[Cyzkrahu]

By MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
Published: March 13, 2010

Op-Ed Contributor - Today’s Russia - Perestroika Lost - NYTimes.com

[spacecrafty]

Well, it was a mighty task, for many reasons (geography, a less than “dynamic” society, a culture deep set in corruption) and it looks like it didn’t work out.

I’d imagine in the next fifteen years Russia will do more than it’s share of saber rattling in both the Caucuses (look out Georgia) and the Baltic region, where it’ll be joined by Ukraine and Belarus against the Baltic States and Poland.

However, in the end, due to demographics, a blind eye to technology, and an economy geared towards resource extraction, I’d bet on Russia breaking up into many smaller states.

[Zarekylin75]

By MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
Published: March 13, 2010

Op-Ed Contributor - Today’s Russia - Perestroika Lost - NYTimes.com

That was an extremely interesting column, mostly for what Gorbachev said (and didn't say) about himself. It's interesting to hear him admit and reflect on the degree to which he didn't understand the full implications of what he was doing in the Mid-80s. And yet, the column showed that he still doesn't fully understand what happened. He appears to have believed that he could have finessed the many difficult problems that Perestroika opened up. He certainly wasn't alone in that - I don't know of anyone East or West who accurately predicted the astonishing way things turned out in 1991. But I think it is quite evident in retrospect that the Soviet system was doomed in one way or another and that the process was only accelerated the moment Gobachev began to unclench Stalin's fist. It's clear, however, that he still thinks he could have maintained the Union in some form if he had acted differently, and I am not so sure of that.

[Roorseprate]

I find it interesting that Gobrachev avoids condemnation of the political killings of dissidents and journalists and the repression of free speech in the country.

Nothing is more of a harbinger of totalitarianism than those killings. Putin even went so far as to contaminate entire hotels and airports in order to kill a dissident. What's going on there is scary.

[Twelearly]

That was an extremely interesting column, mostly for what Gorbachev said (and didn't say) about himself. It's interesting to hear him admit and reflect on the degree to which he didn't understand the full implications of what he was doing in the Mid-80s. And yet, the column showed that he still doesn't fully understand what happened. He appears to have believed that he could have finessed the many difficult problems that Perestroika opened up. He certainly wasn't alone in that - I don't know of anyone East or West who accurately predicted the astonishing way things turned out in 1991. But I think it is quite evident in retrospect that the Soviet system was doomed in one way or another and that the process was only accelerated the moment Gobachev began to unclench Stalin's fist. It's clear, however, that he still thinks he could have maintained the Union in some form if he had acted differently, and I am not so sure of that.

That's just it- he never set about to destroy the SU. He was, through and through, a believer in Communism, and wanted only to reform it. I find it telling that he said "Our main mistake was acting too late to reform the Communist Party." He clearly still feels that all he was attempting to do was reform it.

"Still, the achievements of perestroika are undeniable. It was the breakthrough to freedom and democracy. Opinion polls today confirm that even those who criticize perestroika and its leaders appreciate the gains it allowed: the rejection of the totalitarian system; freedom of speech, assembly, religion and movement; and political and economic pluralism."

...that statement blows me away. He is clearly out of touch with what is going on in Russia, and with the Russian people. People there LOVE Putin. I was there for a month studying in the summer of 2007, and every time Putin came on TV, my host mother gushed at how great he was, how he "kissed babies like American politicians" (I'll never forget THAT image), and she seemed to buy into the idea that the country was better now than during Communism. As he said in the article: "Decisive, tough measures and even elements of authoritarianism may be needed at such times." and people there believe that.

They are still totalitarian; freedom of speech is ok if you are in one of the officially-sanctioned youth organizations; virulent nationalism is sweeping the country again.

When we started our course, we had a meeting about safety and whatnot before classes began. The head of the program looked around the room and told everyone that they'd be ok, except for maybe me because I "looked Chechen, or maybe Afghan." Sure enough, I got dirty looks, extra stares from "cops" (they are basically military that travel 3 to a car and don't hesitate to break out the batons), and had one man start screaming at me on the street to go back to Afghanistan.

Russia is not as nice of a place as Gorby likes to thing it is.

[Zarekylin75]

That's just it- he never set about to destroy the SU. He was, through and through, a believer in Communism, and wanted only to reform it. I find it telling that he said "Our main mistake was acting too late to reform the Communist Party." He clearly still feels that all he was attempting to do was reform it.

Yes, precisely. It was quite interesting to hear him reflect on that. It was a curious mix of honest and self-reflection with what appears in retrospect to be a delusion.

