[wrbwrbwrb]

my understanding and interest in this issue is he has announced changes to our response postures ala what/how we will or won't respond to, not so much in the mechanical delivery but when we will employ nukes.

Announcing that in effect he no longer sees use of chemical or biological weapons use on par with and deserving of the same retaliatory effect of nuclear forces is a misstate which buys, gains or adds absolutely nothing to the issue.

On another note I find that 2 issues are not as clear in what I am reading, validation/verification, Bush included a viable and robust verification clause(s).

It appears that the cameras, inspectors etc. at Russia's strategic missile plant in Votkinsk.

Also, it appears that Russian has basically told us that despite the signing ( still requiring 67 votes in the senate btw to become binding) that they would see any deployment of missile defense shields as an out , virtually abrogating their responsibility to conform to the treaty. Not having it codified means that either Obama has not agreed to not deploy or that he just wants the treaty without having to say yes or no, or that he knows he cannot pas it here if we agree not too, but, this provides an advantage to Putin et al in that if we do, say a year from now deploy one, they can say in effect we have gone back on our word, giving them an out. We would of course say hey its not in the treaty and they will say they were on record as to not obliging themselves of living with it if we deploy a shield. We know in advance how this will play out, we will be made to look as if we changed the game.....

[plogypeskelry]

my understanding and interest in this issue is he has announced changes to our response postures ala what/how we will or won't respond to, not so much in the mechanical delivery but when we will employ nukes.

Announcing that in effect he no longer sees use of chemical or biological weapons use on par with and deserving of the same retaliatory effect of nuclear forces is a misstate which buys, gains or adds absolutely nothing to the issue.

On another note I find that 2 issues are not as clear in what I am reading, validation/verification, Bush included a viable and robust verification clause(s).

It appears that the cameras, inspectors etc. at Russia's strategic missile plant in Votkinsk.

Also, it appears that Russian has basically told us that despite the signing ( still requiring 67 votes in the senate btw to become binding) that they would see any deployment of missile defense shields as an out , virtually abrogating their responsibility to conform to the treaty. Not having it codified means that either Obama has not agreed to not deploy or that he just wants the treaty without having to say yes or no, or that he knows he cannot pas it here if we agree not too, but, this provides an advantage to Putin et al in that if we do, say a year from now deploy one, they can say in effect we have gone back on our word, giving them an out. We would of course say hey its not in the treaty and they will say they were on record as to not obliging themselves of living with it if we deploy a shield. We know in advance how this will play out, we will be made to look as if we changed the game.....

There's a difference betweent he treaty and the NPR but both show Obama to be making a bow to the passivists....as should have been totally expected.

Frankly, decreasing the size our nuke arsenal is doesn't make a lick of difference. Even reducing our strategic inventory isn't such a big deal as long as we maintain a tactical edge and THAT is where the NPR concerns me. The report indicates a reduction in modernization and development. My concern is that this will result in delivery systems that are easily defeatable and warheads that may or may not function as intended. Worse yet, we will not be developing technologies which keep pace with those who may choose to do us harm.

[lisualsethelp]

The issue was using conventional ICBM's. I did a quick research and found some old articles :
ArmsControlWonk (August 2005), Aerospace Power Journal (Fall 2001), "abovetopsecret.com" (April 2007).
I assume from these that conventional missiles is already an old tendency, and more the will of military people than politicians. Again, from RTI : globalsecuritynewswire. May be that they are exploiting the START treaty to get what they wanted since a couple of years.

As for politics : New York Times. Both worries about antimissile systems and modernization are raised (not sure on the latter), while those conventional missiles don't seem to bother anyone.
I must admit, I have been surprised to learn that MIRV had been slowly abandoned after Cold War. Now it's only a detail, impacting the effectiveness of missiles. If no one cares, then sounds good.

On another note, is it really the treaty that prevents modernization ? Or is it a decision solely made by the DoD ? I didn't read the treaty itself.

[Alice_Medichi34]

The issue was using conventional ICBM's. I did a quick research and found some old articles :
ArmsControlWonk (August 2005), Aerospace Power Journal (Fall 2001), "abovetopsecret.com" (April 2007).
I assume from these that conventional missiles is already an old tendency, and more the will of military people than politicians. Again, from RTI : globalsecuritynewswire. May be that they are exploiting the START treaty to get what they wanted since a couple of years.

