[Lillie_Steins]

http://hnn.us/articles/38637.html

By Robert James Maddox

Mr. Maddox is the editor of Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism (University of Missouri Press, May 2007).

The use of atomic bombs against Japan in August 1945 has remained one of the most controversial issues in American history. The conventional view is that these weapons were used to end a bloody war that would have become far bloodier if the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands had proven necessary. Individuals who have become known as “Hiroshima Revisionists” have dismissed this explanation as a post-war myth concocted by Harry S. Truman and those around him to cover up their “real” goal, which was political rather than military. They maintain that American officials knew by the spring of 1945 that the Japanese were trying to surrender, and would have done so if only an assurance had been given that they could retain their sacred emperor. Truman and his Secretary of State James F. Byrnes refused to extend such an assurance, according to this view, because they wanted the war to continue until the bombs were ready. Thus, the nuclear weapons that obliterated two cities were not used to defeat an already-defeated Japan, but to bully the Soviet Union through “atomic diplomacy.” The purpose of Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism (University of Missouri Press, 2007) is to expose the numerous myths that revisionists have spawned over the years.

A sampling of revisionist fictions treated in Hiroshima is as follows:

1. That intercepted messages between Tokyo and Japanese diplomats abroad during the summer of 1945 revealed Japan’s willingness to surrender.

None of these messages even hinted that Japan was prepared to surrender under any circumstances. Some members of what Robert P. Newman has referred to as the “civilian elite” were trying to enlist the Soviet Union in brokering a peace that would have permitted Japan to escape with its prewar empire and imperial system intact. Several enterprising revisionists, including Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin in their recent Pulitzer Prize-winning American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer (2006), have misrepresented these messages by the simple device of pretending that the word “peace” meant the same thing as “surrender.” They neglect to inform their readers that as late as 17 July 1945 the Japanese foreign minister stated that “we are not asking [for] the Russians’ mediation in anything like unconditional surrender. . . .”

Sadao Asada’s essay in Hiroshima, based largely on Japanese sources, shows how difficult it was for the Japanese “peace party” to prevail over the hardliners in the government even after both bombs had been dropped and the Soviet Union had entered the war. That they could have done so before these catastrophic events is impossible to credit.

Edward J. Drea points out that regardless of what the diplomats were trying to accomplish, intercepted military traffic (ULTRA) revealed that the Japanese military was “struggling around the clock to turn Kyushu’s beaches [site of the first planned invasion] into massive killing grounds.” And the generals controlled the situation, not the civilians.

2. That Harry Truman sought to delay Soviet entry into the Pacific War because he was afraid such a move would precipitate Japan’s surrender before the bombs could be dropped.

There is abundant evidence that Truman actively sought Soviet participation in the war and welcomed it when it came. Michael Kort’s essay in Hiroshima examines a recent version of this revisionist chestnut, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s prize-winning Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (2005). Kort shows that the documents simply do not support Hasegawa’s contention that Truman engaged in a “race” to use the bombs before Stalin entered the war.

3. That even if an invasion proved necessary, Truman’s claim in his memoirs that the invasion would have cost an estimated five hundred thousand American lives was a post war creation designed to justify the unjustifiable. Actual casualty estimates were but a fraction of that number.

D. M. Giangreco’s “A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas” demolishes the “low” casualty thesis. He shows that figures as high or even higher than Truman claimed were commonplace at the upper levels of government and at least some were shown directly to the president. The title of a second Giangreco (and Kathryn Moore) essay, “Half a Million Purple Hearts,” tells it all. The number of these medals struck mocks the “low” casualty claim.

4. That the debate over the Enola Gay exhibition at the National Air and Space Museum (NASM) in 1995 was one between those who wished to rely on “trustworthy documents now at hand” and those who wished to present a “largely fictitious, comforting story.”

Robert P. Newman’s chapter in Hiroshima shatters this myth. He shows that instead of consulting prominent scholars in the field, NASM relied on an unqualified in-house staff that had ideological axes to grind.

5. That the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, a postwar study based largely on interviews with surviving Japanese officials, showed that Japan was on the verge of surrender and would have done so by 1 November 1945 “even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.”

