]

ok I thought it was just me.

Thanks. Hugs!

[gennick]

Souls don't exist.
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Ref?

[adactthrd]

interestingly organ donations seem to have some sort of 'memory'

A transplant patient has developed an insatiable craving for junk food - after receiving a new heart from a teenager with a taste for fatty snacks.

David Waters is the latest example of an extraordinary phenomenon which sees some transplant recipients take on the characteristics of the donor.

Before being given the heart of 18-year-old Kaden Delaney, who was left brain dead after a car crash, Mr Waters, 24, had 'no desire at all' for Burger Rings, ring-shaped hamburger-flavoured crisps.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...#ixzz1thinFHaL

[Rupeviv]

.
Before being given the heart of 18-year-old
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Inetersting...So how does the DNA change in recipients?

[Pheboasmabs]

.
Before being given the heart of 18-year-old
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Inetersting...So how does the DNA change in recipients?

I don't think there is much known about this 'phenomenon' only that it exists.
The book by Paul Pearsall, The Heart's Code: Tapping the Wisdom and Power of Our Heart Energy, explores the subject. Pearsall argues that the brain is not the only centre of human intelligence. The heart, he says, carries equal importance. He posits that the body is made up of cells that transmit “information.” Cells communicate this information to each other electromagnetically. Thus a transplanted organ can continue to broadcast old information, something like amputees’ experience of pain in lost limbs. Phenomena like these suggest cells have memories.
Pearsall’s book is based on 73 heart-transplant cases in which parts of the donors’ personalities appear to have been transferred to the recipients.


http://www.care2.com/greenliving/do-...es.html?page=1

[StizePypemype]

Our "self" is a bundle* of ever-changing memories, experiences and opinions, not a fixed and constant "pearl".

But why should we deny the reality of the "self" just because it is ever chenging?

I'd say that "ourself" is the only thing that we can be sure does exist.

[Arrocousa]

Well it is an easily tested thing DNA... How does that change if you get given blood for example?

Muscle memory and cell memory makes sense, tho.

And it would need to be corrected to personality _traits_ to influence me...

[GooogleGuy]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie

"......... Physicalism is the idea that all aspects of human nature can be explained by physical means: specifically, all aspects of human nature and perception can be explained from a neurobiological standpoint. Since a zombie is physiologically indistinguishable from human beings its hypothetical possibility would be an argument for a consciousness that is more than the sum of neurological pathways and brain states.[2]"



And to some extent the aspects of human nature that defy explanation are denied, which has the explanatory gap less obvious.



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap

"The explanatory gap is the lack of an explanation for consciousness and human experiences such as qualia under physicalism. Bridging this gap is known as "the hard problem".[1] The explanatory gap has vexed and intrigued philosophers and AI researchers alike for decades and caused considerable debate."



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia

"Qualia ( /ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/), singular "quale" (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkwaːle]), from a Latin word meaning for "what sort" or "what kind," is a term used in philosophy to refer to subjective conscious experiences as 'raw feels'. Daniel Dennett writes that qualia is "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schrödinger had this counter-materialist take: "The sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the physiologist account for it, if he had fuller knowledge than he has of the processes in the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so."[2]..."


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mind

"Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind-body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as the central issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body.[2]"

[grofvuri]

I'd say that "ourself" is the only thing that we can be sure does exist.

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Yes, the rest is a consensus of opinion.

[Michaelnewerb]

I'd say that "ourself" is the only thing that we can be sure does exist.
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Which gets us back to the OP... Is a mind the only thing that can detect a mind?

I think the obverse is more truerer... but less intent on the answer.

[cypedembeda]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
Since a zombie is physiologically indistinguishable from human beings its hypothetical possibility would be an argument for a consciousness that is more than the sum of neurological pathways and brain states.[2]"

If a zombie is by definition different from a human being then there must be a physiological difference between a zombie and a human being, even if we don't have the knowledge to specify what that difference is.

