[BILBONDER]

Nanavira Thera writes the following:

"1. The traditional interpretation of paticcasamuppāda (of its usual twelve-factored formulation, that is to say) apparently has its roots in the Patisambhidāmagga , or perhaps in the Abhidhammapitaka. This interpretation is fully expounded in the Visuddhimagga . It can be briefly summarized thus: avijjā and sankhārā are kamma in the previous existence, and their vipāka is viññāna, nāmarūpa, salāyatana, phassa, and vedanā, in the present existence; tanhā, upādāna, and bhava, are kamma in the present existence, and their vipāka is jāti and jarāmarana in the subsequent existence.

"2. This Note will take for granted first, that the reader is acquainted with this traditional interpretation, and secondly, that he is dissatisfied with it. It is not therefore proposed to enter into a detailed discussion of this interpretation, but rather to indicate briefly that dissatisfaction with it is not unjustified, and then to outline what may perhaps be found to be a more satisfactory approach."

A thoroughgoing (and perhaps controversial) analysis thus ensues, which I highly recommend.

[Loovikeillilen]

Thanks very much for the link Sobeh, I'd seen this before somewhere but hadn't had time to read it.

[PharmACT]

perhaps controversial

Is this false speech?

Nanavira has adhered to the Pali, as I did in the other thread.

What I posted no-one taught me, just as no-one taught Nanavira.

The sankhara in the Pali are the kaya, vaci & citta sankhara.

This is plainly obvious rather than controversial.

[tabcdyop]

Visuddhimagga

[mrllxp]

from post #3

Element, the following quote is from the Intro itself:

"It cannot be expected that this material, which poses a clear challenge to the mainstream version of Buddhism, will gain any great popularity..."

The editors of the site said it posed a clear challenge, and I said "perhaps controversial" to reflect this. False speech? Wow, settle down, friend.

[AnypecekceS]

mainstream version of Buddhism

Upon a heap of rubbish in the road-side ditch blooms a lotus, fragrant and pleasing.

Even so, on the rubbish heap of blinded mortals the disciple of the Supremely Enlightened One shines resplendent in wisdom.

Just as one upon the summit of a mountain beholds the groundlings, even so when the wise man casts away heedlessness by heedfulness and ascends the high tower of wisdom, this sorrowless sage beholds the sorrowing and foolish multitude.

Dhammapada

[adultcheee]

Nanavira has adhered [faithfully] to the Pali, as I did in the other thread.

Katame ca, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā? Tayome, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā – kāyasaṅkhāro, vacīsaṅkhāro, cittasaṅkhāro. Ime vuccanti, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā.

sn 12.2

[pissmanvd]

(3) "In four ways, young householder, should one who gives good counsel be understood as a warm-hearted friend:

(i) he restrains one from doing evil,
(ii) he encourages one to do good,
(iii) he informs one of what is unknown to oneself,
(iv) he points out the path to heaven.

"The ascetics and brahmans thus ministered to as the Zenith by a householder show their compassion towards him in six ways:

(i) they restrain him from evil,
(ii) they persuade him to do good,
(iii) they love him with a kind heart,
(iv) they make him hear what he has not heard,
(v) they clarify what he has already heard,
(vi) they point out the path to a heavenly state.

Sigalovada Sutta

[illignocearia]

from post #6,7, 8

All I did was paraphrase the Intro after quoting sections 1 and 2 of the link - I haven't expressed any opinion on any particulars. What, exactly, are you commenting on?

[ErubTiereedig]

What, exactly, are you commenting on?

If Nanavira labelled it "contraversial", this pertained to that society.

It was contraversial in a traditional superstitious Buddhist society such as Sri Lanka.

But we are not traditional Sri Lankans.

We are educated people living in another time and are evaluating the Buddha's teachings in the manner the Buddha exhorted.

[EspanaCamsInfo]

If only post #10 had been post #3...

[dalnecymync]

So what similarities and differences are there between Bhikkhu Buddhadasa's analysis of DO and Nanavira Thera's ?

[BlackBird]

I think both the similarities as well as the differences are ably shown through comparing these two excerpts:

Nanavira Thera:

Instead of imass'uppādā idam uppajjati, imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati, 'with arising of this this arises, with cessation of this this ceases', the traditional interpretation says, in effect, imassa nirodhā idam uppajjati, 'with cessation of this, this arises'. It is needless to press this point further: either the reader will already have recognized that this is, for him, a valid objection to the traditional interpretation, or he will not. And if he has not already seen this as an objection, no amount of argument will open his eyes. It is a matter of one's fundamental attitude to one's own existence—is there, or is there not, a present problem or, rather, anxiety that can only be resolved in the present? Buddhadasa Bhikkhu:

As stated in the Pali suttas, there is no gap between any of the states. Therefore, it is not necessary to classify the first two states as belonging to the past, the next ten states to the present, the remaining state to the future, and thereby explain a process of dependent arising as encompassing three lifetimes. If it is explained as encompassing three lifetimes, how can one take advantage of dependent arising and cultivate to end suffering, when the "cause" is in the present life and the "fruit" is in another? The doctrine of dependent origination being taught today encompasses three lifetimes, thus it is not helpful to our cultivation.

