[EmpokemyMok]

Ben - That would be the argument to convince one to stay in support of the mission.

I'm asking about those on the right that don't support the mission. How can this be explained since their opposition is clearly not politically motivated.

[Caunnysup]

I'm not sure I understand your point but that is okay. I think I am misunderstanding you. Are you asking me about people on the right that already consider Iraq a defeat no matter what, or people on the right who disagree with the premise of the war?

You (perhaps your nation?) have deginerated this debate into a left vs right issue which IMHO it should not be. The left right divide was only brought up in regards to US politics, and specifically the fact that important politicians on the left have publicly declared Iraq a loss no matter what.

The realities of a withdrawal/surge/defeat/victory were not married to those statements.

[Annevecenqp]

What were we talking about?

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Iraq.html?hp

Iraq's largest Sunni Arab political bloc announced its withdrawal from the government Wednesday, undermining efforts to seek reconciliation among the country's rival factions, and two bombing attacks in Baghdad killed at least 67 people.

[DadaSeeva]

Patroklos - Just b/c one disagrees with the war does not make them part of the "left". By wording your posts the way you do that label is being applied to all. One can be "right wing" and against the war. Rather than "the left" maybe you should use "opponents of the war" or "anti-war" or some such. It would make the debate so much less political (which would help).

[Tibaveriafark]

Originally posted by Patroklos
Agreed, or at the very least use Democrats vice "left."

I'll get to the meat of your post in a bit, just got busy here If you wish.

I think we know each others positions at this point.

I only have so much time left today to procrastinate myself.

[S.T.D.]

Originally posted by Straybow
You won't find political leaders taking that position. Agreed. It is in their "political" interests to polarize this debate. Sadly, it is not in the nation's interest.

[esconsise]

I suspect what the US needs to do is to address what its interests are in the middle east generally.

There seem to be two long standing and strong policy strands. The first is a desire for stability in the world's premier oil producing area. The second is to provide support to Israil.

The second object would seem to be achievable simply by continuing economic and military support and does not really require interference in the internal politics of any of the arab countries.

So maybe that has nothing to do with Iraq.

The first seems to me to be wishful thinking. The middle east is unstable now, has been unstable for a long time and it is really hard to imagine what anyone other than the people who live there can possibly do to make it more stable.

Toppling Sadaam Husein has certainly not had that effect.

So I rather think that the US might try just letting its president off any responsibility for keeping oil prices low. That might encourage presidents to cut the arab countries some slack - starting with a withdrawal from Iraq.

Finding things to do which cut down the national dependance upon the motor car and air conditioning might also help.

[KatoabamyHant]

Interesting rebuttal/dismissal of O'Hanlon and Pollack, by someone in uniform and with Iraq experience.

Irrelevant Exuberance
Why the latest good news from Iraq doesn't matter.
By Phillip Carter
Updated Wednesday, Aug. 1, 2007, at 3:02 PM ET

In 1975, Army Col. Harry Summers went to Hanoi as chief of the U.S. delegation's negotiation team for the four-party military talks that followed the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. While there, he spent some time chatting with his North Vietnamese counterpart, Col. Tu, an old soldier who had fought against the United States and lived to tell his tale. With a tinge of bitterness about the war's outcome, Summers told Tu, "You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield." Tu replied, in a phrase that perfectly captured the American misunderstanding of the Vietnam War, "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant."

Today, in Iraq, we face a similar conundrum. Our vaunted military has won every battle against insurgents and militias—from the march up to the "thunder runs" that took Baghdad; the assaults on Fallujah to the battles for Sadr City. And yet we still find ourselves stuck in the sands of Mesopotamia. In a New York Times op-ed published Monday, Brookings Institution scholars Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack argue that "[w]e are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms." They go on to describe the myriad ways the surge is succeeding on the security front. But in emphasizing this aspect of current operations, they downplay the more critical questions relating to political progress and the ability of Iraq's national government to actually govern. Security is not an end in itself. It is just one component, albeit an important one, of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Unless it is paired with a successful political strategy that consolidates military gains and translates increased security into support from the Iraqi people, these security improvements will, over time, be irrelevant.

