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STRATFOR FREE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Musharraf Cursed if He Does, Ousted if He Doesn't?

Summary

Despite the media hype and fresh military operations on both
sides of Pakistan's northwestern border, Osama bin Laden and the top leadership of al Qaeda are nowhere to be found. Certain
elements within the Pakistani state and society are known to
sympathize with the group, and it is likely that certain rogue
elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence
establishment are helping al Qaeda members evade capture.

Analysis

Following leaks out of Washington in February, the global media
are rife with reports of renewed and vigorous efforts to nab
senior al Qaeda leaders. Despite U.S. and Pakistani military
activity along the northeastern border of Afghanistan, there has
been no sign of Osama bin Laden or any of his top associates.

The generic explanations of why this has been the case cite
difficult terrain and sympathetic natives -- particularly in the
autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) -- but we
must consider the possibility that influential elements are
helping the jihadists elude their would-be captors.

With Kabul clearly in the hands of anti-Taliban and anti-al Qaeda
forces, the only remaining suspects are within Islamabad's Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) apparatus. After all, it was the ISI
that nurtured Afghan and Kashmiri jihadists and, by extension, al
Qaeda. Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf would find
himself in hot water if individuals or groups within the ISI are
found to be assisting al Qaeda.

Stratfor sources close to Islamabad say there is no doubt the ISI
leadership is firmly under Musharraf's control due to a series of
personnel changes since Sept. 11, 2001. Still, certain old-school
individuals -- from colonels on down -- remain in a position to
thwart anti-al Qaeda efforts.

Sources tell Stratfor that news travels fast when the military is
set to initiate a fresh assault, and jihadist sympathizers relay
the details to bin Laden through a series of contacts. These ISI
elements are no longer in positions of authority, but they retain
sufficient influence to save bin Laden's hide. Sympathizers don't
know where bin Laden is, sources say, but are in touch with a
network of middlemen who do know.

The United States is determined to destroy al Qaeda, and U.S.
officials will not hesitate to take action if they believe a
segment of Musharraf's military is torpedoing their efforts.

Washington will give Musharraf a chance to purge rogue military
elements and provide information about the jihadists'
whereabouts. If he complies, he will run the risk of dissent from
within the military, which is his only remaining constituency.

If Musharraf fails, the United States likely will take matters
into its own hands. This inevitably would lead to the president's
downfall: U.S. troops operating openly in Pakistan likely would
incite the masses and some in the military to revolt.

The Pakistani political system is showing signs of stress. The
Daily Times reported March 3 that Nighat Agha, a senator from the
ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Q, asked the Pakistani Parliament
why local newspapers were reporting the involvement of foreign
troops in operations within Pakistan's borders. She said the
reports were fomenting public resentment. The interior minister,
who also is a senior PML-Q leader, said Musharraf denies the
presence of foreign troops and that the Pakistani army is dealing
with the situation.

A report also surfaced about an unusually lengthy Feb. 29 meeting between Musharraf and Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali. Jamali reportedly complained about trying to run day-to-day government business amid "interference" from some of Musharraf's closest aides. This shows that Musharraf's attempts to maintain control are not sitting well even with his own allies.

The moderate Islamist Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal has threatened to
initiate a nationwide March 23 campaign against the FATA military
operations and Musharraf's nuclear and Kashmir policies. The MMA
also threatened to pull out of a coalition government it formed
with the PML-Q in Baluchistan province. Without MMA support,
deputies in the provincial legislature would be unable to sustain
the PML-Q government.

Mounting U.S. pressure is creating significant problems for
Musharraf. His principal opponents, who refuse to compromise, are taking this as a cue to move against the president. The exiled
leadership of the two main non-Islamist parties -- the Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) --
are preparing to return home. PPP chair Benazir Bhutto has hinted
that she might return to Pakistan later this year, and PML-N
leader Shahbaz Sharif also reportedly is considering returning to
Pakistan before summer.

Although the outcome is unclear, Musharraf does not appear to be
in a position to prevent the opposition from ganging up on him.
No one within Pakistan's military-intelligence complex apparently
has actionable intelligence about bin Laden's whereabouts, and
Washington does not fully trust Islamabad to be straight on this
matter.

Musharraf basically has two choices. He can produce bin Laden, or
he will have to convince Washington that he does not know where the al Qaeda leader is and that he has purged his intelligence agencies of people playing both sides. Either way will be an uphill climb, further complicated by government and popular
unrest.


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