[Cyzkrahu]

Frankly, I found Gorby's remarks honest and historically accurate. When we look back at history we see it following a line to an inevitable point were we are now. However, the circumstances that exist presently are fluid in-as-much as we don’t know what the Stock Markets are going to do tomorrow, where a bomb might go off, or how the birth of a child in small town in the middle of nowhere will effect our future.

Comrade Gorbachev was in control of the Soviet Union and while Conservatives in the USSR grumbled or were silent there was no reason to believe that Gorbachev’s agenda would not be the law of the land. At the time a military coup could be speculated but the question would be could a military coup be successful that is what coup planners would have had to look at hard. That there are two kinds of coup the successful and the unsuccessful, and I think most people would have betted on an unsuccessful coup and therefore an actual coup was unlikely. However, people don't necessarily act rationally and this is one of the fluid aspects of history.

Could perestoiska have continued and could Michal have stayed in power. Frankly, I think so. Without the coup and IF Comrade Michal have found a way for the USSR to walk a line between reform and maintaining itself as a world power (which is possible since the world was changing at the same time) he could have stayed in power. While one can say that Communism had to fall and that was inevitable the weakest Communist government continues in Cuba and the strongest Communist government continues in China. In 1991 if you had said that in the 21st century the US would be borrowing money from Communist China you would probably be rotting in a mental institution today.

The main point that history turned on regarding peretroiska was the personality of Boris Yeltsin over that of Gorby. I have a feeling that Yeltsin was the friend that everybody wanted, and Gorby wasn’t as charming. Call it a matter of charisma. Gorby had charisma but in 1991 Yeltsin had more. He openly defied the coup plotters and I think the people saw the next person that should lead the country.

[Zarekylin75]

Frankly, I found Gorby's remarks honest and historically accurate. When we look back at history we see it following a line to an inevitable point were we are now. However, the circumstances that exist presently are fluid in-as-much as we don’t know what the Stock Markets are going to do tomorrow, where a bomb might go off, or how the birth of a child in small town in the middle of nowhere will effect our future.

Comrade Gorbachev was in control of the Soviet Union and while Conservatives in the USSR grumbled or were silent there was no reason to believe that Gorbachev’s agenda would not be the law of the land. At the time a military coup could be speculated but the question would be could a military coup be successful that is what coup planners would have had to look at hard. That there are two kinds of coup the successful and the unsuccessful, and I think most people would have betted on an unsuccessful coup and therefore an actual coup was unlikely. However, people don't necessarily act rationally and this is one of the fluid aspects of history.

Could perestoiska have continued and could Michal have stayed in power. Frankly, I think so. Without the coup and IF Comrade Michal have found a way for the USSR to walk a line between reform and maintaining itself as a world power (which is possible since the world was changing at the same time) he could have stayed in power. While one can say that Communism had to fall and that was inevitable the weakest Communist government continues in Cuba and the strongest Communist government continues in China. In 1991 if you had said that in the 21st century the US would be borrowing money from Communist China you would probably be rotting in a mental institution today.

The main point that history turned on regarding peretroiska was the personality of Boris Yeltsin over that of Gorby. I have a feeling that Yeltsin was the friend that everybody wanted, and Gorby wasn’t as charming. Call it a matter of charisma. Gorby had charisma but in 1991 Yeltsin had more. He openly defied the coup plotters and I think the people saw the next person that should lead the country.

The Soviet Union had a major structural problem, though as you rightly point out it was far from obvious at the time what would happen. And that problem was the Republic system, which provided a supremely easy way for the constituent republics to simply walk away. The Soviet constitution even offered them a painless legal way out. As long as Stalin's dead hand was still in place, of course, no republic would have dared walk away. But as soon as that hand started to loosen, and Gorbachev made it obvious with his treatment of the satellite states of Eastern Europe that the Army was not coming out to maintain the old order, it was only a matter of time until one or several of the more anti-Russian republics, say in the Caucuses or the Baltics, tried to force the issue.

Frankly, it was obvious in retrospect that even the Russians themselves were not deeply committed to the Union - the Russian Republic bolted at the first chance. Had the Russians themselves been more wedded to the Soviet Union, it might have survived in some form, but Yeltsin found it relatively easy to lead them out.

I quite agree that Gorbachev could conceivably stayed in power over an entity called the Soviet Union for some time longer without the August coup attempt. But I think his vision of saving the system by reforming it is unrealistic and it is colored by the example of the Chinese. But the Chinese are at once more brutal and more pragmatic, more willing to use the army, and they do not have an institutionalized Republic system with relatively well developed local governing institutions, which made it far more practical for the old Soviet republics to simply melt away overnight, as they did in 1991. Any ethnic minority in China that wants to go its own way is going to have to simultaneously fight its way through the army and create a local independent government from scratch. But I think Gorbachev is looking longingly at the Chinese example and thinking it could have been him.