O'Hanlon and Pollack report progress from several diverse Iraqi cities, including Sunni-dominated Ramadi, Arab-Kurdish-Turkman Tal Afar and Mosul, and Shiite-Sunni Baghdad. Curiously, the scholars' dispatch ignores Baqubah, Samarra, Kirkuk, and the areas south of Baghdad—places with the highest sectarian tensions, worst fighting, and least progress.

The short, selective itinerary raises questions about who planned the trip, whom O'Hanlon and Pollack were able to talk with, and what they actually saw—as opposed to what they were briefed on during visits to U.S. bases. At best, these two men saw enough of Iraq to get a glimpse of reality there. At worst, they saw a Potemkin Village of success stories, not unlike the picture shown to visiting congressional delegations, that left them with a false vision of progress.

Truth is elusive in Iraq; it always remains just out of focus. In Iraq you can find evidence on the ground to support just about any conclusion you choose; most visitors arrive, see what they want to see, and go home believing even more strongly in the positions they held before they landed in Iraq. It takes months—perhaps even years—to gain the depth and perspective on Iraq necessary to develop a reasonably objective and balanced understanding of events there. Neither O'Hanlon and Pollack nor conservative scholars like Fred Kagan, the intellectual architect of the current surge, spend nearly enough time in Iraq to understand its shifting, uncertain realities.

To be fair, O'Hanlon and Pollack do raise a few red flags to caveat their optimistic analysis. The duo finds "huge hurdles on the political front," so large that they may cause the country to splinter when U.S. forces begin to downsize. They point to the uneven readiness of the Iraqi army and the dismal state of the Iraqi police as evidence that the Iraqi government will not soon be able to secure the country. Simmering sectarian tensions appear throughout their narrative, exemplified by the Sunni residents of Baghdad who fear the nearby police checkpoint, because it is manned by Shiite members of the Iraqi police who reportedly abuse them every time they pass. Where they found "fully staffed" provincial reconstruction teams from the State Department, O'Hanlon and Pollack praise their ability to work with local governments and businessmen to rebuild the country, but the two scholars say nothing about the less-than-fully staffed teams that exist outside Baghdad, nor the understaffed embassy in Baghdad. And the op-ed skirts around the average Iraqi's quality of life, careful not to contradict the voluminous data compiled and updated twice weekly by Brookings—including statistics on fuel, water, electricity, and unemployment—indicating that the average Iraqi lives a harder life today than four years ago.

O'Hanlon and Pollack admit that "victory" is probably no longer attainable—only some "sustainable stability" that might allow Iraq to keep itself together when U.S. forces eventually depart. But this reveals the fatal flaw in their argument. The lid will remain on the Iraq pot only as long as we are willing to commit to our current troop levels. Reducing troop levels from the current 160,000 to 60,000 or 80,000, and/or transitioning to an "adviser model," will allow the situation to deteriorate out of control, as it did in 2005 when U.S. forces drew down and pulled back from most Iraqi cities. Withdrawing immediately will cause the Maliki government to collapse and the region to descend into a hellish ethno-sectarian war atop some of the world's largest oil fields.

Adm. Michael Mullen, the nominee for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate armed services committee yesterday that the surge will end in April 2008, when current troop levels become unsustainable. When that occurs, and assuming Iraqi forces do not become fully capable of filling the vacuum left by departing U.S. troops, Gen. David Petraeus will be forced to tailor his operations to fit the forces he has. With too few troops, Petraeus will have to economize, perhaps reverting to the "key cities" strategy pursued in 2006 plus some kind of robust advisory presence in Iraqi army and police units. This model failed once before, allowing sectarian militias, criminals, and insurgents to roam with near freedom, and it will likely fail now, too.