Criticizing Truman on the basis of information unavailable to him when the bombs were dropped is intellectually untenable, of course, but there is more. Gian P. Gentile and Robert P. Newman make clear that the survey was “cooked” by Paul Nitze to fit predictions he had made earlier that conventional bombing alone would have caused Japan to surrender before 1 November.

Hiroshima in History reveals that although revisionists differ among themselves on particulars, the overall thrust of their work does a disservice to the historical record.

[brraverishhh]

Actually the real reasons were multiple, from my understanding. The main reason was to end the war as soon as possible.

[Slonopotam845]

It just too sad that the bomb was not dropped on some German city.

[Ifroham4]

Some Japanese complained that it was not pure coincidence, but a racist motivated decision...

US and Bomber Command obliterated almost every German city with casualties bigger then those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.


Regardless of the truth, during the war many US leaders showed admiration and appreciation for Germany and the Germans. After the war ended a high number of Nazi officers found sanctuary in the US. General Patton for example had much admiration for Germans, and he was not alone. Americans did not share a similar feeling for the Japanese.

I am not sure who had admiration of whom exactly but Germany was leveled.

Back to the original post. As far as I know, there were mixed signals from Japan in the spring and summer of 1945 in regard to ending the war. There was a serious struggle among Japanese leaders. The emperor was inclined to end the war but some military leaders wanted to fight to the end. Remember that by the end of the war, Japan had almost 1 million troops left in China, not counting these from other places. The still had a large pool of manpower. Unlike what is commonly thought the nuclear bombings did not end the war. Tokyo for example, suffered more casualties and destruction from fire bombings then Hiroshima. Even in the last night some mad officers tried to take the emperor hostage and cancel his radio transmission. They failed, but if they were successful, the war could have lasted much longer.

Heroshima/Nagasaki and Soviet destruction of the million-strong Kwantung army really spelled the end for the Japanese.

[Ifroham4]

Posted by Andak01:

Even if you could back this up, which I don't think you can, casualties from conventional bombs occur immediately or within a few days.

At Dresden, for example, 25,000 - 40,000 were killed within a night most during the bombing itself. Quite a few died after-words from the various type of wounds.


Nuclear bombs can cause cancer deaths and birth defects for years.

So can conventional bombing from all the asbestos, dust and the rest.


I think what you are trying to say is, conventional bombing casualties in places like Tokyo or Dresden exceeded those from Hiroshima or Nagasaki. There weren't even enough people present in most German cities to account for one or two hundred thousand people.

? Dresden at the time of bombing had over a million people. Berlin, Munich, Dusseldorf... In fact every major German city was bombed.


I don't know how you quantify level, but a comparison shows more level after nukes than conventional warheads. Buildings were heavily damaged in one case and vaporized in the other.

For example over 70% of Dresden was levelled.


It's no secret that the Japs were on their way to the end well before the nukes.

It's no secret to whom exactly? You?

My uncle was a medic in the Pacific and he is convinced that his life was saved by nukes.

My wife's grand-dad fought the Japanese in China in the summer of 1945.

[brraverishhh]

Posted by mikebear:

It was carried out by the RAF as revenge for the bombing of London and had zero military value.

It was bombed with the rest of Germany. Dresden was nothing really special.
As to Dresden's military value - it was a very reasonable strategic target provided the size, industry, location to the front.... I can go on and on about it.

[LottiFurmann]

Posted by mikebar:

In most cases, heavy bombings of cities and other civilian targets are a sign of weakness and despair.

Not really. On the contrary it's very effective way of getting to the enemy. The allies bombed German cities till the very end.


When one side cannot win the war, or don't know how to accelerate their war efforts, they start bombing cities, hoping to destroy enemy's morale.


Actually, no.


In reality it works to the contrary and the enemy (those who survive) becomes more stubborn and determined.


It also destroys factories, communication points, administrative centers, decreases enemy population, morale..... there are a tons of benefits.



Hitler bombed London only after failing to defeat the RAF and invade Britain.


Not really. In fact the entire BOB was about bombing England.


The military value to the Nazis was negligible in comparison to their invested effort.


It's because they did not cause much damage and did not have the economic capacity of US and England to build heavy bombers.

I could bring more recent examples, but in general wars are not won because of the heavy bombings of cities, regardless of what one thinks about the value of enemy lives.

Of course it doesn't but it contributes and contributes well.