[ingeneensueva]

Nanavira uses the term 'determinations' for sankhara and, such as myself, makes reference to MN 44 for the meaning. I use the word 'determinators' or 'conditioners' rather than determinations.

Whereas in English, one will not find much on this by Buddhadasa. He did not discuss the sankhara much in public lectures. He generally only described sankhara in a general way as "the power of concocting".

For me, I disagree here. To me, sankhara are the 'means' of concocting rather than the power. The sankhara are the objects of satipatthana as defined in the Anapanasati Sutta.

Ignorance needs a 'means' to condition the mind, speech & body. It does this via perception & feeling, thought & the breathing.

When can explore this in our meditation. When the breathing is agitated, the body is stressed. When we calm the agitation in the breathing, the body relaxes, consciousness becomes clearer & the mind calms. The agitation in the breathing is ignorance itself.

Ignorance > sankhara > consciousness > body-mind

Certainly, sankhārā may, upon occasion, be cetanā (e.g. Khandha Samy. vi,4 [3]); but this is by no means always so. The Cūlavedallasutta tells us clearly in what sense in-&-out-breaths, thinking-&-pondering, and perception and feeling, are sankhārā (i.e. in that body, speech, and mind [citta], are intimately connected with them, and do not occur without them); and it would do violence to the Sutta to interpret sankhārā here as cetanā.

Notes

[fubyFrery]

The Buddhadasa book on DO available on the internet is a very poor translation & not the complete work.

Even so, the "complete work" was only an introduction to the topic.

In Thai, the whole work is very long & never been translated into English.

[sallythetolly]

Nanaviro on birth & death is as follows:

The fundamental upādāna or 'holding' is attavāda (see Majjhima ii,1 ), which is holding a belief in 'self'. The puthujjana takes what appears to be his 'self' at its face value; and so long as this goes on he continues to be a 'self', at least in his own eyes (and in those of others like him). This is bhava or 'being'. The puthujjana knows that people are born and die; and since he thinks 'my self exists' so he also thinks 'my self was born' and 'my self will die'. The puthujjana sees a 'self' to whom the words birth and death apply.[d] In contrast to the puthujjana, the arahat has altogether got rid of asmimāna (not to speak of attavāda—see MAMA), and does not even think 'I am'. This is bhavanirodha, cessation of being. And since he does not think 'I am' he also does not think 'I was born' or 'I shall die'. In other words, he sees no 'self' or even 'I' for the words birth and death to apply to. This is jātinirodha and jarāmarananirodha. (See, in Kosala Samy. i,3 , how the words birth and death are avoided when the arahat is spoken of.

Notes Here, Nanavira places the emphasis of 'self-view' at attachment where as Buddhadasa places the emphasis on self-view at birth.

Such blind want (tanha) will give birth to attachment (upadana). Attachment arising from blind or ignorant want, then, is ignorant in itself. There is attachment to anything that comes into contact with it, including attachment to this meaning or that meaning of words and attachment to that thing as "mine" and this thing as "I."

Such attachment gives rise to existence (bhava). This is the becoming of something - the illusive "self." The becoming of the "self" arises from attachment. There is attachment to an illusive thing by illusive thought and so we come to have illusive becoming (bhava). At this point there exists the "self," even in the stage of infancy. We call it bhava, or
becoming.

Becoming gives rise to birth (jati). Here the "self" is full bloomed as a "self" that is proper and suitable to its case: to be one "I," one "man," one "self." At this moment here is a self - the thing which is imagined to be the "self" or the "I." Now the illusive "I" takes place in the process of Idappaccayatā.

The "I" thinks, acts and speaks in the way of attachment. Then the "I" begins to act and speak in ignorant ways, such as "this is I" or "this is my possession"; and even "this is my birth, this is my decay, this is my disease and this is my death." All things come to be problems for such a self. This brings problems to the mind, so that the mind suffers and has suffering and disatisfactoriness of all kinds in whatever case. This is Idappaccayatā in the way or process of giving rise to the problem of mental suffering. In reality the suffering happens to the mind, but as we said, it is imagined as happening to the man.

ABCs

[Grennios]

The Buddhadasa book on DO available on the internet is a very poor translation & not the complete work.

Whereas in English, one will not find much on this by Buddhadasa. He did not discuss the sankhara much in public lectures. He generally only described sankhara in a general way as "the power of concocting".

I just obtained a copy of Buddhadasa's book. It has probably been 15 years since I read it.