So, what are we to do? Sadly, as professor Andrew Bacevich writes in this week's New Republic (subscription required), we may be past the point where good deeds can save Iraq:

[T]his much is certain: The moment when Americans might have persuaded Iraqis to embrace them as liberators has long since passed. We have failed to make good on too many promises. In our heavy-handed efforts to root out insurgents, we have too frequently mistaken the innocent for the guilty. However inadvertently, we have killed and maimed too many civilians. Sadly, in places like Abu Ghraib and Haditha, we have committed too many crimes. We have just plain screwed up too many times.

If it is true that victory, or anything close to it, lies beyond our reach, we can no longer justify the cost of persevering in Iraq. It is time to begin the long march home.

Phillip Carter, an Iraq veteran, is an attorney with McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP and a principal of the Truman National Security Project. http://www.slate.com/id/2171510/

[Kotyara]

Originally posted by Arrian

The common allegation that those who are critical WANT defeat is really disgusting. Paranoid delusion, perhaps? It is however true of some people, namely me. But while my opinion might be somewhat represented outside the USA, I doubt that many American commentators would support it.

There's nothing irrational about wanting the Iraqis to win, if it serves a perceived greater good. The greater good in this case being to weaken the US and make it more difficult for the US to intervene in the affairs of other states (a process that has historically done more harm than good).

Not everyone believes that the US is a force for good in the world. In fact I can't think of many governments that could so be described. Certainly not the corrupt British government, and my own nation is too weak to be a "force" at anything other than international rugby.

Despite all the irrational hoo hah that is talked about them, Islamic extremists are relatively harmless and will remain so for the foreseeable future (although they would like not to be).

[esenesesinas]

Originally posted by Kataphraktoi
Because phillip carter is in iraq 24\7? No, but (1) he's spent more time there than O'Hanlon and Pollack, and has actually done so as a serving member of the military rather than a gadfly, and (2) his argument is based on the logical implications of O'Hanlon and Pollack's own argument, when placed against other assertions like those of the likely chairman of the JC.

[oxinsnepe]

For a long time a country which invaded and conquered another would do so intending to annex the territory - integrating the land with its own if a neighbour, creating a colony if far away.

In its short history the US has not really had time for this sort of thing and hasn't generally liked the idea. In the modern world it also seems rather old hat.

So an imposed peace in Iraq with a civil service and governance provided by the colonial power does not seem to be an option anyone considers.

Nor do I hear anyone proposing that a replacement Sadaam Husein be found to restore order in the way a dictator does - by suppressing all oposition.

Instead the idea seems to be that winning constitutes somehow facilitating a way for Iraqis to return to everyday life with functioning shops, offices, factories, courts, civil service, police etc. etc. with some benign form of government functioning. And then US troops come home.

I suppose the difference between someone who takes an optimistic view and a pessimist on this is that the optimist can imagine everything in Iraq starting to work again with a bit of assistance in money and military aid and so on whereas the pessimist thinks that even a whole lot of help with money and military aid and so on will just not get everything working that has to work.

What I imagine everyone could readily agree upon is that progress so far is very slow.

My own pessimism is based on my knowledge of the history of my own country, the UK. Looking at Iraq as it was before the invasion it looks to have reached a point aproximately equivalent to the position in the UK four or five centuries after Christ. It was more important then whether you were Christian or pagan, of Saxon origin or Danish, than whether you were English. Strong leaders could hold territory and impose peace and good governance for a time but succession to their children was hit or miss. Aggressive neighbours were a constant problem.

Now I know how long it took for the UK as it is to-day to evolve from there. It takes a long time for a sense of national identity to be born and to become strong enough to overide tribal or religious loyalties. It took us a very long time to develop politically neutral police forces and armed forces. It was hundreds of years before our judiciary stopped being lions under the throne.

Of course the modern world is different from the world in which the institutions which support my own country's ability to achieve peace and stability grew up. I would be ready to believe that in the modern world the process could be quicker.

But I doubt that hundreds of years can be compressed into periods measured in less than decades.

And plenty of those, at that.

Whether the US has the stomache for such a long haul I don't now. From what is being said - across the full range of the political spectrum - the answer would seem most likely to be that it hasn't.