[alegsghed]

Or, is it the case that it requires a mind to comprehend a mind, that using an internal concept of mind is required to understand mind, that it is somewhat a generator of concepts of itself?

A mind is the only thing that can comprehend anything. But there are minds, human ones at that, that supposedly lack theory of mind, so having a mind would seem a necessary but not sufficient condition for forming a concept of mind.

Not far back it was thought a small percentage of genes was useful and the rest were junk, then understanding of transcription, methylation, epigenetics etc came along and somewhat changed that picture.

What's the chances something similar will happen re the brain?

A large degree of that junk DNA is still considered to be just junk. Popular misconceptions about using on 10% of our brains notwithstanding, nobody has claimed any part of the brain is junk. Well not since Descartes and the pineal gland.

[venediene]

Was thinking of John B. Watson etc

"..Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness..."

>>If a zombie is by definition different from a human being then there must be a physiological difference between a zombie and a human being, even if we don't have the knowledge to specify what that difference is"

The point maybe that, for example, that a concept residing in the mind, having been acted on and being a composite integration of previous action [experience] along with the characteristics of how it is uniquely mind-integrated within and for the mind and for the individual, along with the potentials it facilitates [many of which exist as possibilities not acted on], that the totality of inner forces that restrict or inhibit an outcome maybe larger in scope than the outcome itself in some sense. In the case that consciousness were the product of more-so inhibitory action, and the inhibitory aspects were "magic" in the context of the modern understanding of what makes a mind do what a mind does, and the inhibitory forces were some type of useful "noise", then the zombie wont have the unique noise. The noise could be excess computational capacity in a way, imagination maybe, that let loose might threaten self, otherwise kept orderly by minding the body-vehicle, or requirements associated with.

There maybe an argument that language, as it works with word-concepts, is not all tightly structured and operates with structures of the brain that make it so by straightforward neuro or neurochemical activity, as in like a set of circuits performs some processes, and the processes are for sure localised in brain regions, for example as measurements of blood flow in the brain might persuade us is the case.

Representations maybe more activity of exclusion, which maybe more substantive than inclusion. Something is what it by way of what it is not, in-great-part, and what something is not is often not completely known, yet consideration of the unknowns can be made.

The "noise" maybe that which has not been experienced, a possible impinging force from external environment, an internally generated possibility, not known in any exactness, it might be death, a notion of mortality of self and others. Interactions to do with this. Point being that what is coming and when, can't be known for sure, and then there is the possibility of not wanting to know.

What would the zombie do with the paradoxical situation of both wanting to know and not wanting to know?

Consciousness may turn out to be the product of something paradoxical, paradoxical requirements. This may better explain the explanatory gap than limits of knowledge or cognitive limitations.

Possibly once explaining self to self and to others becomes a part of self, that self is not entirely localized within the mind and mind-body-vehicle of self. This means aspects of self reside elsewhere, which extends to non-human and non-organic things too in a way, but will keep with other human minds here.

It maybe the case that the zombie can't be physiologically exact because of the simple fact it does not and has not occupied the exact same space in time in relation to others. Both shared experience, unshared and limits of shared experience contribute to self.

Pinker, as recalled, cites a comedian with some joke about someone's partner [wife at home maybe] being replaced by an exact replica, and when guy gets home and says something like hello how are you, gets "who are you?" response.

Who are you indeed. A question that is with us birth to death. Not what are you, but who are you.

The who in the who are you doesn't reside strictly or entirely in any fixed way or fixed structures of mind, but is out there in some way.

The explanatory gap, or zombie gap, maybe a great driver of science.

Some light relief.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_FZVD5lsAw

[Tij84ye]

But why should we deny the reality of the "self" just because it is ever chenging?

I'd say that "ourself" is the only thing that we can be sure does exist.

It gets problematic when someone with mental illness or depression clings to their current self because they think that's "who I am", and they resist counseling for change, for example.