The translation used of sankhara is mental concocting. The book states:

What is mental concocting? The Buddha said: "Monks, there are these three kinds of mental concocting: bodily formation, verbal formation and mental formation." The sayings of the Buddha in the Pali Scriptures explain sankhara as that which brews up or gives rise to the bodily functions, that which brews up verbal functions and that which brews up mental functions.

But people who study in the dhamma schools don't explain sankhara this way. They are usually taught according to the Visuddhimagga - that the three sankhara are meritorious karma functions (punn-abhisankhara), demeritorious karma functions (apunn-abhisankhara) and imperturbable karma functions (anenj-abhisankhara).

In the Pali Scriptures, the real words of the Buddha explain sankhara as bodily, verbal and mental functions. Mental concocting gives rise to consciousness.
This book was translated from the Thai prior to 1986 by Steve Schmidt. What is interesting is Buddhadasa does not refer to MN 44 like Nanavira does.

Further, the word "formation" is used, as in found in Buddhadasa's older translated works, such as Anapanasati (although in this older work, the term "conditioner" is also found).

But in his more recent translated works, Buddhadasa used the term "conditioner" exclusively (rather than "condition" or formation").

Personally, I find the discussion confusing (which is why I never cared much for this book). How can "mental concocting" be bodily, verbal & mental functions?

However, Buddhadasa's discussion of sankhara in Anapanasati - Unveiling the Secrets of Life, which was spoken to Western students, is perfectly clear & excellent.

[hHwJ229h]

I'm reviving this thread again to see if anyone would like to say anything further about the different interpretations of DO.

[Farson]

I find Buddhadasa's point of view appealing, but I have some difficulties wrapping my head around it. What is more, from reading his text I am left with the impression that he has developed a pronounced distaste for Buddhaghosa's interpretation, as he keeps bashing it on almost every page of the book. He writes like a philosopher who tries to out-argue another philosopher's views. I find this unnecessary, because the two interpretations complement rather than contradict each other.

To my ears, the translation of the samuppada as "arising motion" is still quite removed from "occurring simultaneously", but I won't argue this any further since I lack knowledge of the Pali language. It appears that drawing an argument on account of this in favour of co-temporality of the arising of all nidanas is a bit of a stretch and I haven't yet come across any sutta that spells this out. Likewise, arguing that dependent origination cannot arise prenatally seems a bit of a stretch, since what we know about the developing baby in the uterus suggests otherwise, but I will leave it at that because these points are just incidental to the main argument.

The principal difficulty for the momentary interpretation of dependent origination is to explain how the the nidanas no. 1, 3, 4 and 5 arise momentarily, that is ignorance (avijja), consciousness (vinnana), name-and-form (namarupa, psychophysicality), and the six sense gates (salayatana). I have no problems with a metaphorical understanding of the nidanas 10-13, namely becoming (bhava), birth (jati), and decay and death (jaramarana), as they can relate to the metaphorical birth and death of any phenomenon that we fancy conceptualising. I have also no problems with the other nidanas 2 and 6-9, namely mental formations (sankhara), contact (phassa), feeling (vedana), craving (tanha), and attachment (updana), because these can obviously arise spontaneously, although it could be argued that sankhara, tanha, and upadana tend to become persistent features of the mind that survive and exceed the moments of dukkha experiences.

Perhaps it is useful to come back to the ball game example that you introduced. If you throw or hit a ball against the wall -say you have a tennis racket- it comes back and cycles between you and the wall until you end the game and walk away. If one attempts to analyse this in the style of dependent origination, one can point out a number of supporting conditions for this game, such as the wall, the racket, the swing of the racket, contact of the ball with the surfaces, gravity, elastic properties, mechanical forces, and so on.

Obviously, some of the features of the ball game arise momentarily and are repeated over and over, such as contact of the ball with the wall, contact with the racket, the swing of the racket, and the mechanical forces acting on the ball. Other features, such as the wall, the floor, and the racket are of a more permanent nature. They do not arise spontaneously, but they stay in place between individual cycles of the ball game. Now, the outrageous claim in Buddhadasa's interpretation is that all conditions are of momentary nature and he makes no distinction between spontaneous and more permanent ones. He states that all twelve nidanas arise in a moment of dukkha. This is a bit like claiming that the wall comes into existence momentarily as the ball makes contact with it, or that the racket comes into existence only when it plays the ball. Just not very intuitive...

Cheers, Putthujano

[JessiPollo]

I find Buddhadasa's point of view appealing, but I have some difficulties wrapping my head around it. What is more, from reading his text I am left with the impression that he has developed a pronounced distaste for Buddhaghosa's interpretation, as he keeps bashing it on almost every page of the book. He writes like a philosopher who tries to out-argue another philosopher's views. I find this unnecessary, because the two interpretations complement rather than contradict each other.

Such an appraisal is unnecessary. Indeed, the man is having "difficulties". Buddhadasa is merely describing mental phenomena. But the man cannot see the mental phenomena occuring within his mind.