[Cyzkrahu]

I think you are correct in your comparison of the USSR and China.

We in the US often see independence as the natural progression for some countries. However, while it would have been difficult or impossible for a republic to break away from the USSR in an earlier time, given the circumstances of 1991 and the existence of the USSR even if they could republics might not want to have broken away. The fear of some of them could have been how would they maintain their independence from neighboring countries other than the USSR. Also, the US would have wanted Kazakstan and the Ukraine to stay within the USSR because of their nuclear missiles.

Also, while we generally believe independence is progress that was not the case in the former USSR. Most of the former Soviet Republics became dictatorships that adored Stalin. The USSR was a lesser danger to the US and world peace than the independent Soviet Republics.

The structure of the USSR had it's faults but it's fall was not the sure thing that people now see so clearly. The Russian Empire/USSR had stood for hundreds of years and if Iran had been more powerful some republics might not have wanted to break away. If China hadn't had the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and was in a stronger position in terms of foreign affairs, it could have been different for the USSR regardless of it's faults.

The Soviet Union had a major structural problem, though as you rightly point out it was far from obvious at the time what would happen. And that problem was the Republic system, which provided a supremely easy way for the constituent republics to simply walk away. The Soviet constitution even offered them a painless legal way out. As long as Stalin's dead hand was still in place, of course, no republic would have dared walk away. But as soon as that hand started to loosen, and Gorbachev made it obvious with his treatment of the satellite states of Eastern Europe that the Army was not coming out to maintain the old order, it was only a matter of time until one or several of the more anti-Russian republics, say in the Caucuses or the Baltics, tried to force the issue.

Frankly, it was obvious in retrospect that even the Russians themselves were not deeply committed to the Union - the Russian Republic bolted at the first chance. Had the Russians themselves been more wedded to the Soviet Union, it might have survived in some form, but Yeltsin found it relatively easy to lead them out.

I quite agree that Gorbachev could conceivably stayed in power over an entity called the Soviet Union for some time longer without the August coup attempt. But I think his vision of saving the system by reforming it is unrealistic and it is colored by the example of the Chinese. But the Chinese are at once more brutal and more pragmatic, more willing to use the army, and they do not have an institutionalized Republic system with relatively well developed local governing institutions, which made it far more practical for the old Soviet republics to simply melt away overnight, as they did in 1991. Any ethnic minority in China that wants to go its own way is going to have to simultaneously fight its way through the army and create a local independent government from scratch. But I think Gorbachev is looking longingly at the Chinese example and thinking it could have been him.

[Zarekylin75]

I think you are correct in your comparison of the USSR and China.

We in the US often see independence as the natural progression for some countries. However, while it would have been difficult or impossible for a republic to break away from the USSR in an earlier time, given the circumstances of 1991 and the existence of the USSR even if they could republics might not want to have broken away. The fear of some of them could have been how would they maintain their independence from neighboring countries other than the USSR. Also, the US would have wanted Kazakstan and the Ukraine to stay within the USSR because of their nuclear missiles.

Also, while we generally believe independence is progress that was not the case in the former USSR. Most of the former Soviet Republics became dictatorships that adored Stalin. The USSR was a lesser danger to the US and world peace than the independent Soviet Republics.

The structure of the USSR had it's faults but it's fall was not the sure thing that people now see so clearly. The Russian Empire/USSR had stood for hundreds of years and if Iran had been more powerful some republics might not have wanted to break away. If China hadn't had the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and was in a stronger position in terms of foreign affairs, it could have been different for the USSR regardless of it's faults.

Yes, that's all a reasonable assessment - it was frankly unimaginable that any of the republics could have safely walked away (or might even have wanted to) even as late as the late 1980s. But what I am talking about was the fatal crack in a disintegrating wall. Once it became obvious that the whole thing was falling apart - and this became obvious within a matter of days in the summer of 1991, which is what makes it all so astonishing - the legal fiction of Republican independence, which had been embedded in the Soviet system in 1918 but which had been thoroughly ignored ever since - suddenly became the vehicle that the republics used to head for the exits. Some of them did it for what we in the West would consider proper romantic revolutionary reasons - such as the Baltics and to some extent the Ukraine - while others, like Belorussia and all of the Central Asian Republics, did it for cynical reasons. They were in the hands of neo-Stalinist strongmen who quickly realized that they had a rare opportunity to be the Big Man in a small country instead of having to answer to the former Big Men in Moscow. But the fact is, whatever their motivation, they faced a largely forgotten and impossible to use escape valve that suddenly opened. And they had functioning provincial governments that made it at least marginally practical.