As for politics : New York Times. Both worries about antimissile systems and modernization are raised (not sure on the latter), while those conventional missiles don't seem to bother anyone.
I must admit, I have been surprised to learn that MIRV had been slowly abandoned after Cold War. Now it's only a detail, impacting the effectiveness of missiles. If no one cares, then sounds good.

On another note, is it really the treaty that prevents modernization ? Or is it a decision solely made by the DoD ? I didn't read the treaty itself.

It will be the decision of the president to institute changes in policy regarding modernization and use of our nuclear capabilities. Congress must approve funding for proposed programs. The treaty is a policy matter and only changes modernization, etc. as long as such things are conducted within the terms of the treaty. Historically, treaties function more as a political tool than as a real prophylactic to war.

[lizadax]

China and Russia have protested, saying it may well lead to a new arms race. There is also a legitimate concern that the launching of a conventional ICBM could be mistaken for a nuclear ICBM. The Administration and Pentagon is considering restricting these weapons to certain sites and allowing Russian and Chinese weapons inspectors periodic (annual, I believe) access to certify them. That may be fine for the sort of engagements we’ve been involved in over the last 30 years; but it gives me pause to think what might happen if their capabilities were degraded (because of electronic warfare interference, or physically degraded because they’re involved in the conflict, etc.) and they were able to detect a launch or missiles in the air, but not their exact origin or target.

[Faungarne]

Well, non-nuclear sub-one hour strike is a new capability.

If your within a few hundred miles of the coast, we've got 4 Ohio class SSGNs, which can put a 150+ Tomahawks on a target as fast as they can fly.

Instead of de-MIRVing our Minuteman III's, we should retire some Tridents, and convert some more Ohio's.

Of course, this is just what the DoD admits to having.

Tomahawks are great; but they fly low and slow. OBL may have been tipped off that Tomahawks were on their way in '98 by Pakistanis with enough time to take shelter.

[bestbyV]

my understanding and interest in this issue is he has announced changes to our response postures ala what/how we will or won't respond to, not so much in the mechanical delivery but when we will employ nukes.

These are my thoughts also. I was going to begin my own thread on this last night, but was too tired to take the time. I was some what surprised that no one had yet begun a thread sooner. What bothered me with this NPR was not putting conventional warheads on ICBMs, though this does increase the threat of accidental nuclear retaliation. What I found troublesome is the nuclear posture that “the United States is now … declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.”

The report goes on to assert that “the United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response – and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable.”

Why am I bothered by this change? For the past 65+ year, the American nuclear posture has been, in a sense, an uncertain threat of when and how nuclear weapons would be used. If the Soviet’s invaded Western Europe with overwhelming conventional forces, there was the threat that we would use our nuclear strike capabilities against them. If any nation attacked the U.S. or its allies or its security partners with a nuclear strike or chemical or biological weapons there was the threat that we would use our nuclear weapons.

Would we have ever followed through on these threats? We never had to answer that question, since the threat alone acted as a deterrence to such attacks. The deterrence was “uncertainty.” Now our adversaries know what they can get away with.

While the claim that, “This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT ..,” I believe that the unintended consequences of this change to our nuclear posture will be to encourage those states who desire weapons of mass destruction to focus on chemical and biological weapons. With the potential -- given the rapid technological development in genetics, bioengineering, and even nanotechnology -- of creating an even more dangerous weapon than nuclear weapons. And a belligerent nation could work at developing such weapons, while “fully complying with the NPT.”

Sure, some may claim “yes, but the NPR asserts that such a nation would still face the threat of a massive conventional attack from U.S. forces.” That is true, but a conventional strike takes weeks, if not months, to assemble the necessary forces to make such a strike possible. A nuclear strike takes 15 to 20 minutes. Which threat do you believe holds more of a threat to those who would wish to do us harm?

Another statement I found troubling is that now, “The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs (LEPs) will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.”

The Nuclear Posture Review Report acknowledges that both Russia and China, while neither are the threats they were during the Cold War, are continuing to upgrade and improve their own nuclear arsenal. Is it wise to stop all new development in nuclear warheads, since our closest peers are continuing to do so? How long will it take them to develop new and better weapons, if we stop our own research and development?

I believe that “the President’s vision of a world without nuclear weapons” is naïve. Trying to put the nuclear danger back into Pandora’s Box is a foolish dream and impossible. Like so many of Obama’s other policies, this one is wrong and unfortunately very dangerous to American security.