[deermealec]

assertions like those of the likely chairman of the JC. As I already stated would happen, you guys are misquoting or quoting Mullen out of context.

I dare you to

a.) ready/listen to everything he said.

b.) show your head in this thread once you do, with the hack job you just posted hanging over your head..

Note I did not quote only portionss of the article in the OP but the whole thing, including all the portions that put the seemingly good news as face value as merely a glimmer of hope for future good news.

That’s the sad thing about the criticism of it. It is not really a stellar appraisal of the situation, but even the thought that something other than Armageddon is occurring over there gets the usual panties in a twist.

In this case Wezil, given the source of the spin, the left

[Wahwlsnt]

How do you see the situation in Iraq playing out, Patroklos?

[hojutok]

How do you see the situation in Iraq playing out, Patroklos? I see about another two years of training the Iraqi police and army, with phased turnover of territory as is happening now. Eventually both of those forces will reach a critical mass. And that doesn’t mean a pull out in two years. I see another year or two of us sitting in our FOBs and other bases to continue training major training and be the big brother down the hall. After that reduce our presence to only advisors/low order training functions.

This has always been my benchmark for success, the rest will follow. Disbanding the Iraqi Army was the worst mistake made in this war, and the one from which most of the other problems can be traced to.

In any case if the various ethnic groups are going to ever got along, they need to start doing it on the security front first. How can you expect them to solve the bigger political problems without getting along on such basic things as security? A functioning Army/police force will do this, because as we seen the only area where the different ethnicities seem to be able to put their differences aside is in those organizations.

And don't be fooled by the "lack of progress" constantly thrown out there by the hacks. Why would anyone expect us to be able to build a several hundred thousand man army from scratch, able to operate in one of the most dangerous places in the world, and armed to at least an Eastern Block satellite level in three years is beyond me. If you set impossible goals don't be surprised if they are not met. This goes for both sides over here in the US.

I am not surprised at how long this is taking. I did not expect so much sectarian violence against civilians to be sure, but I expected whatever did materialize to last at least this long. And that is the source of the problem, perception. IMO people these days have no concept of what a realistic timeline for something of this magnitude should be. Just stop and think for a second on the scale of this project.

And as for the political goals, with the exception of oil revenue sharing I think too much emphasis is put on them. For the average Iraqi the constitutional makeup of the government means nothing. What they need is government services. Hell, even in America supposedly major laws/policies rarely have any direct effect on me. Iraqis want a functioning police force, banking system, water/electricity grid, etc. Basically the things that let them have normalcy. How may years did it take us to write our Constitution. Hell, we completely scrapped our system of government once. It took us 11 years.

[encunnibriG]

Originally posted by Patroklos
Ha, my favorite part of the rebuttal besides the Mullen shaddiness.



So it looks like the soldiers opinions it is, and what do most of them say? Fine.

Grunts: "The US needs to stay until we finish the job."

O'Hanlon and Pollack (and Mullen and Carter): "Finishing the job -- i.e., anything like a victory in Iraq -- would require maintaining current troop levels for years to come."

The Pentagon: "The military will be stretched to its breaking point sometime in the next year; we cannot maintain current troop levels in Iraq."

So: Victory (or at least not utter defeat) in Iraq is possible, but only under conditions which the Pentagon itself acknowledges are impossible.

A possible victory predicated on an impossible condition is, by definition, impossible. Do you really not get that?

[spacecrafty]

The war shouldn't have happened in the first place. As I said.
Then they ****ed up the 'peace' in every way imaginable. As I warned.
Now the US is finally waking up to making an effort to do something other than use brute force and firepower with something approaching a decent level of manpower. As I kept saying to do.

Is it too late? Probably.
Do I want them to fail? Not in the slightest.
Do I feel justified in saying "I told you so!"? Most definitely!

[Glanteeignile]

It is charming to imagine a police force and army cohesive and high minded enough to maintain order in the midst of what is otherwise a political vacuum (after US withdrawal).