China has learned this lesson and allows relatively little power to local governments (and has made sure the Army shows its teeth once in a while to keep everyone in line). I think Putin has learned this lesson too; it likely isn't an accident that he sharply curtailed the power of regional governors and governments and made them more dependent on Moscow. He wouldn't want anyone trying to take advantage of a future crisis to try to head for the exits of the Russian Federation either.

[Cyzkrahu]

I understand the point you are making about the USSR Constitutional ability to secede and that the coup showed that Gorbachev was weakened politically, but you have to consider Yeltsin in the equation. Frankly, I can't remember every detail of that period so can't say which led to the end of the USSR more Gorbachev's weakness or Yeltsin's charisma/strength. I have the feeling that Yeltsin was more of a Russian nationalist and therefore was more in favor of letting the other Republics leave the house.

However, as much as there was a Constitutional tool for secession the foreign politics were in a state that allowed the Republics to stay independent. If the foreign politics and if world affairs had be different some of the Republics might have stayed. I think this is especially true of the central asian republics and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. For example if Iran had tried to imply that they might want to join their Azeri state with the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan independence might not have been the future for that Republic, and it could have effected the Republics around it as well.

I also seem to remember Belorussia wanted to stay with the USSR initially.

Yes, that's all a reasonable assessment - it was frankly unimaginable that any of the republics could have safely walked away (or might even have wanted to) even as late as the late 1980s. But what I am talking about was the fatal crack in a disintegrating wall. Once it became obvious that the whole thing was falling apart - and this became obvious within a matter of days in the summer of 1991, which is what makes it all so astonishing - the legal fiction of Republican independence, which had been embedded in the Soviet system in 1918 but which had been thoroughly ignored ever since - suddenly became the vehicle that the republics used to head for the exits. Some of them did it for what we in the West would consider proper romantic revolutionary reasons - such as the Baltics and to some extent the Ukraine - while others, like Belorussia and all of the Central Asian Republics, did it for cynical reasons. They were in the hands of neo-Stalinist strongmen who quickly realized that they had a rare opportunity to be the Big Man in a small country instead of having to answer to the former Big Men in Moscow. But the fact is, whatever their motivation, they faced a largely forgotten and impossible to use escape valve that suddenly opened. And they had functioning provincial governments that made it at least marginally practical.

China has learned this lesson and allows relatively little power to local governments (and has made sure the Army shows its teeth once in a while to keep everyone in line). I think Putin has learned this lesson too; it likely isn't an accident that he sharply curtailed the power of regional governors and governments and made them more dependent on Moscow. He wouldn't want anyone trying to take advantage of a future crisis to try to head for the exits of the Russian Federation either.

[Gasfghj]

Yes, that's all a reasonable assessment - it was frankly unimaginable that any of the republics could have safely walked away (or might even have wanted to) even as late as the late 1980s.

The Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians might disagree with that.

I wouldn't put much importance on the language of the Soviet Constitution. It was, for the most part, an irrelevant piece of propaganda. Regardless of its language, no Soviet subject believed it protected anyone's rights or created any kind of equality among the ethnicities that made up the USSR. The glue that held the Soviet Union together was the threat of coercive force, not the useless Soviet constitution.

For that reason, the moment the Kremlin's will to use force was shaken, the Soviet Union vaporized. Soviet Central Asia left for the reasons cited. The Baltics left because of the betrayal they felt from their incorporation into the USSR. The Caucasian republics left because a weak Kremlin couldn't play its role as regional hegemon.

[Zarekylin75]

The question is more than constitutional - it was practical as well. There were existing, functioning governments within the republics. The Soviets in Moscow had always considered them harmless puppets, and until the late 1980s, they were. But when the crunch came, they made it more practical for the Republican leaders to walk away. Putin clearly understands this now.

I understand the point you are making about the USSR Constitutional ability to secede and that the coup showed that Gorbachev was weakened politically, but you have to consider Yeltsin in the equation. Frankly, I can't remember every detail of that period so can't say which led to the end of the USSR more Gorbachev's weakness or Yeltsin's charisma/strength. I have the feeling that Yeltsin was more of a Russian nationalist and therefore was more in favor of letting the other Republics leave the house.

However, as much as there was a Constitutional tool for secession the foreign politics were in a state that allowed the Republics to stay independent. If the foreign politics and if world affairs had be different some of the Republics might have stayed. I think this is especially true of the central asian republics and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. For example if Iran had tried to imply that they might want to join their Azeri state with the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan independence might not have been the future for that Republic, and it could have effected the Republics around it as well.

I also seem to remember Belorussia wanted to stay with the USSR initially.