All quotes from: http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010...w%20Report.pdf

Tashi deleks,

M

[vicgirl]

This treaty... which can be summed up in one sentence:

"Go ahead, fuck me up the ass, I won't ever hit back"

Will go down in history as the single worse piece of appeasement this side of Munich. We gave everything away and got nothing in return.

A classic.

This boy-king of yours is going to get a whole bunch of people killed... and I don't mean a 9/11 bunch or even an Iraqi War size bunch. I'm talking millions.

This is nonsense. President Obama stated that the US has the right to do an agressive nuclear strike and that it doesn't need a reason to do it.

There are just 2 conditions:
- The US can't use more than 1550 nukes
- The country that is attacked must not be in full compliance with the NNPT

[capeAngedlelp]

There are just 2 conditions:
- The US can't use more than 1550 nukes
- The country that is attacked must not be in full compliance with the NNPT

So if a nation uses some other weapon of mass destruction, be it chemical, biological, or EMP, or radiological, we can only respond conventionally.

[BluewayAllere]

just to keep track ala the Nuke policy, the one does it again and has to send hill and gates out to clean up his mess....

In Event of WMD Attack, "All Bets Are Off" - Face The Nation - CBS News

[anfuckinggs]

In August 1998 after a series of Al Qaeda terrorist attacks the US had actionable intelligence regarding UBL's wherabouts and decided to take him out. So the US targeted UBL and AQ training camps in Afghanistan with tomahawks launched from the USS Enterprise which was in the Indian ocean at the time. But these had to overfly Pakistan.

Considering the tensions between India and Pakistan, the worst case scenario was that if Pakistan happened to detect missiles in it's airspace, they might have misconstrued it as an incomming nuclear attack from India, and retaliate in kind. And I think we all know what a disaster an all out nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be.

So to avoid this nightmare scanario, the US notified Pakistan that we were launching missiles over their country and into Afghanistan. And it is very likely that somone from the ISI called UBL on his SAT phone and warned him, so by the time those missiles got to their destination UBL and his entourage were long gone. Bottom line...mission failed.

Perhaps using ICBM's with conventional warheads would have been more effective because they wouldn't have had to overfly Pakistan.

Just a thought.

[scoussysows]

In August 1998 after a series of Al Qaeda terrorist attacks the US had actionable intelligence regarding UBL's wherabouts and decided to take him out. So the US targeted UBL and AQ training camps in Afghanistan with tomahawks launched from the USS Enterprise which was in the Indian ocean at the time. But these had to overfly Pakistan.

Considering the tensions between India and Pakistan, the worst case scenario was that if Pakistan happened to detect missiles in it's airspace, they might have misconstrued it as an incomming nuclear attack from India, and retaliate in kind. And I think we all know what a disaster an all out nuclear war between India and Pakistan would be.

So to avoid this nightmare scanario, the US notified Pakistan that we were launching missiles over their country and into Afghanistan. And it is very likely that somone from the ISI called UBL on his SAT phone and warned him, so by the time those missiles got to their destination UBL and his entourage were long gone. Bottom line...mission failed.

Perhaps using ICBM's with conventional warheads would have been more effective because they wouldn't have had to overfly Pakistan.

Just a thought.

LOL! I'm trying to imagine the phone call to Putin...

[DoctoNilsonDen]

The Pentagon is developing a new class of weapons called Prompt Global Strike, capable of reaching any corner of the earth from the US in an hour, the New York Times reported. With such accuracy and force, the new weapon is designed to counter terrorists, to take out North Korean missiles and to destroy Iranian nuclear sites. If the weapons can help to counter the terrorists, it will be a good thing to the world, but If the United States launched a war of aggression against other countries by using these new weapons, it would be very regrettable. All the people in the world still remember the pain of Afghanistan and Iraq clearly.

[JohnVK]

I wouldn't call Afghanistan a war of aggression. More of a police action that had to be pursued as a war. Of course, some may say the same on Iraq and I'd have to agree with them to a degree. In any case, if these new weapon systems are any more devastating than modern conventional weaponry, I don't anticipating them being launched unless there's agreement throughout the command hierarchy that such action is necessary.

[VogsHoock]

Threads merged

[pIp83Uns]

The X-51 Waverider, or an orbital platform, such as the freshly launched X-37 are better options that won't spark a nuclear exchange.

In fact, a several hundred pound metal slug coming in a Mach 25 should eliminate the need for tactical nukes all together.